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ABSTRACT

LEFT ARM OF THE REPUBLIC: THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC
DURING THE CIVIL WAR

JAMES ROBBINS JEWELL

Although the Civil War was fought largely in the East it was a transcontinental war.
Securing the Far West for the Union played an important, though secondary role in the
northern war effort. When most of the Regular Army units were called east, holding the
region and confronting the multiple threats to its security fell to the western volunteers.
Through their efforts, they maintained a general stability in a vast region where both
potential and actualized threats could easily have hampered Union efforts in the main
theatres of war. Therefore, by quelling secessionist schemes and activities and
attempting to maintain peaceful relations between the various tribes and the flood of
whites that continued to flow into the region, the less than 20,000 volunteers protected
the Far West from internal dangers.
Internal responsibilities were only part of the potential hazards lurking along and within
the department’s vast territory. As had been demonstrated during the 1859 Pig War
crisis, relations with the British in far western Canada could easily turn dangerous.
Likewise, once the French imperial designs for Mexico were put into action, department
commanders had to ensure that the United States did not become entangled in that
quagmire, despite the sympathies of most Americans for the Mexican cause. Thus,
despite having been ignored and misunderstood, the Department of the Pacific played an
important role in the larger national scene. Had not the department carried out its
responsibilities successfully, the nature of the Civil War or the development of the Far
West (or both) could have gone differently. To better understand the contributions made
to Union war effort, his study is an examination of the responsibilities faced by the
Union’s most remote military command during the Civil War and how it met those
responsibilities, and in turn how doing so aided the Union cause by protecting the Far
West from the nation’s enemies.
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INTRODUCTION

The Civil War, although fought largely in the East and Trans-Mississippi, was a
transcontinental war. Military service, naturally, differed significantly the farther away
one was from the main theatres of the war. With the exception of a handful of battles in
1861 and 1862 in the deserts of New Mexico and Arizona territories, service in the Far
west did not resemble the regular campaigning that typified the dominant image of the
war. The result of this lack of mammoth battles and hundreds of thousands of deaths is
the false belief that service in the Far West was insignificant and routine. The Pacific
states and slightly populated territories were much like islands, separated by a sea of
wide-open land from the rest of the nation. Those who served their country in this region
were certain to be overshadowed, and, eventually, forgotten. As the San Francisco Alta
California prophetically noted after the war began, “There is but little glory to be won by
serving one’s country on the Plains . . . . No matter how marvelous the achievements it
will not get much play.” 1 Just two years after the war ended, this reality led George
Bowie, former commander of the Fifth California Infantry Regiment to ask, “May not we
claim to have rendered some services that are worthy of public recognition?” 2
It is the object of this dissertation to respond to the colonel’s plea. In doing so it
will become clear that the nearly 20,000 troops who voluntarily served their nation,
sacrificed their energy, sweat, blood, and in some cases, their lives, played an important
1

San Francisco, Alta California, August 11, 1861.

2

George Bowie, “Address,” Society of California Volunteers. (San Francisco: Edward Bosqui
and Company, 1867), 5.

1

role in both the Civil War and the development of the Far West. Through their efforts,
they maintained a general stability in a vast region where potential threats and those that
were actualized could easily have hampered Union efforts in the main theatres of war.
The men and commanders in the Department of the Pacific not only had to quell any
internal unrest that might be planned and initiated by secessionists, whether the aim be to
join the Confederate armies or establishing the Pacific Republic; they also had to
maintain peaceful relations between the various tribes and the flood of whites that
continued to flow into the region. When and if those efforts failed and conflicts between
the two groups arose, they were charged with putting down the Native American
uprisings.
These internal responsibilities were only part of the potential hazards lurking
along and within the department’s vast territory. As had been demonstrated in 1859 and
1860, the generally harmonious relations with the British in far western Canada could
easily turn dangerous. Likewise, after the French began their imperial efforts in Mexico
in earnest, department commanders had to ensure that the United States was not drawn
into the morass. Thus, contrary to those that have ignored and misunderstood the
Department of the Pacific’s role in the larger national scene, the commanders and men,
who served throughout the war years successfully confronted multiple dangers, both
internally and externally, that could easily have altered the nature of the Civil War or the
Far West. When assessing the reality of what the veterans of the Department of the
Pacific accomplished during the war years, Bowie proudly asserted, “In long, tedious,
and weary marches, privations endured, hardships encountered, difficulties overcome,

2

and exposure to the dangers incident to the life of the soldier in our wild regions, few
have equaled us, and none have been our superiors. 3
In part because a solitary veteran’s views cannot be accepted without further
study, and in the larger sense because there is much more to understanding the
Department of the Pacific’s role in the Civil War than studying what the troops endured,
broad questions must be posed and detailed, focused answers determined in order to
understand this complex subject. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of
the role the Department of the Pacific played in the Civil War it must be asked, what
were the dangers facing the department during the war, who were the men who answered
the call to arms, and how did they carry out the various tasks confronting them. For
example, to determine who served in the department it is necessary to ascertain where
these men came from, their age, what their occupations were, and what motivated them to
enlist. In unearthing the answers to such narrower questions, much can be learned about
the state of the Far West both before and during the war years. Thus, by considering the
finer points of the general questions within the context of a dissertation level study, it will
become clear that the Department of the Pacific played a much more important role in the
Civil War than has generally been assumed. Likewise, such a study will demonstrate that
the activities of the Union military during the war years had a significant impact on the
development of the Far West.

Despite the importance of the Department of the Pacific in both the Civil War and
the growth of the Far West during the war, the treatment the subject has received in

3

Ibid.

3

general studies can be characterized in one word, marginalization. This marginalization
has happened at the hands of both Civil War and Western scholars. In reality, even the
word marginalized understates the situation in most works, where the Far West is ignored
by Civil War writers and the war years are passed over by Western scholars.
Considering the two together, the marginalization can be summarized to imply
this: the Civil War years in the Far West were a time and place where little of note
transpired. Such a position, however, is predicated on the notion that the relative calm
that pervaded the vast region during the war meant that little of import, or high drama
occurred. To the contrary, what both Civil War and Western historians have failed to
recognize is that the calm did not occur from a lack of danger, but that it was the result of
a job well done by the commanders and troops serving in the Department of the Pacific.
In general, histories of the war, Civil War historians seem to imply that, with the
exception of a few months in 1861 and 1862, when Confederate forces carried the war
into New Mexico Territory, the western most border of the United States ended at Texas
and the Indian Territory. While this is especially true of military studies of the war, the
general dismissal of the importance of the Far West after the Compromise of 1850 is
pervasive among the best general studies. Even James McPherson, whose book, Battle
Cry Freedom, is probably the best single volume history of the war, makes only one
reference to California or the Pacific slope after the Compromise of 1850. In his final
comment on the Far West in the Civil War era, he notes, “Several hundred slaves did
work in California mines before the state prohibited slavery. Some of them even
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continued to work as slaves after 1850, under court decisions allowing temporary
residence of the slaveholders in the state.” 4
With such prevalent lack of any treatment at all in general histories of the war, it
is important to look at more specific studies. Although there are a small number of books
that acknowledge the existence of the Far West during the war years, treatment of the
western experience varies both in depth and quality. One of the early assessments of the
Department of the Pacific’s role was included in a pioneering social historian John Bach
McMaster’s book, History of the People of the United States During Lincoln’s
Administration. In a work which might appear to hold the promise of examining the
Pacific slope and its people during the Civil War era, McMaster managed to sum up the
westerners’ experience in five pages, and almost all of those were devoted to California.
McMaster’s position was that there were secessionist organizers in the southern portion
of the state, but they were chased off to Nevada Territory, where “some two hundred men
were easily raised and when organized declared for the Confederacy, raised the rebel flag
in Virginia City and defied the Union men to pull it down.”5
What of the Native Americans, how did military and civilian leaders deal with
them during the war years? Other than department commanders parceling out food to
quell one of the motives for Indian uprisings and sending troops eastward to join the
fighting, thereby denuding the region of a military force, McMaster has little else to say
about relations with the regional indigenous population. In reality there were Native

4

James McPherson, Battle Cry Freedom. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 71.

5

John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States During Lincoln’s
Administration. (New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), 65.
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American uprisings in Oregon, along the emigrant trail, as well as in southern California
and the state’s Humboldt region. 6
Fifteen years later, the Far West received even briefer consideration in a study of
Copperheads entitled, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads, by Wood
Gray. Given the presence of a vocal Copperhead population in California, in particular,
this omission is both intriguing and illustrative. Gray managed to sum up the western
experience with Copperheads in just over one page. Despite the miniscule consideration
given to the far frontier, Gray did make a noteworthy observation when he explained,
“the new states west of the Missouri River had comparatively little effect on the outcome
of the war. Here recent emigrants from the older sections had had little time for their
views to take on much of the color of their new environment.” 7 Gray was partially
correct, for there can be no disputing that the Far West contributed fewer troops and was
the scene of dramatically less activity than states such as Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Virginia. Gray, however, failed to understand that the result of this lack of a truly far
western identity led many of the southern émigrés living in the region to remain strong
supporters of their heritage. By summarily dismissing this point, Gray ignores the
important role that the 16,000 Californians and the 1,800 Oregonians (whom he did not
mention at all) played in suppressing the Copperheads and Knights of the Golden Circle.

6

For more on these uprisings see Carl Schlicke, General George Wright: Guardian of the Pacific
Coast. (Norman, Oklahoma, and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 318 and War of the
Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, series 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1897), 50: 1, 166-168. For the Native American-white conflict in the
Humboldt region see Anthony Bledsoe, Indian Wars of the Northwest: A California Sketch (San Francisco,
1885).
7

Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads. (New York: The Viking
Press, 1942), 218.
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Most importantly, by dismissing the activities in these states he failed to consider the
embryonic plots and actual attempts to seize gold shipments, on land and sea, destined for
the East. 8 Of course, pointing out that Copperheads and their allies did pose a threat to
California’s gold fields, an important element in maintaining the Union’s international
economic strength, is well beyond the roughly one page Gray devoted to the Far West.
McPherson, McMaster, and Gray, for all of their brevity, exemplify the typical
historiographical treatment of the Far West during the war. All wrote as if California was
the only state or territory in existence, or at least the only important one, along the Pacific
Coast. Furthermore, they all believed the degree of importance was minimal, at best, and
in McPherson’s case, it ended after the Compromise of 1850. They dismissed the
Department of the Pacific just as effectively as if they had not written about it all, which
had been, and continued to be the most common approach.
Brevity was certainly not an issue when Robert Johannsen wrote Frontier Politics
and the Sectional Conflict in 1955. Despite the excellent quality of that work, there are
limitations to Johannsen’s study. The main concern, as it relates to this dissertation, was
that he only studied the political struggle in the Pacific Northwest before the war. Given
Johannsen’s focus, he argued that, “While the Northwest frontiersmen were busy
building a social, economic, and political structure of their own on the far shores of the
Pacific, they nevertheless were not too occupied to glance now and again at the political
upheaval in the East.” 9 He essentially argued that the Pacific Northwest was an active, if
8

Two solid studies on the plots to seize gold shipments are Clarence Clendenen, “A Confederate
Spay in California: A Curious Incident of the Civil War,” Southern California Quarterly 45 (1963) 3, 219233; and, Francis Holbrook, “To Strike a Blow at the California Trade,” The American Neptune 32 (1972)
3, 195-210.
9

Robert Johannsen, Frontier Politics and the Sectional Crisis: The Pacific Northwest on the Eve
of the Civil War. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), 219.
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distant, player in the pre-secession crisis. After all, Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon was
John C. Breckinridge’s vice presidential candidate on one of the southern tickets in 1860.
As valuable as Dr. Johannsen’s book is in making the pre-war atmosphere in the Pacific
Northwest clear, it does not consider the war years, or affair in other parts of the military
Department of the Pacific.
Others, however, have taken up where Johannsen left off. As war clouds gathered
the most significant concern emanating from the Pacific Coast was whether or not the
southern inhabitants would attempt to take control of the states and territories. In his
master’s thesis, Roger Van Winkle argued that although time would show there was less
actual danger than many then thought, during the early stages of the war, “it was believed
that the size of the anti-war faction was increasing, but also that the secessionist
sentiment was considerable” in Oregon. 10 Recently, another author considered the
strength of that secessionist support within the confines of the southwestern-most section
of Oregon. In his article, Jeff LaLande noted that many Union Oregonians “feared that
rebellion by alleged ‘nests of Secesh sympathizers’ simmered just below the surface” and
that more accurately, such a feeling “played itself out as a kind of rhetorical civil war in
that particular corner of the Northwest.” 11
Concerns over the strength of Southern sympathizers in Oregon was one matter,
and the threat posed to the most populous and, more importantly for the administration,
the wealthiest state in the Far West was another. The potential secessionist/Confederate

10

Roger Van Winkle, “A Crisis in Obscurity: A Study of Pro Southern Activities in Oregon,
1854-1865,” (master’s thesis, Western Washington University, 1968), 76.
11

Jeff LaLande, “’Dixie’ of the Pacific Northwest: Southern Oregon’s Civil War,” Oregon
Historical Quarterly 100 (1999) 1, 36.

8

threat to Union control of California has likewise garnered a steady trickle of interest
from authors over the past forty years. Although he was not the first to consider the topic
of southern designs on California, G. Thomas Edwards’ concise article on the subject
remains a solid overview of how department commander Edwin Sumner skillfully
handled those dangers. In the article, which appeared in Civil War History, Dr. Edwards
noted that
the Federal government in 1861 worried about the course that California might
pursue and took appropriate steps to keep the state in the Union: it secured posts
and weapons; secretly rushed to the far coast a northerner to replace a southerner
as commander; occupied portions of the state; and it did not recall the majority of
the regulars until absolutely certain that California would remain within the
sisterhood of loyal states. 12
Just as political studies of the Department of the Pacific during the war are fragmentary,
military works likewise suffer from a lack of comprehensiveness. Military studies of the
Pacific slope during the Civil War focus almost exclusively on a singular region, the
fighting in New Mexico Territory. More recent works, however, give a little attention to
efforts to maintain a fragile peace throughout the department, but there are only a few
works. Included among that group is Ray Colton’s The Civil War in the Western
Territories, published in 1959, which examines confrontations between various tribes and
both Union and Confederate forces in the western territories from the present state of
Colorado southward. Other books that examine the Confederate invasion of New Mexico
Territory include Robert Lee Kirby’s, The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and
Arizona, and Martin Hall’s Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign. Although neither work, nor
12

G. Thomas Edwards, “Holding the Far West for the Union: The Army in 1861,” Civil War
History 14 (1968) 4, 307. Other earlier studies include Mabel Elizabeth Dodson, “Attempts of Southern
Sympathizers to Gain Control of California,” (masters thesis, Southwest Texas State Teachers College,
1939); more recently, Laurence Fletcher Talbott, “California Secessionists Support of the Southern
Confederacy: The Struggle 1861-1865,” (Ph.D. dissertation, The Union Institute, 1995).
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similarly focused studies, deal much with activity in the Department of the Pacific,
Martin Hall made an interesting observation: “If the capture of New Mexico by the
Confederates would have rendered the conquest of California probable, then the New
Mexico campaign of 1862 should be viewed as one of the most important military
operations of the war.” 13
Works dealing with the Far West during the war have not maintained the initial,
and brief, spark of the 1950s, nor have comments like Hall’s inspired any one to examine
the happenings in the Department of the Pacific. The reason for this, as Hall would point
out, is that California was not taken, and in the view of most of those writing about the
New Mexico invasion, it was never in any serious danger. This dismissive view is not a
true assessment of the reality the department personnel faced during the war, but it
remains the dominant view.
The Lincoln administration did not have the benefit of hindsight to assuage its
concerns about southern sympathizers in the Far West. Historians, however, do have that
luxury. As a result, it is understood that the military conflict in the Department of the
Pacific did not mean engaging Confederates, but rather running battles with the various
Native American tribes. This is where Western historians (excepting the New Western
school of thought) have added to the historiography of the department’s role in the Civil
War. 14 It is, of course, important to note that throughout the war years, the department

13

Martin Hall, Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign. (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press,

1960), 3.
14

Patricia Nelson Limerick, the most prominent of the New Western History school of thought,
gives nearly no attention to the impact the Civil War had on the development of the West. Like
McPherson, her interest in the region during the (pre) Civil War era ends with the Compromise of 1850.
For her the West of the 1850s and 1860s appears to mean the Midwest, which she points out played a key
role in the coming of the Civil War. Patricia Nelson Limerick, Legacy of Conquest, (New York and
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commanders did the utmost to avoid war with the Native Americans as a whole. In fact,
George Wright spent much of his time as commander of the department trying to protect
tribes such as the Nez Perce from incursions onto their lands by gold seeking miners. 15
Of course, Department of the Pacific leaders did not do so out of altruism, but because
Indian wars would slow development of the region and cost men and money at a time
when both were needed elsewhere. Taken on the whole, the department commanders
could claim partial success in this objective. Fighting between whites and certain groups
of tribes broke out in both northern and southern California and southern and eastern
Oregon continued for most of the war.
Thus, after war broke out in the East in 1861, the threat requiring the most active
and vigilant response by the Department of the Pacific was that posed by the region’s
numerous tribes. This topic is one in which Western historians such as Alvin Josephy
and Robert Utley have led the way. However, they are among the few to take up any part
of the topic. Both Josephy and Utley wrote books that examine Native Americans and
their relations with the Federal government, and its representative in the West, the Army.
Josephy’s encyclopedic study of the Nez Perce is the best of those works. In it he does
an excellent, if brief, job of examining the Nez Perce tug-of-war relationship with the
Federal government during the Civil War. 16
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Both authors also wrote studies that focus on the military’s relationship with the
western tribes. Although Utley’s book, Frontiersmen in Blue, is based largely on
previous publications, he does make an important point, “When the bombardment of Fort
Sumter in April 1861 finally plunged the Nation into Civil War, the frontier army
suddenly ceased to protect the frontier. Officers whose sectional loyalties drew them into
the South resigned almost en masse.” 17 Josephy looks at the newly created paradigm
facing the western soldiers after war broke out, which included how the military dealt
with the western tribes during the war, in his book The Civil War in the American West.
The long history of white incursions onto Native American lands leading to
conflicts and depredations continued during the war years. As Josephy points out, the
worst examples occurred in northern California: “White abuses were particularly flagrant
in the northern part of California, where thousands of Indians, driven from their ancestral
hunting, fishing, and root-gathering grounds . . . were dying of starvation.” In their
efforts to avoid starvation, bands of men raided down in the valleys, stealing livestock.
As a result of white attempts to exterminate them, “Emboldened by the withdrawal of the
Regulars, angry Indians were hitting back,” and war erupted. 18 The story was the same
along the southern and eastern Oregon borders, where miners tramped through Native
American lands, fueling the enmity of the tribesmen. Efforts in that portion of the
department were mixed, with Snake or Piaute and Bannock Indians attacking small
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parties of whites, while at the same time there were concerns that the powerful Nez Perce
tribe might follow suit. 19
The Department of the Pacific commanders and troops faced far more than the
dangers posed by potential southern supporters and Native American unrest. As had been
demonstrated in 1859 and 1860, even the generally harmonious relations with the British
in the far western Canadian colonies could flare up to the verge of conflict with little
provocation. The incident that eroded relations between England and the United States in
1859, the so-called Pig War, was not far from the minds of local American and British
officials once war came. 20 As a result of the confusion about who held sovereign
authority San Juan Island, both countries maintained a military contingent there,
primarily to maintain order among the split population. The continued proximity of
British and American military personnel had the potential for disaster should a
disagreement between British civilians or soldiers and their American counterparts occur.
Robin Winks wrote the best studies about American relations with British
Canada, both along the Washington Territorial border and in general. In his more
narrowly-focused chapters from his book, Canada and the United States: The Civil War
Years, as well as in separate articles, Winks makes it clear that although most
British/Canadians harbored no ill will toward the Americans, there was an undercurrent
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of distrust. Some British leaders in western Canada feared that the American military
might mount an invasion of British Columbia, partly on the pretext that Confederate
privateers were being harbored in Vancouver Island. 21
Even more precarious was the situation south of the border. With the French
invasion of Mexico, Department of the Pacific commanders faced a difficult task when
trying to keep the United States from being pulled into the void created by the imperial
war that ensued. To make matters worse, department commanders had to suppress their
own sympathies for the Mexican government while trying to control of the inclination of
Americans to assist their sister republic against an imperial invader. The Mexican and
French representatives in San Francisco inhibited that effort by carrying out an espionage
war against each other. As author Robert Miller points out, each employed agents, and in
the case of the French, they bribed American officials, in their efforts to aid their cause.
According to Miller, based on foreign correspondence, the French held the upper hand in
this bit of international intrigue on American soil; “In addition to being a deputy in the
Port of Collector’s office, Edmund Burk was Chief of Police of San Francisco, and was
also a secret agent in the pay of the French government.” 22 Clearly the quagmire that
was the French invasion of Mexico and the resulting political intrigue by both sides in
California posed a serious threat to the stability of the Far West, which was reflected in
warnings in official communications to the department commanders. The French
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conquest of Mexico in 1863, although manifested differently, posed just as much
potential danger as the British in western Canada.
Clearly, the officers and troops serving in the Department of the Pacific faced a
multiplicity of dangers to the Union during the Civil War. As this overview of the
literature demonstrates, their efforts, despite the absence of consideration in general
histories of both the war and the West were important for both the continued
development of the region and protecting the western most part of the Union. Small
examinations, however, have serious limitations when it comes to understanding the
importance of what the troops did during the war years. By their nature, articles and
small sections within larger works are incapable of addressing all aspects of what the
troops faced and achieved during the war and what that meant to the Far West. Given the
obvious limitations of these efforts, the question arises, why are there not any
comprehensive studies of the role the department played in the war and in the West? The
answer to this question is that there have been comprehensive attempts, but the most
recent (written over 40 years ago), and by far the best, has never been published.
In 1951 western historian Aurora Hunt completed the first comprehensive study
of the Department of the Pacific, or Army of the Pacific as she fashioned it. That work,
The Army of the Pacific, 1860-1866, is based largely on the Official Records and old
newspaper coverage, and it has important limitations. 23 The author set out to tell the
story of a different army than those in the East, one “which served longer, fought as
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bravely and died as valiantly.” 24 For Hunt, the story of the Department of the Pacific, in
which she examines the southwest as well as the Pacific states and territories, is strictly a
military one. She does not delve into the international dangers lurking along both borders
(and in some instances, within the department as well). Also, and given when the book
was written, not surprisingly, she does not consider the impact the troops and their
sacrifices had on the future of the Far West. Even her treatment of white-Native
American relations is too narrow, and almost myopic.
In Army of the Pacific, she ignores the fact that the military’s primary effort was
to negotiate with the tribes, and to at least attempt to protect them from the invading
miners. In her book, Native American relations with the troops are examined almost
exclusively in confrontational terms. Even in this regard her study misses the mark.
Hunt focuses on the conflicts that raged in Arizona Territory (broken off from New
Mexico Territory), but since that region was not within the department’s borders for most
of the war, what occurred there was not the Department of the Pacific’s responsibility.
She almost completely ignores the military conflicts with tribes in California and eastern
and southern Oregon (and late in the war, in what is now southern Idaho). The Nez Perce
treaty, and the preference for peaceful relations with all the tribes, gets short shrift.
Compounding the problems of what is left out is the antiquated style in which the book is
written and her failure to consider how individuals, civilians as well as soldiers (not to
mention the Native Americans), were affected by the department’s activities. Despite
important shortcomings and errors, it must be said that Hunt’s study remains the only
attempted at a comprehensive book on the topic.
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Although this pseudo scholarly monograph remains the only published work on
the topic; in 1963 it was easily supplanted by a far superior study of the Department of
the Pacific. In that year, G. Thomas Edwards completed his dissertation, “The
Department of the Pacific in the Civil War,” at the University of Oregon. In this study,
Dr. Edwards deftly used available sources, including the Official Records, department
reports (not included in the O.R.) and a small number of first person accounts to present a
more comprehensive, more accurate, and exceedingly more valuable analysis of the
Department of the Pacific during the Civil War. In the more than 40 years since the
completion of this dissertation important new primary material has surfaced, and new
scholarship touching on individual aspects of the topic have been published. None-theless, to this point that dissertation remains the only accurate and comprehensive work on
the topic.
As both Edwards and Hunt learned four and five decades ago, the most significant
problem when attempting to analyze the responsibilities facing the Department of the
Pacific and what the troops achieved during war is the limited extent primary sources.
Because of the comparatively small number of troops who served in the department
during the war (fewer than 20,000 of the roughly two million men who served the
Union), the quantity of sources is naturally far fewer than any Civil War historian is
accustomed to finding. Likewise, Western historians are accustomed to a wealth of
primary sources, especially for the 1870s and 1880s. Thus, even under the most ideal
conditions, the available pool of first person material is not especially deep.
Conditions were anything but ideal, for as the San Francisco Daily Alta California
predicted in 1861 there was little glory in serving the Union in the Far West. This feeling
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hardly improved after the war. Most Department of Pacific veterans, and in fact, the vast
majority of the region’s population (based on extant primary sources) seemed to dismiss
their experiences during the war in favor of the highly romanticized (and largely
inaccurate) characterization of the post-war expansion boom.
As a result of these less-than-ideal conditions, it is clear that any study of the
experiences of the civilians and military personnel who lived in the Department during
the Civil War will confront the dominant theme of marginalization. The persons who
experienced those years as civilians and those served in one of the many volunteer
military units marginalized their experiences for a number of reasons, preferring to focus
on their lives prior to, or after the war. In part, based on this fact, historians have
likewise failed to delve very deeply into the subject. The comparative lack of published
works on the Far West during the Civil War has undoubtedly played an important role in
discouraging both Western and Civil War scholars from considering the role and impact
the department had on the war, and on the West. The lack of scholarly studies, however,
gives an erroneous impression about both the available sources and the department’s
impact.
If there is anything resembling a theme among the first person accounts, it is a
combination of pride in a job well done with a tinge of bitterness at being ignored or
forgotten. When the War of the Rebellion, the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies was published beginning in the 1880s, it became the preeminent
source of information on the Department of Pacific. However, of the 128 books in the
set, just two deal with the Department of the Pacific.
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Unlike the major theaters of operations, where old soldiers wrote hundreds of
books and articles, veterans from the Department of the Pacific penned very few first
person accounts. Of the few sources, among the best are the papers veterans presented
before their fellow comrades in arms at annual banquets. The first such paper set the tone
for much of what the veterans wrote. In 1867 the previously mentioned George Bowie,
when speaking before his fellow California veterans, related the details of some of his
services during the war, concluding that “In long, tedious, and weary marches, privations
endured, hardships encountered, difficulties overcome, and exposure to the dangers
incident to the life of the soldier in our wild regions, few have equaled us, and none have
been our superiors.” 25 In later addresses, few of which have survived, the
speakers/writers related certain aspects of their service while maintaining Bowie’s
concern for how that service was recognized.
Three factors combined to cause an almost complete absence of first person
accounts of the war along the Pacific Coast. The most obvious cause was that
comparatively few soldiers took the field throughout the entire war in the Far West. The
situation was similar for the civilian population, which was still relatively small when the
war started.
A second factor was that, of the troops who served out the war on the western
frontier, most either lamented not being involved in the “real” war to the east or they
were eager to put their service behind them and to take advantage of the growing
economic opportunities in the region. One brief, although noteworthy exception, came
from the pen of a Confederate veteran of the invasion of New Mexico. T. T. Teal, who
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had close contact with the invasion commander, stated that “The objective aim and
design of the campaign was the conquest of California . . . . California had to be
conquered.” 26 Teel was a genuine rarity, and his comments related to what “might” have
happened, but that, in many ways, is what is so important about his statement.
Unfortunately, few other first person comments exist.
More important in understanding the drudgery of military service in the
department are the few published accounts that touch on that subject. Fortunately, the
Civil War centennial sparked interest in the war years on the Pacific Coast. In the midst
of the heightened awareness of all things Civil War, two diaries by Oregon infantrymen
were published. The first of those books was entitled, All Quiet on the Yamhill. This
work, which was published on the eve of the centennial in 1959, was based on the diary
of Oregon infantry Royal Bensell, who served at Fort Yamhill in eastern Oregon. The
publication of this work, along with the centennial, led scholars to search local archives
for other regional accounts of the war. The result was the publication in 1964 and 1965
of another diary and three article-length memoirs by members of the First Oregon
Cavalry, It is from sources like these that we learn that the First Oregon Cavalry’s
Captain John Drake believed his troops “were fine material for frontier soldiers,
accustomed to the use of firearms and the care of horses; and notwithstanding their
inferior numbers the huge task of keeping things straight in that vast extend of wilderness
and desert was faithfully and efficiently performed.” 27 Although few in number, such
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primary sources provide valuable insight about the men who served in the department
and the nature of that service.
A third factor that led to marginalization by the war generation was that there was
high turnover at the departmental level. In the first months of the war there were three
commanders, each of whom died before the end of June 1865. 28 The deaths of threefourths of the Department of the Pacific commanders created a void that could not be
filled. Their deaths eliminated the possibility of memoirs giving the departmental
command perspective. This also meant that veterans did not have an authoritative figure
and his/their story to coalesce around .
To a large degree, civilians living in the vast territory encompassed within the
Department of the Pacific also marginalized their experiences during the war years. For
those that had lived in the region since it earliest frontier days, the tendency was to write
about the difficult first years of trying to carve out an existence from the wilderness,
whether as a farmer or miner, in elusive pursuit of gold. Others, who came just prior the
war, tended to stress the boom years that followed the war. While both tendencies
provide excellent context when considering the war years in the larger western
experience, the amount of first person information for the war years is limited.
Limited, however, does not mean nonexistent. Partisan sentiments ran high and,
as can be gleaned from those accounts that do reflect on the Civil War era in the Far
West, it is clear that the population was far from complacent. As one miner noted,
“When soldiers came to town and got to drinking, they were slurred as ‘Lincoln’s
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Hirelings’ to kill Southern people,” and sometimes southern sympathizers made “a
soldier or volunteer drink to the health of Jeff Davis or Beauregard.” 29
This sense of marginalization by both veterans and civilians can be offset, to a
certain degree, by using unpublished sources. While there are important accounts that
add valuable information to the history of the Department of the Pacific’s role in the Far
West during the Civil War, those sources are also few in number. Generally speaking,
there are just two institutions holding the bulk of unpublished veteran-generated material.
A small number of valuable veteran memoirs and papers are housed at the Oregon State
Historical Society, in Portland, Oregon. Not surprisingly, since most of the department’s
troops came from California, the largest collection of veteran accounts is held at the
Bancroft Library at the University of California at Berkley.
While the majority of unpublished military accounts, almost all it seems, are
housed in just two places, civilian memoirs and collections of papers, are scattered in
small numbers throughout the western states. Considering the published primary sources,
along with key archival holdings, it is apparent that while perhaps paling in comparison
to the literal tonnage of source material that most Civil War and Western historians are
accustomed to, there exists a solid foundation of primary materials upon which to base a
study of the Department of the Pacific’s role in the Civil War.
So with just two previous works attempting a comprehensive examination of the
Department of the Pacific’s role in the war what can a third, dissertation-level, study add?
By considering what impact the soldiers’ service had on the developing West, a greater
understanding of both the military’s role in that growth and the importance of the war
29

Doyce B. Nunis and Nora B. Cunningham, editors, The Golden Frontier: The Recollections of
Herman Francis Reinhart, 1851-1869, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962), 204-205.

22

years becomes possible. Achieving the goals laid out for this dissertation means not only
looking at old topics differently it, more importantly, means asking new questions
altogether. By doing so, this study will not only expand on the valuable work done by
Edwards forty years ago, it will also put the same general topic, the Department of the
Pacific, in a broader context.
This study will begin by asking a simple question Hunt and Edwards chose not to
pursue in any depth: just who made up the military in the Department of the Pacific
during the war? The answer to that question will provide much more than just the
demographic background of the troops; it will also make it possible to consider what
motivated them to enlist. The answers to those questions can, in turn, provide insights
into what life was like for thousands of men who, after migrating to the West, eventually
chose to serve their (sometimes adopted) country.
Another key element to this study, which was ignored by Hunt and only lightly
touched upon by Edwards, is analyzing the political role George Wright and the other
department commanders played in the relations with the British in Canada and the French
and Mexicans to the south in Mexico (and the presence of their operatives within borders
of California). Both authors failed to consider just how important a role the Department
of Pacific played in maintaining American stability along its borders. Not giving the
international dimensions of what was done by the Department of the Pacific provides an
incomplete picture of the importance of what the commanders did, and the difficulties
they faced. This study will strive to demonstrate that sympathies for the Mexican cause
might have pulled the Far West, and by extension the nation, into the international mess
in Mexico. Likewise, as was demonstrated only a year before the outbreak of Civil War
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when American and British officials engaged in localized brinkmanship diplomacy over
the San Juan crisis, initially, relations with our British cousins could quite easily have
degenerated to the point of conflict.
Even though the military analysis that will make up an important component of
this study will benefit from the groundwork done by Edwards, and to a lesser degree
Hunt, even that aspect of this study will differ from its predecessors. This study will
synthesize forty years of new topical studies on the various military tasks performed by
the commands in the Department of the Pacific. Doing so will mean reconsidering the
military’s role in preempting any secessionist uprisings as well as its main tasks of trying
to prevent, or if that failed, to suppress Native American uprisings. When considering
those military activities, this study will benefit from the publication of a number of
primary sources that have come to light in the last forty years.
This study will do what the trickle of narrowly defined works cannot, and what
Hunt chose not to do, namely put the Department of the Pacific in the larger context of
the Civil War as well as the development of the West. By asking different questions than
Edwards, this study aims to exceed the scope of contextual boundaries of that work as
well. In essence, the design here is to construct a broader-based analysis of the
Department of the Pacific, which will include looking at the social as well as military and
political activities and results achieved by the roughly 20,000 troops in this forgotten
theatre of the war.
Thus, this dissertation will demonstrate that the Department of the Pacific
provided valuable and successful assistance to the Union cause during the Civil War and
that in doing so it encouraged the continued westward migration that marked the gold and
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silver rush years that preceded the war. This study will move beyond the two previous
works to address these bisecting topics, the most recent of which is forty years old.
Furthermore, where there have been occasional articles or odd pages devoted to
narrowly-defined, fragmentary aspects of the Department of the Pacific’s role in both the
Civil War and the growth of the West, this study will connect those elements into a
cogent study of the department as a whole. It will place the more specific topics within
the contextual whole. Doing so will supplant the implied message of insignificance that
has thus far pervaded general histories of the war with the more accurate argument that
not only was the Department of the Pacific an important element in the Union cause, but
the efforts of those serving there throughout the war stabilized the region during an
overlooked period in western expansion. Where western histories have ignored the war
years, this study will demonstrate how the almost exclusively volunteer military forces’
success so stabilized the region that the flow of people into the vast area’s farmlands and
ore fields continued unabated during the war. In effect, the success of the commanders
and troops in the Department of Pacific during the war not only protected the Far West
for the Union, but in so doing it contributed to the rise of Far West on the national scene.
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CHAPTER
-1WAS THERE A CIVIL WAR IN THE WEST?
On April 24, 1861, the passenger ship Golden Age arrived safely in San Francisco
harbor 12 days and 19 hours after leaving Panama. 1 It had been 13 years since one of
John Sutter’s employees had curiously picked out some shiny flecks, which turned out to
be gold, in dirt overturned while digging a millrace. Those first few bits of gold ignited
the Gold Rush. In the intervening years San Francisco became the urban center on the
nation’s farthest western shores. According to the 1860 Federal Census, the city’s
population numbered 56,802, a number which grew dramatically each year. 2 By 1861
the arrival of cargo ships laden with supplies, mostly destined for the gold fields and
boomtowns that grew around them, was routine. Likewise, passenger ships such as the
Golden Age disgorged themselves of thousands of people each year.
This arrival, however, was anything but routine, for the ship carried one of the
two things that altered the atmosphere and, to a discernable degree, the lives of America’s
western most citizens. Those stepping down onto the Folsom Street Wharf included a
gruff looking, white-haired 64-year-old man, who happened to be a recently promoted
general in the United States Army. 3 Early the next day that man, Edwin Vose Sumner,
presented himself at the office of Brevet Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston.
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Johnston commanded the recently created Department of the Pacific, or rather he did
until Sumner presented a directive from U. S. Army headquarters ordering him to turn
command over to Sumner. 4 Sumner’s arrival meant the expansion and alteration of the
already complex military responsibilities in the region. Its new, or greatly enhanced,
responsibilities included protecting the region from Confederate incursions, internal
unrest, and unstable relations along the borders with Canada and Mexico.
Simultaneously, the troops continued, with increased vigor, such long-standing
responsibilities as guarding the overland mail (and soon telegraph) routes and protecting
the white population from Native American depredations.
Although Sumner had been ordered to relieve Johnston in March, his assumption
of command was providential for the Lincoln administration in light of another important
item arriving in the city that day. Arriving by Pony Express from Missouri was the news
that Confederate forces had fired on and eventually compelled Fort Sumter, in the
Charleston, South Carolina harbor, to surrender almost two weeks earlier. The war,
which California played no small part in bringing on, was at hand. 5
The firing on Fort Sumter and the arrival of Sumner initiated dramatic changes for
the troops stationed in the Department of the Pacific. Although far from the scene of the
coming battles, the Far West posed concerns for the Union government. Primary among
the federal government’s fears was that the region, and California in particular, might
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become contested ground like Missouri or Kentucky. Even worse, there was the
possibility that the region would either join with the Confederacy or form an independent
nation, as had been the talk in the 1850s. Thus, the most paramount responsibility facing
Sumner and the Department of the Pacific was protecting the Far West for the Union.
Although the fear of a pro Confederate insurrection in the region was the preeminent
concern, it hardly represented the only threats facing the new commander. As the newly
arrived Sumner soon found out, the troops in the Department of the Pacific had to protect
against Native American uprisings, potential threats from the British in Canada and
shortly from being embroiled in the troubles between the Mexicans and French in
Mexico. Accomplishing these tasks became more difficult as the years passed and most
of the Regular Army commands transferred east to bolster the volunteer forces that made
up the bulk of the Union armies. Thus, to understand fully the impact the troops in the
Department of the Pacific had during the war years, it is paramount first to consider the
responsibilities they shouldered during the war.
Protecting the Far West, especially California, from the threat of Confederate
invasion or uprisings by Confederate sympathizers was the Lincoln administration’s
biggest concern on the Pacific Slope as the war began. Despite its still relatively limited
population, California gold and Nevada silver contributed mightily to the nation’s
economic well-being. This fact alone dictated that the state, as well as the other ore rich
regions of the Far West, not fall into Confederate hands. The possibility that the military
installations in the state might be turned over to Confederate sympathizers was precisely
the reason the War Department sent Edwin Sumner to San Francisco. The governmental
and military authorities in Washington D.C. feared that the Department of the Pacific
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commander, General Johnston, might defect to the Confederate cause and turn over
control of the arsenals and forts to either Confederates or Confederate sympathizers. As
unlikely as that might seem to some, the fears were well founded, if unfair to the
professional Johnston.
Johnston’s path to the command of the Far West began when the previous
commander of the Department of California, Brevet Brigadier General Newman Clarke,
died October 17, 1860. 6 On October 31, Johnston’s former aide, Major Fitz John Porter,
who then worked for Commanding General of the Army, Winfield Scott, inquired
whether or not he was interested in assuming command of the region. Johnston agreed
and Secretary of War John Floyd made the official appointment. 7
On November 22 the War Department issued Special Order Number 10,
reconstituting the Department of the Pacific, which had been subdivided into two
separate divisions in 1858. Although recreating the Department of the Pacific added a
new level of bureaucracy, it streamlined the command structure for the War Department,
which now dealt directly with one commander instead of two. Of course, recreating the
department on paper in Washington D. C. and putting it into practice in the Far West
were different matters. It was not until January that the Department of the Pacific
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received its new commander. On January 15, 1861, Brevet Brigadier General Albert S.
Johnston arrived in San Francisco to assume command of the recreated department. 8
In most regards Johnston, who possessed vast administrative as well as field
experience, was a solid choice for the post. He was an 1826 graduate of West Point who
had fought in the Texas Revolution, eventually serving as the Republic of Texas’
Secretary of War. Later he led a regiment in the Mexican-American War, commanded
the Department of Texas from 1856 to 1858, and then commanded the military
expedition against the recalcitrant Mormons in Utah Territory. 9 Thus, it appeared that
the U.S. Army’s new man in the most distant region of the country was well-suited for
his post. Unfortunately for Johnston, he assumed command as the country careened
toward civil war. Under such circumstances, the tall Kentuckian faced not only the usual
array of problems that awaited all commanders of the region, but also the danger posed
by those who wished to wrestle its control from the federal government, as well as
potentially hostile relations along both the northern and southern borders.
During Johnston’s brief tenure in command, he oversaw a massive department far
removed physically, but not immune, from the deteriorating situation in the East. As the
secession crisis boiled, the department’s already daunting task of protecting the flow of
people moving into the vast territories encompassed within its borders, as well as the
overland mail route that served as a tenuous connection to the rest of the country, became
even more complex. With the onset of the war, the department faced additional
responsibilities. The most paramount task that emerged was the need to protect the Far
8
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West, and especially California, from internal Confederate sympathizers and the dangers
posed by Confederate elements from Texas.
Those concerns ensured that Johnston’s tenure in command was destined to be
brief. Even as he issued orders to streamline the department’s defenses against both
internal and external threats, his loyalties and connections to the South caused deep
personal turmoil. Rumors that Johnston planned to establish an independent nation on
the Pacific Coast only exacerbated his dilemma. Despite his personal sympathies for the
southern states, he vehemently denied he would dishonor his commission, telling his son,
“I say the whole charge is false in every particular. . . . If the War Department has such
information, why don’t they order an investigation and not give it to letter writers to
damage the reputation of officers?” 10 Although he felt honor-bound to carry out his
responsibilities to the utmost of his abilities, he mulled the decision to tender his
resignation and leave for Texas.
While Johnston deliberated over where his loyalties lay, events elsewhere
convinced officials in Washington D.C. that they needed someone more firmly
committed to the Union in charge of the nation’s most distant region. Specifically,
Abraham Lincoln’s assumption of the presidency in early March, combined with the
earlier surrender of all Union commands in the Department of Texas on February 18,
convinced the high command in Washington that it had no time to waste. The surrender
of the Department of Texas caused particular alarm about the security of the Department
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of the Pacific. 11 Experienced officers with solid reputations, Johnston in the Pacific and
Brevet Major General David Twiggs in Texas, led the two departments, and both were
southerners. Furthermore, many in the military as well as among the civilian population,
believed that each sympathized with the seceded states. 12 In this atmosphere, what the
War Department felt was Twiggs’ inexplicable capitulation cast a long shadow of doubt
about Albert Sidney Johnston’s loyalty.
The Department of the Pacific commander, despite his southern background and
sympathies, was not, however, David Twiggs. From his arrival in the Department of the
Pacific, Johnston acted with alacrity in responding to both regional and high command
concerns. When he received orders to strengthen the entrance to San Francisco, he
reinforced Fort Point and ordered the commander at Alcatraz Island “to maintain your
post and defend against all efforts to seize it, from whatever direction such efforts may be
made.” 13 When frightened citizens in the northwest coast region of California petitioned
Johnston for protection from marauding tribesmen, he not only sent a detachment of
Regulars, he urged Governor John Downey to call up a militia contingent. 14 Clearly,
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unlike Twiggs, who vacillated terribly in the absence of any clear guidance from the War
Department, Johnston executed his responsibilities with an active and even hand. 15
What those in Washington D.C. did not know for certain was that Johnston
determined not to dishonor either his commission or his reputation. Echoing what he had
written his son previously, he told Governor Downey, “I have spent the greater part of
my life in the service of my country . . . and while I hold her commission [I] shall serve
her honorably and faithfully.” 16 Even so, when the news that Texas had seceded reached
San Francisco, he made up his mind to resign his commission, telling his sister-in-law, “I
felt, as soon as I learned the course adopted by my State [Texas] that it was my duty to
conform to her will.” 17 On April 9 Johnston sent his letter of resignation to the Adjutant
General of the United States Army, requesting “that my successor may be appointed and
ordered to relieve me as soon as possible.” 18
Although he did not know it, Johnston did not have long to wait for his
replacement to arrive at department headquarters in San Francisco. Concern about the
potential threat from pro-southern elements in the Far West had become a topic of
discussion at Army headquarters in Washington D.C. in early January. General Scott’s
military secretary, Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes, recalled urging the general to take steps to
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protect San Francisco harbor in mid-January. 19 Less than a week later, the Adjutant
General’s office issued orders to transfer two companies of artillery from Fort Vancouver
to a post at the entrance to San Francisco harbor.20 Two months later, the high
command’s concerns were no longer limited to external threats. Officials were
increasingly concerned about dangers from within the Department of the Pacific.
Rumors spread eastward that Johnston planned to turn the entire department over to
Confederate sympathizers the way Twiggs had handed over Texas. 21
Rumors of this sort were rampant at the time; however, this one reached the
newly-seated Lincoln administration via a source that could not be ignored. Oregon
senator James Nesmith informed Secretary of State William Henry Seward “that General
Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Department of the Pacific, was unfaithful to the
Union.” 22 During a private meeting with General Scott on March 22, Seward expressed
his concerns. Both men agreed that someone with unquestioned loyalty to the Union
should replace Johnston. “The following morning the general wrote an order for Colonel
E.V. Sumner to proceed without delay to San Francisco and assume command of the
Department of the Pacific. The order was approved by the Cabinet in secret session –
Colonel Sumner embarked [from New York] by stealth.”23 This was the man who
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arrived on April 24 aboard the Golden Age. It was on his shoulders that the military and
civil authorities thrust the varied responsibilities that came with command of the vast
Department of the Pacific.
The arrival of his replacement should have been a great relief to Johnston,
however, he realized the War Department could not have acted that quickly on his
resignation. He therefore understood that the decision to replace him had not been his
own. Instead of being pleased by his release from command, he was angry that officials
in Washington had questioned his loyalty. 24 Sumner’s immediate assumption of
command, on the twenty-fifth, was announced to the department with the issuance of
departmental Special Order Five. 25
Edwin Sumner’s arrival in San Francisco, along with the news of the attack on,
and capture of, Fort Sumter, ushered in the Civil War era for the men serving in the
United States Army’s Department of the Pacific. Local newspapers ran special bulletins
and posted the news on bulletin boards announcing Fort Sumter’s surrender. In the wake
of the onset of war, the new department commander initiated a frenzy of activity
designed to address the high command’s chief concern, the retention of the Far West in
the union.
Sumner’s responsibilities were numerous, multifaceted, and daunting. Like
previous commanders in the region, he served two masters, the federal government and
the civilian population. Unlike his predecessors, however, all of whom except Johnston
focused their main attention on Native American relations, Sumner’s primary task of
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preserving federal dominance over the Pacific slope superseded all other
responsibilities. 26 This did not relieve troops of their other tasks, but rather added to
those tasks. Not only did Sumner and his far-flung command have to ensure the region
did not leave the Union or degenerate into chaos like Missouri, they still had to deal with
the numerous Indian tribes, which threatened emigrant trails and overland mail routes,
while protecting the sovereignty of both the northern and southern borders.
Immediately upon assuming command, Sumner initiated changes designed to
protect the left arm of the republic from external threats by Confederate forces. At the
same time, he took measures to squelch any internal schemes by expatriated southerners
or southern sympathizers. In less than a week, he issued a string of orders designed to
concentrate troops in the areas of greatest danger. These moves included immediately
ordering a unit of artillery from Fort Vancouver and two others from the District of
Oregon to San Francisco, and the abandonment of Fort Mojave, in order to concentrate its
command in Los Angeles. 27 These were just the first of many changes that affected the
disposition and make up of the Union forces on the Pacific Coast.
It is clear from the rapid issuance of a number of special orders during Sumner’s
first five days that the initial steps to secure the Far West were mapped out before he
arrived. Despite his belief that Union sentiment pervaded in the Pacific states and
territories, Sumner realized his situation was not enviable. Just four days after arriving,
he perceptively noted that although the Unionists were the most numerous, “the
secessionists are much the most active and zealous party.” As a result he had “no doubt
26
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but there is some deep scheming to draw California into the secession movement.” It was
his belief that “the course of events in the East will control events here,” which given the
surrender of Fort Sumter, was not at all comforting. If the situation in the East continued
to deteriorate, “The troops here now will hold their positions. . . but if there should be a
general uprising of the people, they could not, of course, put it down.” 28 Given the
uneasiness about the status of the region, Sumner’s cautiously optimistic assessment of
his new post could hardly have assuaged officials in the capital.
The general belief was that the most virulent and highest concentration of the
Confederate sympathizers lived in southern California. 29 It was this belief that led
Sumner to order the abandonment of Fort Mojave, which enabled those troops to be
restationed in Los Angeles from the far less important desert post. Contributing to the
concerns about southern California was the realization that a large proportion of the
population was Mormon, and they held no affinity for the federal government. 30
Southern California, clearly, was not the only region in the Far West with a discernable
southern population. Due largely to the false lure of easy riches in the many gold (ore)
fields throughout the region, the entire department was home to a cosmopolitan
population. As the Alta California put it, “Our population is composed of emigrants from
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every State of the Union. California is the United States in miniature.” 31 Actually, the
population was even more diverse than any one place in the rest of the country. In
addition to the hundreds of thousands from the eastern states, many of them southerners,
there was a large Hispanic population, generally referred to as Californios, a small
number of Chinese miners and laborers, and European immigrants that had drifted across
the continent, none of which had any particular reason to be loyal to the federal
government.
Although Sumner and the War Department were primarily concerned about the
security of California, sectional unrest throughout the rest of the department could not be
ignored and required vigilance as well. While California was the key to securing the
region, there were dangers in other sections of the vast department. According to one
Puget Sound resident, “At an early stage in the great civil war it became apparent that
there were in California, Oregon, and Washington men ready to aid in the destruction of
the Union by every means within their power.” 32 Given the sparseness of the population
of most of Oregon and virtually all of Washington and Nevada Territories, these areas
presented limited opportunities for pro-Confederate elements to overthrow federal control
of the Far West. Nonetheless, such persons could pose a local danger in the numerous
mining towns throughout the region, where “sometimes [they] would make a soldier or
volunteer drink to the health of Jeff Davis or Beauregard.” 33 Despite focusing much of
his efforts on California, Sumner understood that stifling internal scheming in the effort
31
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to keep the Far West in the Union required vigilance throughout the entire department,
for as Captain Hugh Gorley noted, he and the other soldiers “felt as though we were upon
a volcano of social disruption.” 34
Sumner and the War Department were not only worried about the potential
internal volcano, but also the external threat. Sumner’s actions upon assuming control
made it clear that the high command feared an external threat nearly as much as it did an
internal cabal. Judging by the relocation of a significant number of troops to San
Francisco and the abandonment of other posts, it appears the consensus was that if an
attack materialized, it would come from one of two directions, either by sea against San
Francisco or by land from Texas or Mexico against southern California. Thus, another of
the Department of the Pacific’s enhanced responsibilities was to protect the region
against a Confederate attack.
Just as the troops in the department had to be vigilant against external land-based
threats, they also had to be wary of sea borne operations directed at San Francisco. As
evidenced by War Department orders sent to General Johnston in mid January, as well as
General Sumner’s first steps once he assumed command, it is clear the high command
genuinely feared such an attack on the West Coast’s largest port city. Thus, it was
paramount that the commanders of the Department of the Pacific ensure that federal
forces could turn back any Confederate advance from the sea.
The frenzy to prepare San Francisco harbor for defense against an external assault
seems baseless in historical hindsight, but it persisted throughout the war years, as
evidenced by the almost comical energy all four department commanders spent to
34
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strengthen the defenses. 35 Despite the massed artillery, the commanders never felt the
city was entirely secure and as a result strengthening and protecting the Pacific Coast,
and especially San Francisco, remained a key component of their responsibilities.
Although the concern focused on an attack from the sea, during which a stealthy sea
captain might use the bay’s notorious fog to shield an approach, the only danger that
came close to materializing occurred from within.36 On March 15, 1863 marines and San
Francisco police thwarted the culmination of a wild scheme to capture the schooner,
U.S.S. Chapman. 37 From that point on the city’s residents gave more credence to the
wild rumors and the Department of the Pacific moved to quell those fears. The Chapman
Affair added a new twist to the department’s attempts to protect the Far West from proConfederate danger.
The considerable efforts spent to protect the Far West from the Confederate and
pro-southern elements only served to complicate what had long been the military’s
primary responsibility in the region, maintaining the peace between non-Indians and
Native Americans when possible, and protecting the American citizens at all costs. With
the continued flow of immigrants into the vast lands encompassed in the department, the
commanders faced the difficulty of protecting those people with a limited force that was
needed elsewhere. Enlarging the military presence in and around San Francisco, as well
as in southern California, necessitated moving the scattered commands like chess pieces.
35
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With just over 2,000 men present for duty in the entire department as of June 1861
repositioning troops was not an enviable job. 38 In some cases the result was the complete
removal of a military force from a specific region. Thus, throughout the war, the
department commanders had to balance the need to thwart potential pro Confederate
threats before they materialized with the need to protect the citizens from various tribes,
whose situation grew increasingly desperate each year.
Local citizens, fearing what those tribes would do once the military departed,
besieged each of the four successive department commanders with plaintive requests not
to remove the military force. Each commander received letters predicting dire
consequences if the troops left: “If this protection is to be withdrawn, those who have
under its promise made their homes in the wilderness will be left to the mercy of ruthless
savages, and a beautiful district about to be reclaimed by civilization again abandoned to
its original condition.” 39 Fortunately, the first three of the department’s commanders
had spent many years dealing with the Native Americans on the western frontier. They
understood that relations between non-Indians and the tribes were frequently volatile and
potentially deadly. 40 Only the last commander, Major General Irvin McDowell, who
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spent most of his military career as a desk officer, did not have experience dealing with
the western Indian population. 41
While McDowell performed staff work and Johnston and Sumner confronted
problems elsewhere, George Wright had learned the nature of dealing with far western
tribes when the region endured a string of bloody Indian wars in the 1850s. Although
generally ignored in favor of the more widely publicized Indian wars of the 1870s and
1880s, the decade before the Civil War had been a bloody one in the Far West. Wars
raged in Washington Territory’s Puget Sound, the Yakima valley, and along what is now
the eastern border of the state. Before Oregon became a state it endured the Rouge
Indian War at nearly the same time that northern Californians fought the First Modoc
War. Although all these conflicts were resolved before the Civil War started, the
memories were fresh for both the Americans and the Indians. The wars left an indelible
impression even on friendly tribes, such as the powerful Nez Perces who “never forgot
how the American army had treated the Indians who surrendered” during Wright’s 1858
campaign in Washington Territory.42
Just as the wars sputtered to a conclusion at the end of the decade, Native
American depredations in northern California flared up again in 1861. The pleas from
the area’s frightened citizens led to the creation of a new district in the Humboldt region
of northwest California. 43 Attacks also persisted along the immigrant trails and the mail
route. To discourage such attacks necessitated dispersing elements of the various
41
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regiments throughout the department. The complex task of protecting the non-Indians and
the Native Americans from each other remained the most nagging problem facing the
Department of the Pacific during the war.
The steady flow of farmers, and especially miners, who altered the population
dynamics of a region seemingly overnight, were the root cause of the troubles. Driven by
the successive ore discoveries throughout the department and the fertile farming lands,
the population continued to grow throughout the war years. The violation of reservation
boundaries, combined with the generally poor treatment the Native Americans continued
to receive during the 1860s, eroded the already fragile relationship between the
immigrants and the Indians. This, in turn, meant the military continued to have its hands
full with an old problem.
Department of the Pacific commanders and men faced another lingering problem
during the war years, namely dealing with the British to the north. Despite sharing a
common background, relations between the British in far western Canada and the
Americans had been contentious for many years. In fact, in the years immediately
preceding the Civil War the situation along the Washington Territory-Canadian border
had careened toward a conflict between the two nations. Although that situation
subsided, the British neutrality policy during the war strained relations between the two
governments. On the Pacific Coast, this policy meant that Confederate raiding ships
could enter Canadian ports in Victoria, British Columbia, and repair, refit, and, relax
before setting out to raid Union commercial vessels. The occasional presence of
Confederate vessels so near the department’s boundaries along with those not always
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harmonious relations necessitated that the Department of the Pacific commanders (as
well as the British governor) keep a wary watch north of the border.
The most volatile situation between the two countries since the Oregon boundary
confrontation, which was at least temporarily settled in 1846, occurred because of a pig,
and was fomented by aggressive American officers. 44 After an American living on San
Juan Island in Puget Sound killed a pig owned by the Hudson Bay Company in 1859,
tensions rose precipitously. The Pig War, as this almost comical confrontation was
called, was more bluster than bite, but it strained diplomatic relations almost to the point
of breaking. 45
During the war, the suspicions that lingered from the Pig War cast long shadows
on both sides of the border. Even as General Sumner recalled the Regular troops from
throughout the region for transportation to the main theatre of war, he rescinded a
directive to abandoned San Juan Island –which would have effectively handed it back to
the British. 46 As the war progressed, a far more important concern faced the department
commanders. The Confederate sea raiders that wreaked havoc on United States ships in
the Pacific Ocean were allowed to enter the British port at Victoria, Vancouver Island.
Victoria, it was feared, was also a haven for pro Confederates who plotted attacks on the
Far West, possibly by land, but more probably by sea. Throughout the war, most
44
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potential threats were local in nature, but the region was not immune to national
difficulties such as the fallout from the 1861 seizure of Confederate diplomats headed for
England. 47 Despite the lack of serious problems in the region, department commanders
deemed Puget Sound unstable enough that one of the few Regular Army units left in the
region during the war remained on San Juan Island. In short, the commanders of the
Department of the Pacific could not assume the northern border was entirely secure.
British officials, like their counterparts to the south, continued to be suspicious of
what the Americans might do during the war. Early on, the governor of Vancouver
Island, James Douglas, believed that Union moves into British Columbia as well as onto
Vancouver Island were inevitable. His response was to strike first, and to take control of
all of Puget Sound before department commanders sent volunteer commands to replace
the departing Regular forces. 48 As fanciful as this scheme appears, other influential
persons had previously expressed similar impressions of American intentions. Years
earlier, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston had assessed the Americans, stating,
“they always keep pushing on their encroachments as far as they are permitted to do so;
and what we dignify by the names of moderation and conciliation, they naturally enough
call fear.” 49
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Governor Douglas was not the only one who tentatively watched American
activity in the Department of the Pacific. In 1863 a rumor reached London that troops in
California were being organized for an invasion of British Columbia via Washington
Territory. 50 Whether the result of local concerns about aggressive American actions or
driven by far off difficulties between the two nations, such as the Trent Affair, relations
with the British required deft handling on both sides of the border. Mismanagement
might lead to a confrontation deadlier than the follies of the Pig War.
During the war, official relations between England and the United States in the
Far West were clear, although not always harmonious. Clarity was not, however, the
case with American relations in Mexico. By 1863, the commanders of the Department of
the Pacific faced a fluid situation in Mexico. At the outset of the war the United States
enjoyed friendly diplomatic relations with Benito Juarez’s Mexican government, but
when the European powers became involved in internal Mexican affairs, it claimed
neutrality. Remaining neutral as the French began taking over the country may have
been pragmatic, but it was hardly popular. American sentiment remained with the
Juarez’s government as it moved from one location to another, staying just one step
ahead of French forces. In January 1862, California governor, John Downey, summed up
how many Americans felt: “Three of the great Powers of Europe have now combined to
force monarchial institutions and aristocratic privileges upon that living embodiment of
Disunion principles, the Republic of Mexico . . . . The same Powers will combine to
enforce aristocracy and royalty upon Americans.” 51 Although committed to a neutral
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policy between the belligerents, Department of the Pacific commanders Wright and
McDowell both remained apprehensive of any northward movements by either the
French or Mexican forces. Clearly, it was the former that posed the real danger to the
sovereignty of the department’s borders. However, being pulled into the morass by either
party would have been detrimental to the Union war effort, no matter how sympathetic
Americans felt toward the Mexicans.
The neutrality the administration desired was difficult to enforce among a
populace that despised the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. This sentiment
enabled Mexican agent General Placidio Vega to purchase arms and recruit men easily
for Juarez’s forces from his base of operations in San Francisco. 52 Efforts were made to
thwart such activities, but national policy could not dictate how the general populace –
military as well as civilians –felt.
For the Department of the Pacific commanders and men, the potential threat from
Mexico, however, was not merely derived from the presence of a monarchical force or
the possibility of being pulled into an imperialistic war. Almost from the outset of the
war, both Confederate and Union leaders viewed the northern Mexican states as an
invasion route pointed either at Texas or the farthest section of New Mexico Territory
(now Arizona) and California, depending on who did the planning. Rumors, usually
spread by well-intended civilians, bedeviled all levels of command in the department
throughout the war. Thus, as early as June 1861 then-department commander General
Sumner warned the commander at Fort Yuma, on the California –New Mexico Territory
border, that
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a rumor is prevalent in this community and the State generally that the so-called
government of the Confederate States purpose sending from the State of Texas or
elsewhere, through certain States of the Mexican Republic, to this coast a military
force, considerable in number, with the object of seizing upon and holding the
port of Guayams [Mexico] . . . . It is well to be prepared for any movement. 53

Similar fears led Wright, and later McDowell, to send forces into New Mexico Territory
(and later keep them there). The troops stationed in southern California, deemed the
hotbed of pro Confederate sympathies in the department, also kept a vigilant eye peering
south and southeast, to prohibit an invasion force linking up with local sympathizers.
Even the commanding general, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, took the potential
Confederate threat from within Mexico seriously. In January 1864 he was concerned
enough that he telegraphed department commander McDowell that pro-Confederate
elements in the Mexican state of Sonora might try to organize an invasion force. If news
confirming this fear reached McDowell, Grant advised him that “these apprehensions
[would be] well founded, prepare to meet them. You will find no difficulty in raising any
number of volunteers that may be necessary in California to repel an invasion of the
State.” 54 Whether the danger came from the French, Mexicans, or Confederates and their
sympathizers, the southern border, like that with Canada, remained a problematic
responsibility for the Department of the Pacific throughout the war.
Whether facing external Confederate or internal pro Confederate threats, potential
incursions from foreign powers, or dealing with the justifiably angry Native Americans, it
was clear that the commanders and troops faced a myriad of challenges in their efforts to
hold the Far West for the Union while protecting the region’s citizens. Throughout the
53
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Civil War, successfully carrying out their responsibilities required deft handling of
difficult responsibilities by both the leaders and men in the Department of the Pacific.
Although no one could have known it at the time, their share in a four year struggle began
on April 25 when news that Fort Sumter surrendered – days earlier – reached the Pacific
coast with the arrival of the ship Golden Age in San Francisco.
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CHAPTER
-2A CALL TO ARMS
Less than a month after the first major battle of the Civil War the San Francisco
Daily Alta California prophetically stated, “There is but little glory to be won by serving
one’s country on the Plains . . . . No matter how marvelous the achievements it will not
get much play.” 1 Historically speaking, this prediction has generally held true. Those
who served in the Department of the Pacific during the Civil War have more or less been
lost in the literary (and literal) tonnage of material written about the war. However, the
truth was different; as Colonel George Bowie put it, “In long, tedious, and weary
marches, privations endured, hardships encountered, difficulties overcome, and exposure
to the dangers incident to the life of the soldier in our wild regions, few have equaled us,
and none have been our superiors.” 2 Perhaps veterans who experienced the gore of the
fields of Gettysburg or the slaughter at Franklin might disagree, but it cannot be denied
that the officers and men of the Department of the Pacific rendered important service to
the Union during the Civil War.
As war clouds darkened the national sky in early 1861 the reconstituted
Department of the Pacific faced a myriad of responsibilities with a limited force. Once
war came, however, those responsibilities both increased dramatically and became more
complicated. Beginning in March the War Department made an increasingly difficult
task even more troublesome when it began ordering Regular Army commands east to the
1
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main theatre of war. The 2,245 troops present for duty in January were reduced to just
over 2,000 men by June, and that number shrank significantly during the coming weeks. 3
With the departure of the Regular Army forces from the Far West, citizens and
politicians worried that the population’s safety and security in that remote part of the
country had been sacrificed for the greater endeavor in the East. In July, the War
Department finally took steps to rectify that problem. On July 24 the War Department
sent an order to raise one infantry regiment and five cavalry companies to both Governor
John G. Downey of California and General Sumner. 4 Raising those troops did nothing to
assuage the citizens’ fears, as once the commands were organized, they were to proceed
to Nevada to protect the mail route. In partial response to continuing local concerns as
well as the need to maintain the advantages gained over pro-Confederate elements early
on, in August the War Department sent another request to Governor Downey to raise five
additional regiments of volunteers for three years service. 5 Although the Regular Army
forces served well throughout the first months of the war, most of them were needed
elsewhere; therefore, volunteers from Oregon and later Washington and Nevada
territories, made up the majority of the forces in the Department of the Pacific. It was
their task to guard against internal and external threats from Confederates and their
sympathizers, to guard the department’s (and the nation’s) borders, and to police the
tenuous communication threads connecting the West with the main part of the country. It
also fell to them to battle the tribesmen who threatened communications and emigrants.
With all these responsibilities, it was only natural for Colonel Bowie to ask, “May not we
3
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claim to have rendered some services that are worthy of public recognition?” 6 Before
addressing this question, it is important to consider the background of the military’s
presence in the region. Once that is understood, then it must be determined who served
in Department of the Pacific during the war, where they came from, what motivated them
and what they felt about their service to their country as well as how they viewed
themselves. Only after more is known about whom they were and what they represented
can there be, in later chapters, an examination of the services and sacrifices they made for
their nation during that time of national cleavage.

On February 2, 1848, Mexican and American officials had formally signed the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending the Mexican-American War. The lopsided military
affair evinced America’s growing military might. It was the military’s resounding
success that enabled expansionist political leaders to exact the one-sided treaty from
Mexican officials. On the whole, the military’s performance during the war was its finest
hour since a mixed force of militia, Continental soldiers, and French army and naval
commands received the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781. For all the
national benefit gained from this tremendous land acquisition, the military created a
monumental problem for itself.
The vast lands encompassed in the treaty were only lightly occupied in 1848, but
that changed a year after America assumed ownership. Roughly two weeks before the
treaty was formalized gold had been discovered near the small town of Sacramento.
Although it took almost a year for that information to circulate throughout the existing
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states, the prospects of becoming wealthy and independent unleashed a flood of people
heading toward a previously unknown place in a little understood part of the continent.
What had been a massive addition to the nation with unknown potential, requiring limited
involvement almost immediately demanded political and military attention.
While the rush of humanity to California caused a great deal of political strife
much sooner than anyone anticipated, it also created serious problems for the United
States military. The post war military establishment was a victim of its own success. As
President James K. Polk stated in his final State of the Union message in 1848, “The
events of the late war with Mexico . . . . [have] demonstrated that upon the breaking out
of hostilities not anticipated, and for which no previous preparation had been made, a
volunteer army of citizen soldiers equal to veteran troops, and in numbers equal to any
emergency, can in a short period be brought into the field.” 7 After the MexicanAmerican War ended, the vast majority of troops who helped win the war were no longer
needed. Fortunately for the government, since volunteers made up the majority of the
forces that fought in Mexico, the end of the war meant the end of their service. After
reverting to approximately its pre war size, the Army faced the prospect of garrisoning
and patrolling numerous parts of the newly acquired lands far sooner than anyone could
have anticipated. Given the rapid development and populating of the western frontiers,
the Army confronted the difficult task of having to perform enhanced duties with roughly
the same force as before the war.
From the outset of the United States’ assumption of control of the Far West, it
became obvious that the Army was stretched too thinly to protect the emigrants and lend
7
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authority to governmental control over the region. With the general resolution of the
Oregon boundary dispute between England and the United States combined with the land
cessions from Mexico, the government, as Polk told Congress, had to address “the
continuance of Indian disturbances and of the destitution and defenseless condition of the
inhabitants” in the region. 8 Military commanders and most presidents understood well
how to confront the problems: the military needed to be enlarged, and soon.
Despite the obvious need to enlarge the Army as well as the Navy to more
effectively protect the growing number of citizens in the West, politicians remained tepid
to military and presidential pleas. For 13 years presidents, secretaries of war, and
Congress wrangled over the need to enlarge the army, and if so, to what extent. Two
impediments plagued those hoping to enlarge the military between 1848 and 1861, and
they were the same two that dogged national leaders before (and since): the fear of
standing armies and, most importantly, the cost. The former carried philosophical
weight, but it was the latter that stymied nearly every attempt to expand the military.
Every political leader in Congress knew at least one thing about America’s military force;
it cost a great deal of money to maintain a large permanent force. Given the fact that the
military was expanded just twice during those thirteen years, there was never a large
enough contingent in the West to stem the fears of either local civilians or politicians. 9
Even the Indian wars that broke out in the modern states of California, Oregon,
and Washington during the mid-to-late 1850s failed to persuade politicians in
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Washington D.C. to enlarge the army. In the midst of these conflicts, President Franklin
Pierce, who managed to wrestle an increase in the military from Congressional leaders,
informed Congress that “the state of the service permit[ed] but few and small garrisons in
our permanent fortifications.” 10 With eastern politicians concerned about monetary
issues on one side and the small, but growing, population in the western regions calling
for protection on the other, the western military commands were placed in an impossible
situation.
It was impractical to attempt to meet western concerns with a force that numbered
less than eighteen thousand (throughout the entire country) yet the military did its best.
In Oregon and Washington Territory alone there were more than a dozen forts or other
military posts, which did not include temporary camps. The Department of California
also included more than a dozen posts of one type or another. 11 Garrisoning those
facilities proved difficult during calm times and nearly impossible during active
campaigns, which necessitated that Regular Army commands spend extended periods in
the field.
Such a massive expanse of lands required an equally impressive construction of
facilities and outlay of troops to address everyone’s concerns. However, the military
maintained a comparatively small number of posts with the pitifully small army
sanctioned by the politicians. Such a situation required spreading the western commands
dangerously thin. One young lieutenant in the 1st Dragoons recalled a rather comical
example of just how few troops were stationed in the Far West during the 1850s.
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Following the conclusion of the 1855 Yakima Indian war, Lieutenant Phil Sheridan
remembered that when two officers filed charges against each other, “General John
Wool, the department commander, had not at command a sufficient number of officers of
appropriate rank to constitute a court.” 12
Two important and far reaching results came out of the military’s western
experiences during the 1850s. First, by maintaining a national army that numbered less
than eighteen thousand, volunteer commands did much of the campaigning during some
of the Indian – white conflicts. 13 Second, in its effort to stretch too few men over too
many thousands of miles, the military perfected the policy of parceling out small
elements of its western regiments. In fact, it was impractical to reconstitute an entire
regiment in the field against the highly mobile tribesmen. 14 Both factors influenced the
experiences of the troops in the Department of the Pacific during the Civil War.
When Albert Sidney Johnston assumed command of the Department of the
Pacific in January 1861, his 2,245 men garrisoned 28 permanent posts, as well as a
number of temporary camps, from Fort Colville in far northeastern Washington Territory
to Fort Yuma on the border between California and New Mexico Territory (present day
Arizona). 15 Those scattered forces came from five regiments, three infantry (1st, 4th, and
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9th) and one each of cavalry (1st dragoons) and artillery (3rd). 16 The ranks, by regulation,
were filled primarily with young men. 17 Most of the junior officers, like Lieutenant
Sheridan and Captains George Pickett and Winfield Hancock, were in their thirties.
Naturally, the field grade officers, such as Johnston and Wright were the oldest (the
former turned 58 a few weeks after his assumption of command and the latter was
already 59 as of January). 18
Like every other military department, southerners dominated the Department of
the Pacific’s officer corps at the start of the war – twelve of whom later served as
Confederate generals. 19 The enlisted men came from virtually anywhere, but as one
soldier from Virginia noted in 1855, “There is some of most every nation in the army,
less Americans than any other.” 20 The reason so many foreign-born men enlisted in the
army was simple economics. Freshly arrived and unable to find work, they made perfect
targets for recruiters. German national Eugene Bandel’s experience was not unique:
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I had sold everything I owned that was of value. I owed six dollars at my
boarding house. I did not know what to do. By chance I saw a flag hanging from
a house and under it a sign. It was a notice that the United States wanted recruits
for the army. This was my only resort if I did not want to steal or beg. I went in.
I was accepted soon enough and sworn in. I was bound to remain a solider for
five years, for clothes, lodging, and food, and eleven dollars a month. 21

There were plenty of native sons whose luck also ran out, such as John Whaley, who
enlisted because, “I see very plainly I can never make anything while I stay here
[Virginia] for I get further behind every year that terminates.” 22 This was the Regular
Army that held the Pacific Coast for the federal government as war neared in the early
months of 1861.
At first Johnston, and then General Sumner, continually redeployed the
Department of the Pacific’s limited force of Regulars, abandoning posts in one spot to
strengthen key points elsewhere. It soon became apparent, however, that to address the
increasingly complex responsibilities required a larger force. This became even clearer
during the late summer when the War Department began recalling most of the Regulars
for service in the East. Maintaining the defenses left by the departing troops became a
primary concern for department commanders (Sumner at first, but it mostly fell to
General Wright) and the region’s political leaders, such as California governors Downey
and his successor Leland Stanford, Oregon governors John Whiteaker and Addison
Gibbs, as well as the territorial governors of Washington (William Pickering for most of
the war) and Nevada (James W. Nye).
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In July, after the Union defeat at Bull Run, Virginia, the War Department
instructed General Sumner to accept a regiment of infantry and five cavalry companies of
California volunteers “to aid in protecting the Overland Mail Route.” 23 Continued
Union failures throughout the summer in the East made it imperative to concentrate all
Regular Army commands possible in that area. Hence, in October most Regular Army
commands were ordered east once volunteer units relieved them. 24 This, in turn,
necessitated the War Department request that the states and territories raise more troops,
with responsibilities far in excess of protecting the mail routes.
Recruiting troops, under any circumstances, in the most distant section of the
country was not easy. In order to fill the ranks of the planned regiments, recruiting posts
had to be established in the few population centers. In the Far West, San Francisco and
Sacramento were the only true cities, but there were population bases throughout
northern and central California, with smaller pockets in the southern part of the state.
There were smaller population centers in Oregon’s Willamette Valley, in the Portland –
Vancouver region, and to a lesser degree, along Puget Sound and coalesced near Fort
Walla Walla in Washington Territory.
As became clear during the war, the California commands filled their ranks more
easily than the Oregon, Washington, or Nevada units. In 1861, when it came time to
raise men for the 1st California Infantry, recruiters like Lieutenant George Pettis set up
offices in both San Francisco and Sacramento. Pettis, himself, joined the regiment in
Sacramento and in October went to San Francisco and there “commenced business by
23
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opening his recruiting office on the corner of Montgomery and Clay streets, in the same
building with the Morning Call” newspaper. 25 In three months he recruited enough men
to fill his regiment’s Company K. Working in similar fashion the remainder of the 1st
California Infantry was recruited entirely in the San Francisco area and “assembled and
organized at a camp situated in the City of Oakland . . . . It was named Camp Downey, in
honor of the Governor of the State.” 26 In fact, the 1st and 2nd California Infantry
regiments were recruited in the San Francisco region, as were many companies in the 6th
Infantry and 1st and 2nd California Cavalry regiments. 27
Although many of the California regiments were recruited in the region between
Sacramento and San Francisco, that pool of potential recruits was not infinite. Recruiters
from the 4th California Infantry targeted towns in the northern mining districts, such as
Placerville, Shasta, and Auburn. The regiment even included a company raised in
sparsely-populated San Diego. 28
Recruiting for the two Oregon and one Washington regiments from the widely
dispersed and much smaller population proved challenging. Colonel Thomas Cornelius,
the original commander of the 1st Oregon Cavalry, encountered this problem when trying
to recruit men for his regiment in November 1861. The colonel raised one company at
Salem, while his second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Reuben Maury, recruited two
25
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companies along the Oregon-California border in just one month. However, due largely
to the limited population in Josephine and Douglas counties, attempts to fill companies
there were not as successful. By early1862 recruiters in those counties still had not yet
filled their assignment of two companies. The same situation prevailed in Portland and
The Dalles. Frustrated by Cornelius’ failure to recruit a full regiment, in the middle of
February the department commander instructed the colonel “to perfect the organization of
six companies of your regiment, according to the plan indicated. The remaining four
companies will not be organized until further notice.” 29 On March 16 Cornelius reported
that recruiting efforts in Portland, Oregon City, Salem, and The Dalles finally enabled
him to fill this reduced number of companies. 30 This was seven months after he was
assigned the responsibility of recruiting a full regiment.
Colonel Cornelius’ experience in raising a regiment, although more difficult than
his counterparts in California, were far from the least successful attempt to raise a
regiment in the Department of the Pacific. On October 12, 1861, Justus Steinberger was
appointed a colonel of volunteers and ordered to raise the 1st Washington Territorial
Infantry Regiment. After losing two precious months, General Wright prodded “Col.
Justus Steinberger to repair to Fort Vancouver and commence raising and organizing the
regiment of infantry authorized by the Secretary of War.” 31 Anticipating the
impossibility of recruiting a full regiment in Washington Territory, Steinberger asked for,
and received, permission to recruit most of his companies in California. The long
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delayed process finally got underway in late February, when Steinberger reported that
newly-appointed company officers were at last actively recruiting troops for his regiment.
As anticipated, efforts in Washington progressed slowly, leading Steinberger to
inform departmental headquarters “I have intelligence only from Captain [R.V.] Peabody
on Puget Sound, and the report exhibits very little progress.” As bleak as Peabody’s
news was, it was more than the colonel knew about the recruiting efforts near Fort
Dalles. 32 Finding men in California willing to serve in a Washington command was not
easy either; therefore, Steinberger’s recruiters cast a wide net, working in Alameda,
Calaveras, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz and Sacramento counties. 33 In this way, after
organizing eight companies of Californians, the 1st Washington Territorial Infantry
eventually reached regimental strength. Although Steinberger’s experience was not
typical, none of the recruiters raising troops from among the cosmopolitan population, so
far removed from the main conflict, had an easy time filling the ranks.
The problems confronting recruiters everywhere went beyond the region’s limited
population. They also faced the difficult task of inducing men, who, for the most part,
had come to the Far West in pursuit of wealth in the gold fields, to abandon their dreams
and join the military. Complicating this already difficult task was the fact that most men
who contemplated joining wanted to chastise the Confederates on the battlefields in the
East. As the editor at San Francisco’s Daily Alta California noted, performing the
important, but comparatively unexciting task of garrisoning and patrolling the Far West
and keeping a watchful eye on Confederate sympathizers and Native Americans alike had
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little appeal. Both political and military officials understood the problems facing
recruiters, and did what they could to assist in the various efforts to raise troops. Aided
by politicians and many newspaper editors, recruiters employed a number of strategies to
get a man to enlist, including appealing to his sense of patriotism, encouraging potential
recruits to believe they would serve in the East against Confederates, and, if all else
failed, using the universal strategy of appealing to a man’s economic concerns with
monetary incentives.
The first recruiters in California, either out of their own ignorance or recognizing
the difficulties facing them, published calls to arms that did nothing to dispel the
prevailing opinion that recruits would be sent east to fight Confederates. A member of
the 2nd California Cavalry remembered “how bitterly disappointed the great majority of
the boys were when this order [to proceed to Nevada Territory] came, as we fully
expected to go to Washington City, and from there to the front.” 34 The scene was
repeated throughout the department. James Shelley experienced a similar disappointment
when he joined the 1st Oregon Infantry. “How anxious we all were,” he recalled years
later, “to have the opportunity to go East and participate in the real struggle, though the
Recruiting officer, doubtless knew we would be kept on the [Pacific] Coast.” 35
Early on recruiters recognized that letting potential recruits believe they were
destined for glory in the main theatre of operations proved a winning strategy. Although
each individual had his own reason for joining, many were compelled by feelings of
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patriotism and what better way to express that patriotism than join up to fight the
Confederates. As it turned out for everyone who served in a California, Oregon,
Washington, or Nevada command, they had to prove their patriotism far from the titanic
battlefields in the East. 36
Politicians as well as recruiters believed that appealing to an individual’s
patriotism was a good strategy to fill muster rolls. One of Colonel Justus Steinberger’s
unsuccessful recruiters in the Puget Sound region encouraged enlistment with a broadside
that announced: “TO ARMS! TO ARMS!! TO ARMS!!! ‘Eternal Vigilance Is the Price
of Liberty!!!’” It reminded the “Fellow-Citizens of the United States in Washington
Territory” that “He who prates of love of country and will not place himself in readiness,
in time of danger, to defend it, is unworthy of that proud name we all bear, AMERICAN
CITIZENS.” 37 As noted previously, the effort ultimately proved futile, forcing the
colonel to raise most of his command in California.
During the drive to raise men for the 1st Oregon Infantry, state politicians,
working with local newspaper editors, targeted influential men in counties where
recruiting was underway. They reminded them that “men are needed promptly, and
every consideration of patriotism and of State, local, and personal pride” required them to
“respond to this appeal by earnest and successful work.” 38 Appealing to patriotic fervor
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during national crises had the predictable effect. As William Hilleary, who joined the 1st
Oregon Infantry on Christmas Eve 1864, explained, “My reason for enlisting was that I
felt that I owed the service to the best government on the earth, that rebels were trying to
overthrow.” 39 Like Hilleary, George Hand, a sergeant in Company G, 1st California
Infantry, was also driven by patriotic commitment to serve, saying he joined “as I had
never before served my country, I thought it my duty to do so.” 40 The officers in the
various regiments were no less patriotic than their men. Assessing the role patriotism
played in encouraging men of all ranks to join the 1st Oregon Cavalry, 2nd Lieutenant
James Waymire noted, “I will say here that from my personal knowledge I know that a
great majority of the men who composed the First Oregon Cavalry were young men
acting from a conviction of patriotic duty.” 41
As key as patriotic fervor was to encouraging men to join the volunteer forces in
the Department of the Pacific, patriotism alone, did not lead every recruit to enlist. In
fact, as the war dragged on and it became clear that none of the commands recruited in
Oregon, California, or Washington and Nevada territories would be sent east, raising
troops became more difficult. To offset that effect, recruiters in the Far West responded
in the same manner as those to the East. With the support of both local and state
government officials, and aided by civilian funds, recruiters offered monetary incentives
to induce men to join. These incentives, more commonly known as bounties, played a
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key role in bringing in new troops throughout the war years, but were especially
important as it dragged on into 1864 and 1865.
The inherent problem with using bounty incentives was that scheming individuals
could, and occasionally did, exploit the system by staying with a command long enough
to receive their bounty and then deserting. To combat this, recruiters and officials
everywhere began postponing most of the bounty until completion of one’s tour of duty,
generally set at three years or the duration of the war, whichever was shorter. This had
drawbacks, however, and political regulations could be circumvented if local citizen
committees wished to provide additional bounties upon enlistment. In this way, some of
Private William Hilleary’s associates in the 1st Oregon Infantry not only received their
state bounties upon completion of their service, but local citizens paid as much as $50 in
coins to a recruit upon his enlistment. 42 Savvy Oregon politicians upped the bounties,
but stretched payment out over “three equal installments, to be given each enlisted
volunteer who should offer his services for a period of “three years or dur[ation of] the
war,” the last to be paid at the end of service. 43
Generally, bounty amounts rose as the war dragged on, but with so many
recruiters targeting San Francisco, an astute prospective soldier could play competing
recruiters off against each other. Doing so was certainly not unethical, and as long as the
individual did not desert, the military got its man in the end. Timing was everything in
this game, and when the first calls came to raise the better part of two California
regiments in late summer 1861, the patriotic excitement was sufficient to fill those
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companies relatively easily. Later in the war, however, the situation changed. In late
1862 there were three regiments competing for recruits in the San Francisco area, the 6th
California Infantry, 1st California Cavalry, and what became the California Battalion of
the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry. The result was that rival recruiting stations offered
immediate cash bounties, between $25 and $100, as well as clothing, subsistence, and
blankets (the latter two were offered by the cavalry commands). 44 The cavalry
commands, generally speaking, did not have to offer as much in actual cash payments
since most men preferred service in the mounted arm, which had the somewhat
inaccurate appeal of not having to spend the war in post, living a sedentary military life. 45
The excitement of service was not the cavalry recruiter’s only advantage over his
foot-sore competitors. Since cavalrymen in the Department of the Pacific were required
to supply their own mounts, much like the Confederate policy, but different than that
employed by the Union cavalry in the East, they were compensated for their horses and
their skills. While the volunteer infantryman private could expect to be paid in the low
teens, cavalry privates were paid in the low thirties, with a substantial bounty. Men
enlisting in the 1st Oregon Cavalry received not only $100 for enlisting, but also the
ambiguous promise of a 160 acre land warrant (for somewhere in the vast state of
Oregon) at the expiration of their service. 46 The promise of money and land was an
alluring combination, especially in Oregon, which suffered economic stagnation in the
44
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late 1850s. Likewise, bounties would not have worked elsewhere in the Department of
the Pacific, or, to a lesser degree, anywhere in the country for that matter, if economic
conditions been better. For many who enlisted in the department’s volunteer commands,
the opportunity for wealth or good land that drew them to the Far West never
materialized, and their misfortune became one of the recruiters’ most effective tools.
Realizing patriotism and economic distress led men to consider joining the
military and how recruiters manipulated those sentiments is only the first step in
understanding the background and character of the men who served in the Department of
the Pacific during the Civil War. In large part, they resembled their compatriots fighting
in the main theatres of the war. However, there were some differences, and it is
important to understand the influence those differences had on the volunteers who
protected the Far West for the Union during the Civil War.
Passing a physical examination was the first step taken by all men who wished to
become soldiers. According to Army regulations, doctors “examined him [the recruit]
stripped; to see that he has free use of all limbs; that his chest is ample; that his hearing,
vision, and speech are perfect.” Furthermore, the doctors checked to see “he has no
tumors, or ulcerated or extensively cicatrized legs, no rupture or chronic cuteaneous
affection; that he has not received any contusions, or wound of the head, that may impair
his faculties; that he is not a drunkard; is not subject to convulsions; and has no infectious
disorders.” 47 Rules, however, as the cliché goes, are meant to be broken. As a member
of the 4th United States Cavalry recalled:
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Then I had to take off my boots and step under the apparatus used to measure the
height of recruits and the sergeant proceeded to do his part of the work, and as he
knew that the lieutenant [recruiting officer] wanted to enlist me, he stretched my
measure considerably; bringing it up to five feet, five and one-half inches [the
minimum height for cavalrymen]. Then he took me to the doctor’s office. . . .
Apparently he had no intention of cheating Uncle Sam for the sake of getting a
recruit. There was not a joint in my body that he did not examine thoroughly. 48

Being otherwise fit, officials pushed the diminutive James Larson through the
bureaucracy and he officially entered the service of his country after his medical
examination. 49 Rules, already lax in 1860 when Larson enlisted, became even more so as
the war dragged on. 50
Although the physical standards for the troops were bent according to needs,
department commanders and officials in both Washington D.C. and along the Pacific
Coast, stood firm on the minimum qualifications for officers. Officials were less
concerned about their physical attributes and ability to endure the rigors of service than
their loyalty to the Union and their capacity to lead. 51 In an effort to address those
concerns, department commanders played a much more direct role in the selection of
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regimental officers than they were guaranteed under the volunteer system. Authority
technically resided with the governor of each state or territory. Fortunately, Generals
Sumner and Wright worked during the war with generally cooperative governors who
heeded their advice during the selection process.
Even though the governors were generally cooperative, they were politicians and
they lived in a world nowhere as neatly defined as the department commanders.
California Governor John Downey tried to point out to General Sumner that he only
varied from the general’s suggestions “for the purpose of facilitating the prompt raising
of the men and to prevent dissatisfaction on the part of the militia officers who are
anxious to enter upon active service.” 52 Downey’s concerns, however, were not
Sumner’s problem; his objective was placing qualified and loyal officers at the head of
the forming regiments. Sumner made his view plain when he informed the governor “I
deem it very important that officers of the Army should be selected to command the
regiments.” 53 Downey, like the other governors in the future, understood that Sumner
(and later Wright) was the military expert, and that officers had the support of the War
Department. One of the few showdowns over an appointment did not even involve the
question of choosing between a Regular Army officers and a civilian, but rather that of
which Regular officer to appoint colonel and commanding officer of the 2nd California
Cavalry. Downey wanted Lieutenant John Kellogg and Sumner desired that Captain A.J.
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Smith get the position. In the end the governor informed Sumner, “The regiments are
now arranged as you desired.” 54
Sumner’s broad authority to ensure the quality and loyalty of regimental officers
also afforded Sumner the opportunity to grant advancement to men who served with and
under him in the past. Roughly a dozen officers received high commissions, and a few
others gained lesser positions, due to Sumner’s prodding. Those who benefited included
his son, and men like Lieutenant Benjamin Davis and William McCleave, a former first
sergeant. In Davis’ case, the general testified to his abilities, noting, “I have known this
young officer since he entered the Army, and I know him to be one of the best officers in
it,” and just as important, he was “a firm loyalist to the Government.” 55 As for former
Sergeant McCleave, Sumner chose to replace an incompetent volunteer captain with
McCleave, who was then living in Los Angeles. 56 Since Sumner commanded the
department when many of the California regiments first organized, his influence
exceeded that of either General Wright or his replacement, Major General Irvin
McDowell. Those officers who rose to high commands after Sumner’s early attention
included A.J. Smith, James Carleton, Patrick Connor, H.M. Judah, and B.F. Davis. The
first three became generals (Smith served as a Union major general in the Deep South)
and Davis was killed leading a cavalry brigade against the Army of Northern Virginia.
The situation was different in Oregon at the start of the war, where Governor
Whiteaker made no effort to raise any troops and his loyalty to the Union was suspect.
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Given the governor’s open criticism of the administration, the War Department made
unique arrangements to encourage the raising of an Oregon cavalry regiment, and three
years later, one of infantry. At the behest of Oregon Senator Edward Baker, the War
Department granted civilians authority to recruit the 1st Oregon Cavalry. Thomas R.
Cornelius, a veteran of a number of the Oregon Indian wars directed the recruiting effort.
Instead of reporting to General Sumner, his command was technically under the authority
of Senator Baker, by then a colonel in the Army of the Potomac. 57 This bizarre and
unwieldy arrangement ended when Baker was killed at the October battle of Balls Bluff,
Virginia.
Senators and generals were not the only ones making every effort to ensure the
department’s second tier officer corps was loyal and qualified. In September 1861, when
rumors spread that James Denver (who gave his name to the city) wrangled for himself a
generalship and assignment as a commander in the Department of the Pacific, California
citizens opened a dogmatic campaign to prevent his appointment. Denver was an
opportunist with an uncanny penchant for landing on his feet. Originally drawn to
California by the Gold Rush in 1850, during the following eight years he served in a
succession of political posts. Those offices included, state senator, secretary of state, and
finally U.S. Congressman, and then in 1858 he left for a post in Kansas. In 1852 he had
killed a newspaper editor, who criticized his handling of supply trains destined for
California, in a duel. 58 Whatever political capital he once had in California, his craven
attempts to use the state as a springboard for his own gain combined with his affiliation
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with the Douglass Democrats sapped most of it by 1861. When a letter he purportedly
wrote to his brother, in which he took serious shots at the federal government, surfaced in
a California newspaper, he became persona non grata. 59
Unrest caused by the prospects of California volunteers being led by Denver
became both widespread and virulent. The situation caused so much anxiety that
California’s Adjutant General, William Kibbe, warned the War Department, “We are
endeavoring to fill up the six regiments called for from this State, and I assure you that
this report [that Denver had been posted to the department] has proved our greatest
obstacle.” 60 Kibbe summed up the situation by stating:
All true Union men in this State . . . who have manifested their patriotism and
loyalty by volunteering their services for the war. . . . openly declare that if
General Denver assumes the command over them they will at once resign; that
they have not only no confidence in his loyalty, but on the contrary they believe
him to be at least a sympathizer with the rebel cause and opposed to the war, and
also that he is totally unfit in point of military skill or experience. 61
The War Department heeded the warning and Denver spent the bulk of his war
experience in the military as a desk general before resigning on March 5, 1863. 62
In an odd sense, becoming a junior officer seemed, on the surface, more difficult
than gaining regimental rank, or a general’s commission (even if held only briefly).
Since the troops themselves decided who became company officers, with the final
approval of the governors who could refuse to appoint any selected man, both the
department high command and the political leaders understood the importance of
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ensuring those officers met at least a minimum level of competence. 63 Therefore, those
chosen by the troops still had to pass a qualifying examination, designed, in theory, to
ensure their fitness for command, and more importantly, their loyalty to the federal
government.
The tests were conducted by Regular Army officers at one of the permanent
installations, such as department headquarters in San Francisco. Volunteers in the
District of Oregon, such as the 1st Oregon Cavalry’s Captain John Drake, went before a
board of examiners at Fort Vancouver. 64 Any officer who failed the examination was
denied a commission. The board of examiners, however, proved less efficient than their
stated objective. Captain Drake admitted that outside the regiment’s colonels, Thomas
Cornelius and Reuben F. Maury, “the rest of us officers knew absolutely nothing about
military matters.” In fact, Drake and the other junior officers discovered “There was a
man in Company D who had been a private soldier in the regular army. We (the officers)
got him into our cabin and he taught us the manual of arms. There was another man in
the same company who had been in the cavalry service in British India. He taught us the
sabre exercise.” 65 The boards, however, were not really concerned about the junior
officers’ inexperience; they were volunteer regiments after all. They achieved their
primary goals, namely of not letting Confederate sympathizers get into the officer corps
where they could foment rebellion.
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Had a small number of strategically placed secessionists been able to obtain
commissions in the Department of the Pacific’s officer corps, Union control of the region
might have been jeopardized, but the measures taken by the military rendered such a
notion impractical. The officer corps, however, was not the only way to sow the seeds
for a coup d’etat, or so at least many prominent citizens feared. Citizens in Eugene,
Oregon, fearing Confederates sympathizers might infiltrate volunteer units, beseeched the
military high command to take steps to prevent that from occurring. In an effort to calm
such fears, General Sumner’s office informed these town leaders that District of Oregon
commander, Colonel B. L. Beall, had been instructed, “under no circumstances to accept
the services of anyone ‘about whose loyalty to the National Government there is the
shadow of a doubt,’” which Sumner explained, “will frustrate any plans on the part of the
secessionists to place their friends in positions dangerous to the State.” 66 The general
was more sanguine when he wrote to Colonel Beall that he had “reason to fear that in the
event of volunteers being called for from the State of Oregon,” that at least “the officers
selected may not possess that character for loyalty to the General Government essentially
necessary.” 67 Although no internal threats from either the officers or the troops ever
materialized, Sumner was correct to be wary at the war’s outset. As evidence that the
watchful eyes and screening process failed occasionally, a member of the 1st Oregon
Infantry described how upon hearing the news of President Lincoln’s assassination, “a
few were heard to rejoice over the dreadful deed and not all such rejoicing was confined
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to the civilians – one Commissioned officer, at least, having been reported as a Rebel
sympathizer.” 68
With each new ore discovery the transient population of miners spread further
throughout the region and by the onset of the Civil War, the thinly populated Far West
boasted the most diverse residents in the nation. Not only were there persons from every
state, western Europe, and Russia, but also China, a large Hispanic population, which
until 1848 had been citizens of the Republic of Mexico, and of course the dwindling
number of Native Americans. Since the people came from such diverse geographic and
national backgrounds, concerns over the population’s allegiance to the Union were
legitimate. Therefore, a key to discerning the role played by the troops in the Department
of the Pacific during the Civil War is understanding the background of the men who
served in it.
Like the population they protected, the men who served in the Department of the
Pacific came from an amazingly diverse geographic background and worked in an
equally wide array of jobs. For many citizens, life on the Pacific coast never quite
reached the economic success that led them to come to those far off lands in the first
place. Farming was not easy and the reality of placer mining was not the El Dorado
image shamelessly promoted in the East and across the seas. As it turned out, mining
miners was the best work to be found. Thus, when a need for recruits to fill regiments
during the war arose, there was a ready pool of potential volunteers.
In contrast to what had been true in the prewar army, American citizens actually
outnumbered foreigners in the ranks of the far western regiments. In the case of the
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Oregon regiments, this is somewhat surprising, considering, the fact that the region had
not been under American control for very long. As a result few of the men who
volunteered were actually native Oregonians. The 1st Oregon Cavalry’s William Clyde
and Charles Hubbard were two of the rare exceptions. 69 Among the troops recruited in
Oregon, the largest number named the Old Northwest as their place of birth, with
Pennsylvania and New York not far behind. 70 Troops from every Confederate state
except Florida and Mississippi also served in the Oregon regiments. Even though
American citizens made up a majority of the troops in the department, there were
significant numbers of foreigners in the ranks. The foreign-born troops came from such
countries as Norway, Switzerland, England, France, Scotland, and more frequently,
Germany. The largest number of foreigners, however, came from the Emerald Isle,
which, given the general influx of Irish immigrants after the potato famine, is not
surprising at all. 71
The men in the California regiments generally mirrored their compatriots to the
north, with one significant and one minor exception. Whereas few men serving in the
Department of the Pacific were born in the region, one command was an exception to the
rule. As a captain in the 1st California Infantry wrote, “The extraordinary horsemanship
displayed by the native [Hispanic] Californians led to the belief that a battalion of

69

M.A. Pekar, and Edna Mingus, compilers, Oregon Soldiers During the Civil War, (Portland,
OR: Genealogical Forum of Portland, Inc., 1961). There are no page numbers in this work, but entries are
arranged alphabetically. This compilation deals strictly with troops who served in the Oregon regiments or
the 1st Washington Infantry Regiment not raised in California. See listings under Clyde and Hubbard.
70

These determination are based on a compilation of the origins of the men listed in Pekar and

71

Pekar and Mingus.

Mingus.

77

cavalry, composed entirely of such would render excellent service.” 72 Thus, a leader in
the Hispanic community in southern California named Don Andreas Pico helped raise a
battalion made up primarily of Hispanics from the Los Angeles region. The command
was eventually named the First Battalion of Native Cavalry. Despite Pico’s important
role in raising such a force from among the native Californians, age and disability kept
him from taking to the field; as a result, Major Salvador Vallejo served as the battalion’s
original commander. Both men were prominent in the local Hispanic community, which
at that time retained much of its pre American acquisition dominance –although mostly
confined to the southern part of the state. 73
Although an entire battalion was raised in California’s Hispanic communities,
these were not the only non-Caucasians who served in the Department of the Pacific
during the war. Charles Graffell, an African-American cook, served in the 2nd California
Cavalry. 74 There is some evidence that other African-Americans held similar positions,
but they appear to have been limited to auxiliary roles. Taken as a whole, the men in the
ranks in the Department of the Pacific came from a more cosmopolitan background than
any other command in the Union armies.
Unlike their geographic, national, and ethnic backgrounds, which differed widely,
the men serving in the Department of the Pacific were similar in their ages, but older than
those serving in the East. Of course there were wide variances among the troops, such as
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Privates Richard Jordan (42), Chancy Gregg (45), and Erwin Fleeheart (20), all from the
4th California Infantry Regiment, but most soldiers were in their late twenties. 75 Being
near thirty was hardly young for military service and it was noticeably older than an 1862
survey of the men in the main Union armies, which found 25 to be the mean age. 76 This
is not surprising given that the majority of the region’s population came from elsewhere
and therefore had already spent time trying to make their way in the world.
The hope of becoming wealthy or at least economically independent proved an
illusion for most, and, as a result, men too poor to return to the East worked in many
fields to earn their living. Finding work outside farming and mining in the sparselypopulated Far West was difficult. In fact, in the search for economic stability many men
had a varied, almost wandering working history before they joined one of the fifteen
regiments or battalions that served in the Far West. Many, like the 1st Oregon Infantry’s
Corporal Hilleary spent the years immediately before the war in a number of odd jobs. In
Hilleary’s case those jobs included mining for many years and, finally, before joining on
Christmas Eve 1864, working as a public school teacher. 77 Sergeant George Hand, a 31
year old bachelor from New York, was one of the true “49ers” who fell victim to “the
California fever,” which “was raging at the time and, as I had not been vaccinated against
it, I took it and left for [by sea] for the land of gold.” Hand left behind the early stages of
a career in drafting and twelve years later abandoned his pursuit of gold, no better off for
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his efforts. 78 The 4th California Infantry’s Royal Bensell tried the other common
occupation, farming, which met with little success before he joined in 1862. 79
The story was the same for most soldiers. Few boasted steady (successful)
employment histories before joining. Although farmers, miners, and general laborers
were the most common pre-war occupations, the regimental rosters included carpenters,
blacksmiths, a banker, accountant, silversmith, and even a painter. 80 Also, among the
Oregon troops was a home guard unit mustered into the 1st Oregon Infantry comprised of
students from a private academy and Pacific University. 81 One of the most industrious
individuals was J. Henry Brown, who by 1862 had already spent ten marginal years
chasing gold around the Far West. Determined to better himself, and his economic
chances, he wanted to attend an academy in Salem, Oregon, but he had no money for
food, board, or tuition. Undeterred, Brown “wait[ed] on the tables in a hotel for my
board, and sawed wood nights, morning and Saturday for my clothing and tuition.”
However, after six months “it became evident that the toil was too much and I was
compelled to discontinue [it].” The hard-working 24-year-old, originally from Illinois,
joined the 1st Oregon Cavalry when the call for recruits came in 1861. 82
Despite their significantly lower numbers and the theoretical impact of the
examination boards, the background of the officer corps was also quite diverse. Captain
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Drake of the 1st Oregon Cavalry, recalled that the regiment’s officers included “three
farmers, two miners, two lawyers, two doctors, four clerks, one civil engineer, one
mechanic, five businessmen, two former soldiers of the United States Army, four of no
particular vocation.” 83 The other commands also included men from a wide range of
backgrounds. Among the 1st California Infantry’s company officers were a number of
printers. In fact, Sacramento printers made up the vast majority of Company B. 84 As
Captain Drake noted, there were a good number of former soldiers, mostly noncommissioned officers, sprinkled throughout the officer corps of the various commands
in the Department of the Pacific. That fact was a boon to newly-appointed field grade
officers, who relied on the experienced old soldiers to lead and train the raw volunteers. 85
Just as the men differed in occupation and place of origin, their quality as soldiers,
and really as human beings, differed as well. On the whole, the majority of both officers
and men eventually learned the soldier’s trade sufficiently to carry out the department’s
various responsibilities. Individually, however, there were martinets and ne’er-do-wells
among the officers and cutthroats and bums among the men, and both groups had their
share of drunks.
Drunkenness plagued the frontier military and that situation did not abate because
of the war –in any department or in either army. 86 Service in the vast department, with

83

Drake, 395.

84

Pettis, 7-8.

85

As was the case in both the Union and Confederacy, former Regular Army officers were highly
sought for their ability to organize and train both raw recruits, and the many equally raw politicians who
wiggled commands out of politically driven state and national leaders. In such an atmosphere relegating an
experienced officer to a junior commission made no sense.
86

Perhaps the most famous example of alcoholism among 19th Century officers was U.S. Grant,
who used alcohol to fight the boredom of garrisoning a lonely outpost. Likewise, during the Civil War,

81

posts from the almost unbearably hot Fort Yuma, the dampness of the installations on
Alcatraz Island, in San Francisco harbor and on Vancouver Island, Washington Territory
to the remoteness of Forts Colville near the Canadian border and Fort Lapwai in what is
now west-central Idaho easily corroded the best soldiers, and only exacerbated the worst
traits in the poorer ones. Drunkenness was not the only problem among the troops, but it
was the most destructive, as it only enhanced other detrimental traits. Given the day in
and day out monotony faced by those troops manning permanent installations, or the
exhausting effect of extended patrols over inhospitable lands, many troops took any
opportunity to escape their routine with a few drinks. As one member of the 4th
California Infantry recalled, pay day meant drinking. The drinking commenced shortly
after he and his comrades received their first payment as soldiers. The result was not
surprising; “It looked as if a hard battle had been fought; for more than a mile around the
camp there could have been seen those who had fallen dead-drunk, the victims of General
Alcohol.” 87 The truth was that, excessive drinking did far more than diminish military
effectiveness; it was dangerous in and of itself. J. Henry Brown recalled one such
incident that occurred when heading to Fort Walla Walla, where “a member of Co. “C”
who was drunk and a bad man anyhow shot a[nother] member of Co. “C” while on the
march.” 88
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While dealing with one drunk soldier could be deadly, such a situation became
exponentially more explosive when confronted with numerous drunken soldiers, as
became clear to a member of Company E 11th Ohio Cavalry, then guarding the telegraph
line to San Francisco. After most of the company went on a binge, “they were nearly all
drunk. One of them was so drunk that he could not get on his horse.” When ordered to
do so, he attacked a sergeant, who “drew his revolver and shot him, the ball tore out one
of his eyes but he did not kill him.” At the same time, after another drunk soldier rode
about the post, knocking down an officer in the process, “The commander ordered
Companies [A, B,] D. and G. under arms.” 89 In the melee that ensued, the soldier on the
horse was mortally wounded. Such incidents did nothing either for morale or efficiency.
Drunkenness impeded control over troops and destroyed the cohesion necessary in
military units.
Not every soldier drank and even those that did were not all necessarily drunks;
more than a few soldiers were simply unsavory by nature. Sergeant John Dimick felt
many of his fellow troopers were “Mean low degraded wretches that cant talk of anything
but some low blackguard slang. And it would be like jumping out of Hell into heaven to
get away from them.” 90 Just as offensive, and potentially far more deadly, than merely
being a despicable individual was having cowards among the soldiers, and somehow such
individuals found their way into the ranks. Royal Bensell served with such an individual
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noting, “My impression is, J.B. Condon is unnecessarily frightened, in more polite terms,
a Coward.” 91
As they were quick to point out, the officers could be at least as repugnant as any
soldier. Common complaints centered on abuse of power (one such incident prompted a
California infantryman to express a sentiment that reverberates among all soldiers across
time; he ridiculed his commanding officer as “What an Ass.”), which only got worse
when the officers drank. 92 Demonstrating a lack of decorum as well as the ability to
control their drinking, a California soldier wrote in his diary that “Lieut. of 5th
[California] Inft. went on dress parade very drunk,” while “Another one was caught in the
graveyard with a squaw.” Not surprisingly, the sergeant felt the officers “are, take them
all in all, a miserable, slovenly set and altogether unfit to command even Indians. This is
the whole and nothing but the truth.” 93
Concerned more with the martial abilities, or rather the lack of those skills, than
the character of his fellow officers, Captain Drake worried about the almost total lack of
military knowledge he and his fellow 1st Oregon Cavalry officers possessed: “This was
discussed amongst us: how we were to obtain the necessary instruction to enable us to
perform the duties of officers and train those raw recruits was a problem that worried us
not a little.” 94

By the end of the war, Drake, with more than a bit of introspection,

could say, “Notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labored, the time came when
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we understood our business and our duties as well as any officers or troops that we came
in contact with, and a great deal better than many of them.” 95
As the records show, Drake and his associates eventually became efficient
officers, and most of the men also became good soldiers. Despite the number of
examples of the worst of both men and officers, the majority did their duty to the best of
their abilities and more or less reflected the values of the population from which they
came. Even those who disdained the worst in their fellow soldiers recognized that most
were good men and good soldiers. Sergeant Dimick, who despised many of his fellow
cavalrymen, realized they were a mixed bag. As he informed his fiancé, “It is true there
is [sic]a good many men in our company that I would not be ashamed to be in company
with. But there are some again that are no account to themselves or to anybody else.” 96
The always pragmatic Captain Drake felt his troops, no matter their faults, “were fine
material for frontier soldiers, accustomed to the use of firearms and the care of horses;
notwithstanding their inferior number the huge task of keeping things straight in that vast
extent of wilderness and desert was faithfully and efficiently performed.” 97 Colonel
George Bowie added the compliment that “They all faithfully and honorably acquitted
themselves in the sphere assigned them.” 98
The men who served in the Department of the Pacific during the Civil War came
from all walks of life and their places of birth spread across North America, including
every state, Canada, and Mexico, and across the Atlantic to Europe. Virtually all of them
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were volunteers and most started out as neophytes. Understanding who served in the
nation’s western most lands during the Civil War provides a basis on which to examine
their service to their (in some cases adopted) country. Knowing their demographic
information, pre war employment, how they characterized each other and their service
rendered, sheds light on the type of soldiers that served in the Department of the Pacific
during the Civil War. Being aware of such important information makes it clear why the
regional and national officials and military high command initiated policies toward the
troops. Despite the inability to gain any glory in the Far West, astoundingly diverse men
from different regional, national and ethnic, as well as economic, backgrounds
successfully carried out the complex responsibilities assigned them during the war.
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Chapter
-3THE DANGER WITHIN:
PROTECTING THE FAR WEST FROM SOUTHERN SYMPATHIZERS

When war broke out in the East, the Federal government knew the Far West was
not secure. Not only were there thousands of southern-born civilians spread throughout
the region, the department’s officer corps was rife with southerners, including the
department head. Although Albert Sidney Johnston did not dishonor his commission by
turning over his command to southern sympathizers, rumors that he would reached
Washington D.C. even before the firing on Fort Sumter. 1 By secretly ordering the
unquestionably loyal Edwin Sumner to San Francisco to replace Johnston, officials in the
capital made it clear that they feared an insurrection in the Far West and that they were
committed to preventing that from occurring. 2
Once the war began the Federal government worried that pro Confederate
insurgents would precipitate a revolt within the department’s borders, either on their own
or with the aid of invading Confederate forces. If such a revolt proved successful it
would be an economic disaster for the Union and a political and military boon for the
1
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Confederacy. Ensuring that did not happen was the Department of Pacific’s most
important task –especially at the outset of the war. Although the general view was that
the strongest concentration of Confederates and southern sympathizers was in southern
California, the reality was far more challenging. When the world flooded into California
in 1849 and then later dispersed in spasmodic rushes to other gold strikes throughout the
Far West, thousands of southerners were among the faceless miners desperately pursuing
the dream of quick riches. With pockets of southerners, many of whom openly
sympathized with their native states, scattered throughout California and Oregon as well
as Washington and Nevada territories, the Department of Pacific had to maintain close
watch for any insurgent activities, and be prepared to defuse those threats, if possible,
and, if not, to suppress them by force.
Oddly, the man the Federal government distrusted, department commander Albert
Sidney Johnston, actually initiated the first measures to protect the Pacific slope from
internal threats. It is significant to note that as early as December 1860, the government
developed apprehensions about the Far West’s security, specifically about retaining the
region within the union. Such concerns were not misplaced, given the vocal secessionist
populace and large number of southerners stationed throughout the region’s military
posts. Understanding the atmosphere, with regard to southern sympathizers, is therefore
fundamental to understanding how the department protected the Far West from a proConfederate insurrection.
Well before the war, there had been an element among the western frontier
populace agitating to break away from Union control and to create their own nation. The
issue revolved around not wanting to abide by federal laws (including taxes) crafted by a
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government a continent away. The would-be revolutionaries hoped to create a new
nation on the North American continent, a Pacific Republic. This was not a new scheme.
The original idea was called the Bear Flag movement, which referred to the uprising led
by famed American frontier explorer John C. Fremont against the Mexican government
that took place in Sonoma, California, in June 1846, during the Mexican-American war.
After the 1860 election California agitators dusted off the dream of a Pacific
Republic and used the Bear Flag as a means to challenge the federal government without
being directly associated with the Confederacy. Their hope was that Department of the
Pacific commander General Johnston would collude with such a scheme by turning over
his command to those attempting to take the Far West out of the union.3 Despite rumors
to the contrary, and fears at the highest political and military levels in Washington D.C.,
the general flatly rebuffed those plotters who had the temerity to approach him with their
plan. Although they could not know Johnston would not betray his commission, as
David Twiggs had, officials in the nation’s capital had nothing to fear.
Uneasiness about the security of the most remote section of the nation grew as the
political unrest intensified with the secession of southern states in late 1860 and early
1861. Making matters seem far more precarious, the incoming Lincoln administration
understood that significantly more people in the states of California and Oregon had
voted against, rather than for, Abraham Lincoln the previous November. 4 Lincoln won
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California by a mere 711 votes and Oregon by 280, and those thin margins were only
possible because of the split Democratic ticket.5 Such an atmosphere did not portend
good things for the Union in the Far West. In January, in response to those trepidations,
Army headquarters ordered Johnston to strengthen the San Francisco harbor defenses
against all enemies. 6 Johnston quickly took steps to allay those concerns, including
countermanding Army headquarter orders to discontinue work on Fort Point at the harbor
entrance, manning that post in force, giving specific instructions heightening the level of
awareness at the harbor installations, and removing 10,000 rifled muskets from Benicia
Barracks to the greater safety at Alcatraz Island.7 Making it clear that the danger could
come from any source, Johnston ordered the commander on Alcatraz Island, “To
maintain your post and defend Alcatraz Island against all efforts to seize it, from
whatever direction such efforts may be made.” 8 Although maligned by contemporaries
as a would-be traitor, whose plan to turn the department over to secessionist was thwarted
only by the timely arrival of his replacement, the general not only brusquely spurned
inducements to surrender his command, he diligently followed orders until he turned
command over to his successor. Therefore, it was Johnston who set in motion the
strengthening of the San Francisco harbor defenses against any dangers, including
insurrection.
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The efforts to reinforce San Francisco harbor may have relieved some anxieties
about that important trading hub, but it did not quell the increasingly vocal calls for a
separation from the union. What the new commander, Edwin Sumner, found after
corresponding with his subordinates and civilian informants did not alarm the veteran
officer so much as it left him and officials in the capital ill at ease. As part of the initial
assessment of his new command, Sumner informed Army headquarters that despite a
generally loyal populace, subversive efforts were afoot “to draw California into the
secession movement; in the first place as the “Republic of the Pacific” expecting
afterwards to induce her to join the Southern Confederacy.” 9 Not long after the War
Department received that sobering view, the New York Times opined for its readers that
southern sympathizers in California “hoped that by suddenly precipitating the state into
confusion and proclaiming a Pacific Republic, either the whole of the state or, at all
events, the Southern half of it, would gently but surely glide into their hands.” 10 Echoing
these sentiments, Mary Rhodes, who lived in southern California, wrote “The only hope
of peace here is the formation of a Pacific Republic.” 11
It seemed that the Pacific Republic movement was on the verge of coming back to
life, and along with it the Bear Flag. In mid 1860 one central Californian echoed the
Pacific Republic sentiment when he warned his eastern relatives,
Whenever you get at it and divide North and South on your side of the mountains
we shall secede, with the Rocky Mountains for a line and form an Empire on the
Pacific, with Washington Territory, Oregon and California and we shall annex all
9
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of this side of Mexico. We should have a fine country. We don’t care a straw
whether you dissolve the Union or not. 12
Although recent scholars have questioned whether or not southern California was a
hotbed of pro-Confederate sentiments, that was the belief held during the war. This was
not a view held by a gaggle of fearful post commanders in remote districts and paranoid
civilians. Future general James Carleton and Winfield S. Hancock both believed enemies
of the federal government populated the southern part of the state. 13
In mid 1861 Hancock served as an assistant quartermaster in Los Angeles. Being
stationed deep in the southern part of the state, the captain diligently kept tabs on any
disloyal activities. On May 7 he sent a warning to departmental headquarters, informing
Sumner that the Bear Flag had been publicly raised 12 miles from Los Angeles three days
earlier and that informants told him “that flag will be paraded through our streets under a
strong escort” the next week. 14 He felt that in order “to avoid insult to our flag, it might
be well to have all the efficient dragoons from Fort Tejon at this point by Saturday
next.” 15 Although the dragoons did not reach the town before the rumored
demonstration, Sumner already had the foresight to order a company commanded by
Brevet Major James Carleton to Los Angeles. When the rumored parading did not occur
Hancock subscribed the inaction to two things: first, he believed the “leaders” to be men
12
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of means, who suddenly realized their attempts to foment anti government sentiment
among the masses might endanger their wealth, and secondly, “the moral effect produced
by the reported proximity of troops,” extinguished their enthusiasm. 16
Unfortunately for the Department of the Pacific and the federal government, talk
of splitting the West from the union and forming a Pacific Republic not only persisted,
but extended beyond California. The idea of a separate nation on the Pacific slope had
been kicked around in Oregon almost as long as it had in California. For almost twenty
years there were Oregonians who felt no particular connection to a national government
that seemed little interested in their well-being, periodically calling for a Pacific
Republic. In July 1860 one Oregon newspaper charged that southern-sympathizing
Oregon senator Joe Lane and like-minded California senator William Gwin were
conspiring with southern leaders to break the nation into three separate republics, two in
the East and one on the Pacific Coast. 17 Farther up the coast, one Puget Sound pioneer
remembered “there was in serious contemplation establishment of an American republic
on this Coast independent of the United States to embrace all the States and Territories
west of the Rocky Mountains.” 18
Although the notion of a Pacific Republic originated long before the Civil War,
the idea gained renewed appeal in the unsettled political atmosphere caused by the war.
In this atmosphere, Department of the Pacific officials faced the challenge of trying to
control a divided population, where secessionist sentiments – which often gave rise to
16
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renewed calls for a Pacific Republic – were found in every town and mining camp. As a
pioneer Angelino remembered, “Sympathy was very general here for the Confederate
cause.” 19
Across the Sierras in Nevada Territory, secessionist sentiment grew so vocal and
displays of southern support so frequent by early summer 1861 that reinforcements were
rushed to Fort Churchill, 30 miles south of the capital, and a supply of arms stored in
Carson City were removed to a safer location. 20 A homegrown Confederate flag was
even flown in Virginia City until the arrival of a Union force intimidated the
secessionists. 21 The captain sent to investigate the level of danger concluded that there
existed “an organization to subvert the authority of the Federal Government in this
Territory and declare for the Confederate states.” 22
The story was no different in the western part of Washington Territory: “At an
early stage in the great civil war it became apparent that there were in California, Oregon
and Washington, men ready to aid in the destruction of the Union by every means within
their power.” 23 Puget Sound pioneer Charles Prosch further stated, “In secret they
plotted, here and elsewhere on the coast, to dismember the Union, with a view of aiding
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their confederates in the Southern states.” 24 The situation was the same in the territory’s
eastern half.
Prior to the war, Walla Walla, which was adjacent to Fort Walla Walla, was the
only town of any note in the eastern part of Washington Territory until a gold strike on
Idaho’s Salmon River in 1863. At that time it was also the only gathering of buildings
worthy of being called a town in a region that included northeastern Oregon and what
became west-central Idaho Territory in 1863. As an established town, Walla Walla
served as the gold miners’ main supply hub, and as such it grew in the same way that
gold rush towns had grown in the Sierra Nevadas. There were large numbers of
southerners included in the population of desperate miners. When war broke out in the
East, the proximity of U.S. soldiers and southern sympathizing miners led to the
inevitable clash. As one early town resident remembered, “The gamblers and roughs at
Walla Walla and all the mining camps were Rebels or rebel sympathizers . . . . And these
gamblers and desperadoes were the terror of the Union people.” In such an atmosphere
tensions escalated when soldiers came to visit one of the many bars. The southernsympathizers “sometimes would make a soldier or volunteer drink to the health of Jeff
Davis or Beauregard, and if he refused, kick him or knock him down.” 25
In the fall of 1861 words finally exploded into gunfire during a ball honoring a
local girl. As the mixed crowd grew rowdy, words were exchanged between one of the
soldiers and the southern gamblers, two of whom pulled out their pistols and began firing.
During the ensuing melee some 50 to 100 persons emptied their weapons, some “jumped
24
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down from the gallery,” whereupon they “all were shooting through the theatre. The
crowd of ladies and children ran out the back way, over the stage, and all was confusion.”
The southern sympathizing sheriff discharged his pistol in a sergeant’s mouth, killing him
instantly, as he called the victim a Union son of a bitch. Other soldiers, as well as
gamblers and thugs, were hit. One of the soldiers staggered through the front doors, his
uniform pocked with several bullet holes and bleeding profusely, before falling dead on
the street. Once word reached the fort, a large number of enlisted men sought out those
that killed and wounded their comrades. Inexplicably, all the assailants had escaped –
some to meet well deserved violent deaths in the region’s other mining districts. 26
Somewhat similar cases of violence between secessionists and the military
occurred far to the south, one along the southern California - Nevada border, and the
other in the south-central part of California. Demonstrating that the Los Angeles-San
Bernardino area was not the only place rife with dangerous secessionists, three members
of the First California Cavalry were attacked in La Paz, on the Colorado River, without
warning in May 1863. The three were part of a detachment of troops that escorted
supplies from Fort Yuma to Fort Mojave. On the return trip, the command stopped in La
Paz before continuing back to Fort Yuma. While in town, three of the troopers tragically
encountered a man named Edwards, described as “a secessionist desperado who was
confined at Yuma.” 27 Upon seeing the unarmed soldiers, Edwards, who had been
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captured with former state legislator, Daniel Showalter, fired on all three, killing two and
seriously wounding the third. Despite stationing troops in La Paz in July, Edwards
escaped, undoubtedly due to the assistance of local secessionists. 28
Two months after those murders, and a bit north and west of La Paz, on August 6,
heightening tensions between Visalia, California, secessionists and troops stationed at
nearby Camp Babbitt finally boiled over. On that day a pro Confederate local named
James Wells murdered Charles Stroble, a sergeant in the Second California Cavalry. As
had happened in Walla Walla, the network of local secessionists helped Weller escape
before a patrol from the camp arrived. 29 Lieutenant Colonel William Jones, commanding
Camp Babbitt, warned department headquarters, “An outbreak may be looked for at any
moment. The rebels are well organized.” 30
Although the Walla Walla fire-fight and murders in Visalia and La Paz are
extreme cases, they illustrate what General Sumner told Army headquarters: “The
secessionists are much the most active and zealous party, which gives them more
influence than they ought to have from their numbers.” 31 Just before leaving California
for glory on the eastern battlefields (and death from a heart attack), Sumner informed his
successor, General Wright, “The secession party in this State numbers about 32,000 men,
and they are very restless and zealous.” 32 As worried as officials were over open support
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for a Pacific Republic, the truly menacing spectre was the significant minority of the
population that openly sympathized with the South and the secret organizations of armed
southerners said to be sworn to fight on behalf of the South. Both national and local
leaders believed such groups were present in every part of the far western frontier.
Although these organized and armed societies went by a number of names, including
Knights of the Columbian Star, the most often cited organization was the Knights of the
Golden Circle. 33
The society, which envisioned a slave empire that spread out in a circle from
Havana, Cuba, and reached as far north at the Mason – Dixon line, was organized as the
Knights of the Golden Circle on July 4, 1854, in Lexington, Kentucky, by George
Bickley. 34 Specifically, as Bickley told a Raleigh, North Carolina audience in 1860,
The Knights of the Golden Circle constitutes a military organization, as a nucleus
around which to hang such political considerations, as will if well managed, lend
to the disenthrallment of the cotton States from the oppressive majority of the
manufacturing and commercial interests of the North. 35
By the time the war started there were many clubs throughout the South, including some
in Texas and even Mexico, espousing this goal. With a significant minority of
southerners living in the far western states and territories and the open support shown for
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the Confederacy by many of those persons, it is not surprising that clubs were also
formed on the Pacific slope following Lincoln’s election.
As Captain Hancock’s experience in the months after war broke out attest,
southern California proved to be fertile ground for secessionist sympathizers. This was
particularly true in the area between Los Angeles and San Bernardino, where southern
sympathies were at least as strong as the attachment to the national government. As one
early newspaper editor and politician stated, the southern part of the state was “strongly
saturated with the virus of secession at the time.” 36 This saturation rattled San
Bernardino Judge John Brown, sufficiently that in July he wrote his fellow jurist, Los
Angeles Judge Benjamin Hayes: “I fear there will be trouble in this place soon. I have
been informed that private secession meetings are held in this city almost every night;
there is one to-night, and I was advised this evening to keep my gun in good order.” 37
Civilian officials were not the only ones concerned about secessionist plots in
southern California. Later on, during the local elections in September 1861, Captain John
Davidson, stationed in the Los Angeles area with a company of the First Dragoons, found
himself in the middle of an unruly mob of southern sympathizers, “having sticks in their
hands, [who] commenced shouting: “Hurrah for Jeff. Davis! Hurrah for the Southern
Confederacy. Most of the persons had revolvers.” 38 The blatant disregard for the
presence of a uniformed Union officer, whose command was less than half a mile away,
did not bode well for maintaining control of the region.
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Although southern California became the most fertile region to raise new clubs on
the Pacific Coast, K.G.C. organizations existed throughout the Far West. 39 When, in
August 1861, a significant number of influential San Franciscans heard rumors that
Sumner would lead a large contingent of troops into Mexico and permanently out of
California, they protested directly to Secretary of War Simon Cameron. They warned
Cameron “The hatred and bitterness toward the Union and Union men . . . is no more
intense there [the East] than here.” According to the businessmen, their investigation had
“show[n] us that there are upward of 16,000 “Knights of the Golden Circle” in this State,
and that they are still organizing even in our most loyal districts.”40 This number seems
radically inflated, but when one considers that Sumner put the number of secessionists
within California’s borders at 32,000 (which included informant estimates for the Knights
of the Golden Circle), the number seems at least possible. 41
Demonstrating the level of confusion regarding the secessionist movement in
general and the membership of the secret organizations specifically, the State of
California’s Adjutant General (head of the militia) informed then Commander and Chief
of the Union army, Major General Henry Halleck, “It is represented and generally
believed that there is a secret organization in this State, numbering between 20,000 and
30,000 men leagued together for the overthrow of our government.” 42 An agent who
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gained the confidence of some of the organization’s members reported in August 1864
the active membership within “the Knights of the Golden Circle and the men they can
control, will reach 50,000,” but he admitted, “the actual number is very hard to arrive
at.” 43 Whatever number is exactly accurate is less important than the fact that department
officials and influential civilians believed the threat was genuine at the time.
This confusion was the problem. In order to neutralize any threat that a secret
organization such as the K.G.C. might pose, it was imperative that Union officials remain
informed about their plans and activities –and, if possible, about the membership.
Despite the level of importance, infiltrating an organization in which the membership
only knew a few members by sight, proved challenging. Fortunately for each of the
Department of the Pacific commanders, Union spies did infiltrate a number of K.G.C.
clubs during the war. Although most of the members remained unknown, as did the
combined total membership, department spies unearthed significant information about
K.G.C. plans, at considerable personal risk.
One such operative, Gustav Brown, confirmed the general suspicions about
secessionist sentiments in southern California when he reported his findings about the
Knights of the Golden Circle in Los Angeles and San Luis Obispo counties. What
Brown’s infiltration of the organization uncovered was startling for its depth and
dramatically contradictory of previous inflated estimates. While the total number of
members in the state was unclear, Brown found out there were 242 members in San Luis
Obispo County and 253 in Los Angeles County, and they were all well-armed. Captain
Hugh Gorley put the numbers in more colorful terms, saying the K.G.C. were “as thick as
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leaves in Vallambrosa.” 44 From his infiltration, Brown gleaned from the lower level
members that “there are men organized in Nevada for the purpose of coming into
California in case of an outbreak for the purpose of assisting the Knights.” 45
Sifting reports made by other operatives, Captain Robert Robinson of the Provost
Marshal’s office, explained to his superior why it was so difficult to keep track of K.G. C.
activities: “There are no large meetings held of the order in their capacity as an
association, but a few only of the officers and the trusted members get together to initiate
new members and devise the work which is to be carried out.” 46 Even without the large
gatherings, the department responded to the danger posed by the K.G.C.’s strength by
sending additional troops to southern California, especially in the first year of the war.
The departmental chess game worked well; as a result the K.G.C. were unable to execute
any of their clandestine plots.
Despite the overwhelming focus on California (especially the southern part of the
state) the entire far western frontier was divided in its sympathies, which proved fertile
ground for other K.G.C. clubs. As one Boise basin miner noted, “In this new mining
region, as everywhere else, the people were divided in their opinions regarding the war
and in their sympathies for those who were actively engaged in it.” 47 As the Portland
Oregonian reported, the situation was the same throughout that state, where clubs were
supposedly formed along the coast and on the Columbia River, which posed a threat to
44

Military Order of the Loyal Legion, California and Oregon Commandry, 60 (Wilimington,
N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing, 1991, reprint), 201.
45

O.R., 50:2, 1018.

46

Ibid, 938.

47

W.A. Goulder, Reminiscences: Incidents in the Life of a Pioneer in Oregon and Idaho, (Boise,
ID: Timothy Regan, 1909), 207.

102

the commercial traffic on the river. 48 The Oregonian also reported that the various
K.G.C. groups bided their time, waiting for a signal to rise up in all of Oregon’s leading
towns. 49 In November, the provost marshal at Fort Hoskins, Oregon reported more
disturbing information. A local civilian told him that he overheard “the disunionists
making menacing threats against the garrison, such as, ‘Well, I have been up there, and I
think that we can take the garrison in one hour. . . . We would fire the buildings and shoot
the officers as they came out .’” 50 Such bluster would not have jangled the provost so
easily had not a portion of the fort’s command already been sent elsewhere to protect
more important points in California.
In the later part of November, the most terrifying rumors imaginable reached Fort
Hoskins. Combining the locals’ two greatest fears and presenting the department
officials with two of their most challenging responsibilities in one, the provost marshal
informed District of Oregon headquarters that at least one southern sympathizer
attempted to incite unrest among the tribes. According to the informant, when a man
named Newcomb left a gathering of Indians, “he distributed to the Indians guns and
revolvers and ammunition, and told them to fight for Jeff. Davis and the Southern
Confederacy.” 51 The tribesmen, the provost reported, were too wise to fall for the ploy –
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this time. 52 Although nothing came of the pro-southerner’s attempt to agitate unrest
among the Puget Sound tribes, news the following year confirmed that there were those
still hoping to use the Native Americans to open up a new front, thereby aiding the
Confederacy. In October 1862, General Alvord reported hearing rumors about
disturbingly similar activity along what is now the border between southeastern
Washington and east-central Idaho among the Nez Perce tribes. According to the
general, “Seccession sympathizers, fiendish enough to wish to see re-enacted the scenes
in Minnesota, may exist there.” 53 Whether or not the plot ever had much chance of
success, it never came to fruition, and the Pacific Northwest was spared the horrors of a
secessionist supplied Indian war.
Making matters worse for the Department of the Pacific were the southern
sympathies of some of the region’s political leaders. This made subduing the subversive
scheming more difficult until these southern sympathizers were voted out of office.
Southern sympathizers, if not full blown pro Confederates, held many important political
offices ranging from U.S. senator, House of Representatives members, and governor on
down to the local officials, particularly in southern California. That included the mayor
of Los Angeles, Damien Marchessault, who was reportedly a secessionist. 54 At the start
of the war both California and Oregon were represented in the Senate by vocal opponents
of the Republican candidate and the party’s platform, and many considered California’s
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William Gwin and Oregon’s Joseph Lane to be secessionist (Lane had been the vice
presidential candidate on the Breckinridge ticket). 55 In 1860 the Knights of the Golden
Circle openly supported John Downey for governor of California. Downey did become
governor after Milton Latham resigned the post to assume the state’s vacant senate seat. 56
In the southern part of the state, during the fall 1861 elections, the locals chose almost
exclusively anti government candidates.
The situation was the same to the north, in the Pacific Northwest segment of the
department. In Walla Walla, the county sheriff and the city marshal were both avowed
secessionists, as were other local officials in many of the mining boom towns. 57 Worse
yet, one of the most belligerent opponents of the federal government (many said pro
Confederate) on the West Coast was Oregon’s governor, John Whiteaker. The governor
proved so uncooperative when called upon to raise a regiment of volunteers to help
protect the Far West that the responsibility was eventually turned over to prominent
citizens. Showing just how little trust the War Department had in Governor Whiteaker’s
allegiance to the Union, on September 24,
The War Department being convinced of the necessity of raising a body of troops
in Oregon to meet all exigencies which may exist there, and with a particular view
to the defense of the frontier, I am directed to authorize you [Thomas Cornelius,
Benjamin Harding, and Reuben Maury] to raise for the service of the United
States one regiment of mounted troops. 58
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The three men who served as the First Oregon’s regimental officers were told to report to
former Oregon senator Edward Baker, then a colonel in Virginia and to take their orders
from him. Whiteaker’s persistent opposition to federal authority necessitated this
unwieldy arrangement, until Baker’s death in late 1861.
Having been circumvented by the War Department, the governor followed a
course of belligerent resistance in all future dealings with both civilian and military
departmental officials. 59 In one editorial, an Oregon newspaper editor, disgusted by
Whiteaker’s pro-southern attitude and obstructionist tactics, lamented, “poor fiddling
Whiteaker, ‘Old Cat Gut’ is the biggest ass in the State.” 60 Echoing this sentiment, Judge
R. E. Stratton warned Department of the Pacific headquarters in the summer of 1861, “It
is not to be doubted that the Governor of this State strongly sympathizes with the rebels.”
“Oregon,” he added, “has a large faction of her population who are as devoted to the
rebels as any men to be found in the South.” 61
With southern sympathizers holding a number of western political offices, and a
significant –and vocal– secessionist population throughout the Pacific slope, the
Department of the Pacific faced a daunting challenge. 62 Although the military presence
in the region was greater than before the war, department leaders never had enough
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troops to address their multiple responsibilities; therefore, they did not have massed
troops to suppress uprisings and keep the region within the Union. Just as they did when
dealing with the Native American threat, department officials moved troops from one
reported secessionist hotbed to another. By doing so, they prevented secessionists from
gaining control of any part of the Far West or menacing the important gold fields and
shipments. One of the best methods to defeat any such dangers was to remain abreast of
all secessionist activity. With the knowledge of what the southern sympathizers planned
to do, department leaders attempted to overawe the recalcitrant secessionists while
limiting the danger of exposing other areas within the department’s borders.
The first step to securing the Far West for the Union was to silence, or at least
quiet, the secessionist enclaves. The trouble with that strategy, however, was that there
was no place with a heavily concentrated pro-Confederate population. The majority of
southern sympathizers were scattered throughout the small frontier mining and farm
communities. The one significant exception was southern California, where civilian and
military leaders alike believed southern sympathizers abounded. All three of the
department’s last commanders felt the Los Angles – San Bernardino area was rife with
secessionists. Therefore, when considering how the department dealt with the internal
threat through its vast expanse, it is important to examine how it maintained Union
control over the most volatile southern hot spot on the Pacific slope.
Even before the war broke out, lightly-populated southern California had a
reputation for harboring southern sympathies and antagonism toward the federal
government. One military official believed this was, at least in part, due to the large
Mormon population in the region, particularly in the San Bernardino area. As he put it,
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“The Mormons, whatever their professions, hate us [the federal government/military] at
heart.” 63 Furthermore, the “open sedition and treason among the whole people” appalled
the officer. 64 Los Angeles Judge Benjamin Hayes spoke for many officials in those days
when he asked the simple question: “What are the Mormons doing?” 65
The Mormon population, which seemed strongest near San Bernardino and in the
adjacent Holcomb Valley, could not by itself, however, account for the region’s anti
government atmosphere. That there was a significant population of southern
sympathizing in the lower part of the state led the Confederate high command to dream
of a Pacific outlet. According to Confederate Captain Trevanion Teel, the southern
government assumed there was a large enough number of secessionists in the Southwest
(what is now southern portions of New Mexico, Arizona, and California) that the arrival
of an invading Confederate force would be welcomed. From these secessionists, the
government anticipated organizing a large army with which to conquer California. 66 In
early January 1862 the usually unruffled Judge Hayes acknowledged that even he feared
the region’s Confederate supporters might initiate internal fighting. On the ninth of that
month he wrote in his diary: “I begin now, indeed, to apprehend that we are on the eve of
witnessing serious evils in this beautiful section of the State. A war here would certainly
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be utterly ruinous to all our material interests; and would be likely to stain our annals
with tales of bloodshed.” 67
Well before the judge pondered the frightening possibilities, General Sumner took
steps to alleviate his own apprehension about keeping the southern part of California in
the Union. Once he became acclimated to the dangers and challenges of his new
command, Sumner acted quickly to preempt any secessionist uprisings. He understood
the areas posing the greatest danger to Union control were the southern part of California,
as well as in the Carson City, Nevada Territory vicinity. Wasting as little time as
possible, Sumner began taking steps to secure both regions in late April, when he
reshuffled his scattered force. 68
Just as he removed troops from the District of Oregon and northeastern
California’s Fort Crook and ordered them to the San Francisco area to shore up the
defenses of that key location, Sumner also consolidated his forces in southern California,
concentrating them where he believed the secessionist threat was greatest. On April 29,
Sumner ordered Fort Mojave abandoned, with instructions for its garrison to establish a
base near Los Angeles. 69 As Sumner explained to Army headquarters in Washington, “I
have found it necessary to withdraw the troops from Fort Mojave and place them at Los
Angeles. There is more danger of disaffection at this place than any other in the State.” 70
Clearly, expediency in bringing a larger force to the Los Angeles area was paramount.
Therefore, not only did Sumner order the troops from Fort Mojave to the town, three days
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later a company from Fort Tejon was also ordered closer to Los Angeles. 71 At the same
time, the forts’ commander, Brevet Major James Carleton, was placed in command of all
the troops in the general area, thereby streamlining the chain of command. 72 To further
bolster this larger command, two howitzers were added to Carleton’s force, while one
company was sent further south to San Diego. 73 These were the first steps to overawe
southern California’s secessionists and to snuff out any hope they might have of rising up
and taking control of the region.
On June 7 Carleton received orders to abandon Fort Tejon as well and to move
the remaining troops to the newly created Camp Fitzgerald, a temporary base first
occupied on May 14, 1861. 74 By the end of June there were four infantry companies and
the two howitzers in Los Angeles. Concerns about the possibility of an election day
uprising in another southern part of the state resulted in Carleton’s receiving orders in
mid-July to personally gauge the attitude of San Bernardino residents and to assess the
level of threat. 75 The situation there proved unsettling and Carleton advised that there
needed to be a camp in the vicinity. Eventually, the department heeded his advice and
established Camp Carleton. 76
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The strategy paid off. Even though the region voted a number of anti government
candidates into office, only minor subversive activity broke out. However, the
atmosphere had been volatile; as the commander of the troops in San Bernardino noted,
there had been “one or two displays of secession sentiments, which were promptly
checked by the show of a portion of the dragoons.” Never-the-less, the locals “expressed
the belief that the measures taken by the general and the arrangements made by myself
prevented great trouble, if not much bloodshed.” 77 Still, “the secessionists are much
more numerous than the Union men in this section of the country . . . . I am satisfied that
the sudden and unexpected appearance of the dragoons had a very beneficial [controlling]
effect.” 78
The presence of a number of infantry companies and the dragoons did temporarily
end the secessionists’ public scheming in southern California, but Department of the
Pacific officials faced usurper threats in other parts of its jurisdiction as well. As
Confederate victories mounted throughout the summer, secessionists in the Far West
grew bolder and more vocal in both their support for the South and their threats to assist
it. In addition to the strong secessionist presence in southern California, department
officials heard increasing rumblings about a concentration of Confederate sympathizers
in and around Carson City, Nevada Territory.
With only the under-strengthed contingent at Fort Churchill, Nevadans took
matters into their own hands, keeping vigilant watch over the secessionists. Without
sufficient arms with which to equip themselves, more or less all they could do was report
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treasonous activity to the commander at the fort or directly to department headquarters.
One such group wrote to the commanding officer at the fort: “We are confidently
assured that the secessionists have completed an organization of over 100 . . . . The
general impression is to seize the fort and get possession of the Territory.” 79

Two

weeks later informants, rightly or wrongly, estimated the number of active pro
Confederates had increased to over 200. The commanding officer at Fort Churchill
informed department headquarters “This gang of men is well armed and is composed of
such men as have for some months bid defiance to the laws of the Territory.” 80 Making
matters worse, there was a quantity of arms and ammunition, belonging to the state of
California, warehoused in Carson City, a tempting cache for those wanting to challenge
federal authority in the region. 81
General Sumner responded to the danger in Nevada Territory just as he had in
southern California. In early June he provided the U.S. Army Adjutant General’s office
with an overview of his efforts to quell internal unrest in southern California and Nevada.
I have found it necessary to withdraw from Oregon a considerable part of the
force stationed there to re-enforce the troops in California and Nevada Territory
. . . . I have checked them [Confederate sympathizers] in the southern part of this
State by placing a strong command at Los Angeles, and they are now trying to
organize in Nevada Territory, but I am moving re-enforcements rapidly to Fort
Churchill, which will put down this movement. 82
A key part of Sumner’s strategy, beyond reinforcing Fort Churchill, was to gather up all
the public arms and to distribute as many of them as were needed to loyal militia units,
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while simultaneously searching for any stolen weapons that might be traced back to the
secessionists, and to arrest anyone with ties to any such weapons. Responsibility for this
task fell to assistant quartermaster Captain Treadwell Moore, who searched a number of
buildings, including private homes, and arrested a few Silver City and Virginia City
residents suspected of hiding stolen weapons. 83 Although Moore later released everyone
he arrested and only confiscated those weapons he could find, his presence sent the
secessionists underground and encouraged local Unionists to form two companies of
militia. 84 Moore’s active presence combined with the distribution of additional guns to
the loyal militia and the expansion of the garrison at Fort Churchill to four companies
quelled any further secessionist activities in Carson valley – for the time being.
Sumner’s reshuffling of troops to address the department’s changed
responsibilities, which included defending the vast territory encompassed within its
borders against internal threats, proved successful, and although a number of anti
government (and some open secessionists) were elected to office that fall, quiet prevailed.
The jockeying of troops throughout the department deflated secessionist schemes in all
regions, and not just the two locations where a concentration of southern sympathizers
existed. With the Confederate invasion of New Mexico Territory late in 1861, the
department achieved an important victory by subduing the secessionist movement within
southern California and west-central Nevada Territory. Although there was more unrest
in the department during the following years, particularly in southern California, quelling
internal unrest at that time was especially important considering that, as Captain Teel
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stated, the Confederates hoped to create an army from the southern sympathizing
elements in the southwestern lands.
Keeping the undercurrent of secessionist sentiment from erupting in any region
within the department was one of the its primary responsibilities, and having done so in
1861 was a victory for the Union’s most remote department. However, there were other
ways the secessionist element challenged the Department of the Pacific’s control over the
far ranging lands. Within the general populace of dissatisfied spirits there existed those
that did not plan to wait for a Confederate invasion, or a general uprising, to launch their
support for the southern cause. The department faced the additional task of preventing
those southern sympathizers from leaving the region to join Confederacy. The danger of
that happening decreased rapidly after 1861, but from the outset of the war until the early
months of 1862 the troops in the southern part of the Department of the Pacific remained
busy trying to stop the boldest of the secessionists from joining the Confederate ranks.
Two groups of influential southern sympathizers were among those that undertook the
dangerous endeavor during the war’s first year.
With such a massive area to protect, it might appear the border would have been
too porous for department officials to have hoped to prohibit the flight of anyone wishing
to fight for the Confederacy. For practical reasons, however, this was not the case.
Given the Pacific slope’s daunting distance from the main fields of conflict, there were
few possible routes that presented any real hope of reaching the contested lands. Further
complicating the situation for would-be Confederate soldiers was the fact that most routes
led to Union states. The best path to take, and here best is used rather generously, was
the southern route, which headed east from southern California, through New Mexico
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Territory, and finally into Texas. As harsh as the trek across the sun-baked Arizona-New
Mexico-Texas deserts was, it was the shortest route to Confederate territory. Doing so
was noticeably more plausible late in 1861 and early 1862 when actual Confederate
troops occupied part of New Mexico.
No one could question the commitment to the southern cause of anyone who
undertook the long journey across the burning hot deserts of Arizona and New Mexico
just to reach the active battlefields. That a few brave (or desperate) souls undertook the
trek attests both to the inability to cross on any other land route and to the Department of
the Pacific and Pacific Squadron’s ability to prohibit anyone trying to flee aboard ocean
going ships. Under these limiting circumstances, there was only one good debarkation
point, and a federal fort sat on a rise overlooking it.
In California’s southeastern corner, where the turgid Colorado River is met by the
Gila River, thus separating present-day Arizona from the Sunshine State, Fort Yuma
rested on a hill like a sentinel above the river. This arid, stiflingly hot, entirely
inhospitable place was the point at which the southern transcontinental route (and
Butterfield stage line) crossed into California. For those individuals determined to head
east to join the Confederate forces, this was also the starting point for an eastward
odyssey that required traversing the debilitatingly hot and dry cactus lands of New
Mexico Territory and west Texas.
On June 16, 1861, a small party of men set out from Los Angeles for Fort Yuma
with plans to press across the deserts before them until they reached Texas in their efforts
to join the Confederate fighting forces. The leader of this small party, joined by a
considerable number of like-minded individuals before they reached Fort Yuma, was
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former department commander Albert Sidney Johnston and seven other former federal
officers. 85 Knowing efforts to arrest him would soon be underway, Johnston left Los
Angeles a week ahead of his (well orchestrated) rumored departure, and thereby reached
Yuma before the net could be drawn around him. His party arrived at the fort on July 4,
and left shortly thereafter to stay ahead of either an arresting party or orders for the forces
at Fort Yuma to arrest him. One of the party recalled they left “after the sun had sunk
low enough to permit the waters of the spring to cool so that our animals would drink.” 86
The many years in the West as a cavalry officer had both tempered Johnston like steel
and enabled him to anticipate how his former colleagues would go about trying to capture
him, thus he pressed on and thereby escaped before department orders for his arrest
reached Fort Yuma. 87 The department had failed to prevent the departure of the most
important group of Confederate supporters to make the bold attempt during the entire
war. Others, however, were not so fortunate.
The Johnston party’s escape had a very perceptible impact on the Confederacy, as
Johnston became the second highest ranking general in the Confederate armies, before
being killed at Shiloh the following April. There was a future brigadier general and
colonel among the rest of the group, three of whom gave their lives in battle (making four
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altogether counting Johnston). 88 Thus, Johnston’s escape had been an important failure
by the department.
Success, however, did not always greet similar efforts. In late November former
state senator, Daniel Showalter, and roughly 20 followers attempted to replicate
Johnston’s successful escape from California. Although the Showalter party was not as
important as Johnston and his companions, they were still well known by department
officials, and they were determined to prevent them from joining the Confederate forces
in New Mexico Territory. By this time this responsibility fell to the first volunteers to
take the field, who replaced the Regular Army commands when the latter left to shore up
the forces in the East. To prohibit any secessionists from slipping past the troops at Fort
Yuma, Colonel James Carelton, now the District of Southern California commander,
ordered the troops to confiscate all ferry boats on either side of the Colorado for 30 miles
in both directions. 89 In addition to blocking the eastern escape route, Carleton ordered
patrols sent from Camp Wright, near Los Angeles. If they came across any large and
suspicious parties traveling eastward toward the border, they were to “stop it, search the
persons and baggage if you suspect them of being enemies of our country.” If the search
produced “evidence of their being disloyal, or of their giving aid and comfort to the
enemy, hold them in confinement and report all the facts and all the evidence in each case
to me.” 90
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Unfortunately for the Showalter party, Carelton knew of their intentions and was
better prepared to stop them than had been the troops the previous July. Worse yet,
Showalter failed to outwit the Union troops as Johnston had, and furthermore, he did not
possess Johnston’s calm, but hardened determination. Given Showalter’s shortcomings
and the Union troops’ diligence, the likelihood of the party’s escaping California was
slim. To enhance their chances, they planned to cross the Colorado “river about thirty
miles below Fort Yuma on the Sonora side,” and travel under the guise that they were
prospectors heading to Sonora. 91 With Fort Yuma ahead of them and patrols circling
toward them from behind, the group was more or less trapped, although they did not
know it until it was too late.
On November 29 a troop of First California cavalrymen surprised the main body
of the Showalter party (two scouts sent ahead of the group had already been captured).
Major Edwin Rigg, who sent the pursuing troops after the secessionists, informed his
superior: “The party consists of sixteen men, each man armed with a rifle and pair of
revolvers. They gave us a hard chase, but we finally captured them.” 92 Carleton ordered
Rigg to send the prisoners to Fort Yuma, which served as something akin to a political
prison for much of the war. Astonishingly, the entire party was released less than six
months later. Despite the quick release, the notorious group’s capture and incarceration
dissuaded others –but not all– from attempting to reach the Confederates then in New
Mexico. 93 By the end of the year department officials could be proud of their success in
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greatly reducing, if not completely stopping, the secessionist flight from southern
California. Although fewer and fewer persons attempted to make their way from
southeastern California to New Mexico Territory/Texas as the war progressed, the Union
troops stationed in the region maintained their vigilance throughout the rest of the war.
While the number of secessionists attempting to escape the Far West for the
Confederacy diminished as the war progressed, the internal threat did not. In fact, the
two boldest actions taken by Confederate sympathizers within the department borders
occurred after the war was well under way. Although possession of the entire Pacific
slope would have been a tremendous boon to the desperate South, California was the
main prize. California’s Pacific ports could greatly aid the southern cause by giving the
southerners a port beyond the Union blockade, but mostly the Confederacy desperately
needed its gold. Control of California would not simply provide the South with a reliable
source of wealth, it would simultaneously deny the Union millions of dollars in gold each
year.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy, once Union troops turned back the invasion
from the Southwest in the spring of 1862, the possibility of conquering California
evaporated. The Confederate defeat and subsequent stumbling retreat to Texas ended the
dream of a coast-to-coast Confederacy – for both the southern leaders in Richmond and
for West Coast secessionists. As severe as that blow was to the region’s pro-Confederate
population, it did not extinguish their determination to aid the South by attacking the gold
supply. In fact, if anything, it forced the secessionists to craft more imaginative, more
fantastic, schemes.
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The problem facing the Confederate sympathizers was not acquiring gold; that
was the easy part. Their challenge centered on taking as much gold as possible at any
one time, and limiting the number of raids. Clearly, this precluded robbing the hardscrabble individual miners, few of whom had more than a half-full pocket of gold at any
one time. If western secessionists hoped to aid the Confederacy, they needed to strike on
a much larger scale. Not only would that enhance the value taken in any one attack, it
would also lessen the likelihood of capture. Under these circumstances the options were
limited; attacks could be made either on the various gold expresses that carried bullion
from local banks to San Francisco; the secessionists could rob any of the holding banks,
or, most grandiose –and most rewarding– of all, they could find a way to attack the ocean
going gold shipments on their way east. In the end, two actual attempts were carried out
separately, and there is no indication of any centralized organization that planned similar
efforts elsewhere.
Prior to the completion of the transcontinental railroad in May 1869, the only
feasible method of transporting large quantities of goods to or from the Pacific Coast was
to send them via ocean-going ships. That long, tedious, and generally expensive method
meant little was shipped back from the Pacific states. The one exception was California
gold. Not since the Spanish galleons carried North American treasure back to Europe
had ships leaving American ports transported such wealth as the years after the Gold
Rush. The American government had always been concerned about the security of those
shipments, and those worries magnified exponentially after the Civil War broke out.
Given the activities of such Confederate raiders at the C.S.S. Alabama and the previously
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noted attempts to outfit a British ship at Vancouver Island to prey on American shipping
in the north Pacific, those concerns were warranted.
Despite the attractiveness of pirate operations against the gold shipments
(and other commerce), it was not until 1863 that southern sympathizers living on the
West Coast undertook the bold enterprise. As had been true when trying to launch raids
from Vancouver Island, the primary challenge facing anyone trying to outfit a raider
along the Pacific states was acquiring an adequate vessel. This was no simple task
considering the authorities (both local and federal) understood such an effort might be
attempted, therefore, they employed undercover agents to remain abreast of any activity
involving a large enough ship that could attack commercial vessels on the ocean.
However, if a ship could be acquired, the risks lessened once at sea, and the rewards
could be significant. The Pacific squadron was stretched terribly thin, therefore capture
on the seas seemed unlikely, and most tantalizing of all, each of the Pacific Mail
Steamship’s gold shipments carried roughly one million dollars worth of bullion in its
hull. 94
In the early hours of March 15, 1863 a group of less than 20 secessionists finally
actualized their plan to attack the gold ships that ran from San Francisco to Panama. The
plan, concocted by southerner Asbury Harpending, was
to sail the Chapman to some islands off the coast of Mexico, transform her into a
fighting craft, proceed to Manzanillo [Mexico], exhibit our letters of marque and
my captain’s commission in the Confederate Navy and then lie in wait for the first
Pacific Mail liner that entered the harbor, capture her – peacefully if possible,
forcibly if we must.
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Once the first ship was captured, Harpending continued, the pirates planned to transform
the Pacific Mail ship into a (bigger) privateer with which to prey on the other gold ships
before word of their activity spread. 95 The first step in this bold plan was acquiring a
ship. The conspirators’ initial obstacle was that they did not have enough money to
purchase a satisfactory ship; therefore, the scheme was put on hold until February.
Finally, an infusion of money from one of the would-be privateers enabled them to
purchase the J.M. Chapman. Preparations, which had to be done as inconspicuously as
possible so as to avoid detection, went slowly. For the next few weeks the privateers
loaded war material aboard the ship and made modifications to make it ready for a career
as a sea raider. 96
Unfortunately for Harpending and his c-conspirators, their efforts did not go
unnoticed. As Department of the Pacific commander General Wright informed the Army
Adjutant General, “The collector of this port and officials of the Government, as well as
the city authorities, were on the alert to detect any parties who might engage in such a
business. A schooner [J.M Chapman] attracted attention.” 97 On the morning of March
15, unaware they had been detected and were under constant surveillance, the Chapman
left its moorings and started to ease out of the harbor. A boarding party from the one
man of war available, the U.S.S. Cyane, quickly pulled alongside the Chapman and
climbed aboard. Being overmatched, neither the crew nor the additional men hiding
below deck resisted, and the ship was captured without incident. When members of the
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boarding party discovered Harpending, he was “chewing and tearing up papers, which he
[sailor from the Cyane] doubts not were the letter of marque and instructions.” 98
Once the authorities knew of the plan, the scheme was doomed. Had the ship
somehow gotten past the Cyane, it would have been obliterated at the entrance to the
reinforced harbor, where Sumner and Wright had combined to order the placement of
well over 100 pieces of heavy artillery. Even before the purchase of the Chapman,
department personnel, along with naval and civilian authorities, knew some attempt was
being made to acquire and outfit a ship as a raider. For some time, as Wright noted,
“suspicions have been entertained that attempts were being made to fit out rebel cruisers,
either on Puget Sound or in the harbor of San Francisco, for the purpose of preying upon
our commerce on the Pacific.” 99 This awareness enabled the military (both naval and
land) authorities to work with their civilian counterparts to thwart this bold attempt as
well as remain abreast of all other designs to attack the gold shipments, none of which
were ever tried.
The failure of the Chapman scheme, along with the inability to purchase a ship in
Victoria, ended any hope of outfitting a Confederate raider on the West Coast. However,
other Confederate agents found alternate ways to aid the Confederacy. While the bullion
ships, laden with western gold destined for the East Coast, were natural targets, obviously
devising a successful plan to capture any of them was difficult. Banks in San Francisco,
where gold was held before being loaded onto those ocean going ships, housed the next
largest quantities of gold. Any thoughts of robbing those banks of large (and heavy)
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quantities of gold were even more impractical than trying to seize gold shipments on the
ocean. Any such attempt would, itself, be a challenge because the banks understood the
danger, and therefore exercised extra vigilance. Furthermore, the likelihood of fleeing
with wagons full of gold through the city without being stopped presented additional
dangers, given the fact that they would first have to elude any bank guards, then civilian
authorities, and finally, the military. As no such plot ever surfaced, the combined
difficulties apparently precluded the secessionists from concocting any such schemes.
With the failure of the seaborne attempt to capture western gold and the
impossibility of a raid on one of the banks warehousing the bullion succeeding, there
remained just one way to acquire a significant quantity of the much needed wealth, albeit
less than could be captured from a gold shipment or robbing a bank. The gold that
accumulated in San Francisco banks, waiting to be sent on the circuitous ocean trip to the
East, arrived in the city via stagecoach. All traveled considerable distances, and most of
those routes went through uninhabited, rugged country. A Wells Fargo strong box full of
gold bullion and coins, guarded by at most three men (and any daring passengers inside
the coach) made for an inviting target. Finally, on June 30, 1864 a small band that
claimed to be authorized Confederate agents came to the same conclusion and set in
motion the robbery of stage expresses transporting gold down from the Sierra Nevada
Mountains. The stated purpose was to use the gold to raise and arm Confederate units in
California, where many still believed there was an undercurrent of secessionism. 100
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That evening, six men, one wearing a Confederate captain’s uniform, held up the
Pioneer Company Stage’s Virginia City (Nevada) – Sacramento stage, near Placerville.
They ordered the driver to throw down the Wells Fargo strong box, filled with seven
sacks of bullion and $2,000 worth of gold coins. They did not, however, rob any of the
passengers. Before ordering the stage to proceed, the leader, R. Henry Ingram (who wore
the Confederate uniform) handed the express driver a receipt that stated the gold had been
taken on behalf of the Confederate military, with the purpose of outfitting recruits in
California. The band attempted to rob the next stage, but failed before fading into the
darkness. 101
Whether or not the party was comprised of Confederates, secessionists, or merely
imaginative highwaymen, the robbery was a civil matter. Therefore, the following
morning a posse of local law enforcement officials set out in pursuit. The posse caught
up with some of the robbers that day and attempted to arrest them, at which time a gun
battled erupted. Two gang members were caught, at least one of whom was later
executed, and a deputy sheriff was killed. Two weeks later, most of the remaining
members of the group were cornered in a farm house, but rather than surrender, the
heavily armed men fought it out with the posse. That decision resulted in the mortal
wounding of two “secessionist” highway men and the capture of all but one of the rest.
The local officials did not give up their pursuit of anyone else who might have been
involved in the plotting or supporting of the robbery. In fact, the focus shifted to those
that provided protection to the group. Those effort resulted in the arrest of a number of
noted Democrats and individuals known to harbor southern sympathies. Fearful that
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some of their allies would attempt to capture the jail and free their friends, the local
officials received reinforcements from a detachment from the Fifth California Infantry. 102
Whether or not the gang that robbed the stage and those that supported them were
authorized to raise troops for the Confederacy is uncertain, but the testimony of the one
gang member eventually executed (for the murder of the deputy sheriff) sparked deep
concern. According to the defendant, Thomas Poole, he belonged to “a band of men
whose purpose it was to form a company for the Confederate army,” committed “to resist
to the last if the military authorities or any one else attempted to interfere with them.” 103
The sequence of events and, in particular, this testimony rattled the local population. It
also shows the importance of civilian cooperation in the effort to protect the Far West
from internal threats, particularly when danger was just as likely to be non military as
military in nature.
With the war winding down in the fall of 1864 and the secessionists’ failure to
find a successful means to attack the gold shipments, it became less and less likely there
would be any serious threat to West Coast security. There was little –maybe no – chance
that any secessionist action, of any kind, could materially aid the Confederacy by this
stage in the war. This being the case, the pro Confederate element in the Far West grew
increasingly quiet during the last months of the war.
When the war finally sputtered to a bloody conclusion in April and May 1865,
Department of Pacific leaders and troops could be proud of their ability to keep
secessionists from either taking the Pacific slope out of the Union (with its much-needed
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gold, and then later joining the Confederacy) or initiating a destructive, and distracting,
regional civil war. Furthermore, the department’s ability to squelch subversive activity,
most often before it was much underway, prevented western secessionists from drawing
troops away from the eastern theatres of the war, and thereby weakening the main Union
armies. The truth was that the Department of the Pacific performed its three primary
tasks remarkably well. Those responsibilities included, first and foremost, maintaining
Union control of the region, protecting the gold shipments, and prohibiting southern
sympathizers in the Far West from joining the Confederacy.
Preventing an insurrection, with its myriad of possible outcomes, from breaking
out was the Department of the Pacific’s most important responsibility, and therefore its
greatest success and contribution to the Union war effort. By shuffling troops from one
secessionist hot bed to another, establishing posts in the most volatile regions, and using
force to deter those crafting clandestine schemes to overthrow federal control authority
(this was particularly so with the infiltration of secret organizations such as the Knights
of the Golden Circle), Department of the Pacific leaders and troops prevented a costly
uprising in the Far West. The failure of internal plans to separate the region from the
Union, combined with the inability of a Confederate invasion force to reach California
and conquer the area, meant a tremendous lost opportunity (both economically and
politically) for the South. A significant part of that lost opportunity, of course, was the
failure to capture gold shipments – either on the sea or in large quantities in California or
Nevada Territory. The department’s ability to protect the gold shipments meant the
national government could count on the annual infusion of over one million dollars in
gold bullion at a time when the reliance on greenbacks grew exponentially. Such gold
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resources gave greenbacks greater, although certainly not overwhelming, credence, and
the South’s failure to acquire hard currency greatly hampered its ability to purchase
much-needed war material overseas. Thus, by safely protecting the gold shipments from
land and sea (originating along the Pacific Coast) attacks, the Department of the Pacific
greatly aided the Union war effort while simultaneously hurting the Confederacy. 104
Although less important than holding the Pacific slope for the Union and protecting the
gold shipments, the department did a solid job of diminishing the number of far western
secessionists who escaped to the Confederate states. By doing so they reduced this
relatively small manpower source drastically.105 Furthermore, by manning forts in key
locations to slow the secessionist exodus, leaders strengthened the department’s
southeastern border against possible invasion. In short, the Department of the Pacific did
an outstanding job of suppressing the insurgent sentiment that lingered throughout the Far
West during the war, and it did so at a time when it faced a growing cacophony of
dangers.
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CHAPTER
-4SOUTHERN SCHEMES AND BRITISH BLUSTER IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST DURING THE CIVIL WAR:
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND THE NORTHERN BORDER

During the Civil War, the situation north of the border presented Department of
the Pacific leaders and regional political officials with potential dangers singularly
different than those churning below the southern border in Mexico. Fortunately, the far
western Union leaders did not have to fear a large-scale Confederate invasion coming
through Canada as they did from Mexico. That bit of good news notwithstanding, the
situation along the northern border warranted close observation and precautions to thwart
any potential dangers that might arise. The combination of a vocal populace of
southerners in both the regional capital, Victoria, on Vancouver Island and in the gold
upstart gold towns, combined with an edgy governor, nervous about the influx of
Americans chasing gold strikes, had the potential to create any number of problems.
Even though, by 1861 relations between political and military officials on both sides of
the border were better than they had been in many years, the momentary calm did not
entirely assuage decades-old mutual suspicions. Given the uncertainty of the governor’s
commitment to British neutrality, there existed the strong possibility that he might ignore
Confederate sympathizers trying to outfit a raider with which to disrupt United States
commerce on the Pacific. Those same sympathizers could, as was proven in eastern
Canada, provide a base for paramilitary attacks into Washington Territory. Most
frightening, if also most unlikely, of all was that the royal governor might disregard the
official British position of neutrality and take matters into his own hands.
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As far-fetched as such potentialities might seem, they were taken very seriously
by Department of the Pacific leaders and especially the more easily agitated politicians in
the Northwest. Unchallenged American control of the Pacific Northwest, meaning the
present states of Washington, Oregon, and the Idaho panhandle, did not begin until 1846,
and even then there were numerous unsettled boundary questions. In fact, the question of
control of the region almost precipitated a war in the mid 1840s. Acrimony arose anew
as late as 1859, when the fragility of a joint occupation of San Juan Island in Puget Sound
resulted in a political confrontation of comic proportions. Compounding these regional
agitations (with international ramifications) was Canada’s role in larger conflicts between
the United States and England, which resulted in two wars and two political
confrontations that nearly escalated into wars on other occasions in the 85 years prior to
1860. The key to understanding the difficulties facing the Department of the Pacific
north of the border, thus, is putting the concerns held by department commanders in the
context of the long history of periodic animosity between England and the United States
as well as understanding the dangers unique to the region, especially once the war began.
Given the fact that American and British forces had each crossed the Canadian
border as part of military operations during two previous wars, concern over what the
British might do did not seem that far fetched at the time. In 1775 American colonial
forces, led by Generals Philip Schuyler and Richard Montgomery invaded Canada in an
attempt to convince the French population to rise up and throw off their British masters.
Ultimately, the campaign was a failure. Not only did the French prove more pragmatic
than foolhardy by not joining the Americans, whom the British soundly defeated at
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Quebec in December 1775. 1 Two years later Canada again factored into the active side
of the Revolutionary War when British forces commanded by General John Burgoyne
marched south out of Canada with the intention of striking Albany, New York, and
cutting an eastward swath, thereby isolating New England from the rest of the rebelling
colonies. Ultimately, this campaign proved far more disastrous to the British military
than the American effort two years earlier had to the colonists. The colonial victory at
the resulting October 1777 Battle of Saratoga, and the subsequent surrender of
Burgoyne’s army, induced the French to join the American fight. Having served as the
target of an early American invasion and then as the base of operations for a British
attack on the colonies, Canada proved an integral factor in the early part of the American
Revolution, with repercussions that affected the outcome of the war.
American wariness of the British presence in Canada did not dissipate with the
end of the Revolution in 1783. In fact, supplies for the British forts in the Ohio Valley,
that were supposed to be abandoned as part of the Treaty of Paris, came down from
Canada. Those supplies included arms for the various Native American tribes, many of
whom used them on American frontiersmen. Anxieties caused by the British refusal to
abandon its forts in that region, the holding of which was made possible supplies from
Canada, did not cause the War of 1812, but they aggravated an already tense situation.
By 1812 the United States was a dramatically different nation than it had been at
the outset of the Revolution. Although the country’s borders ran from coast to coast ever
1
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since the Louisiana Purchase, only a few sparse settlements extended beyond Michigan
Territory. The expanded American-Canadian border meant that when the War of 1812
broke out, the potential theatre of operations extended several hundred miles further
westward than it had in the 1770s. Just as had been the case at the outset of the
Revolution, Americans harbored Canadian aspirations. Unlike the Revolution, however,
when Canada represented a potential ally, in 1812 the sole purpose of an advance across
the border was to take the fight to the British. 2
Reminiscent of actions of more than 35 years earlier, American forces invaded
Canada at the earliest stages of the war. Victories again proved difficult to achieve in
1812 and 1813. For their part, the British also repeated their Revolutionary experience,
marching south from Canada fighting a number of engagements in 1812 and 1813, finally
launching a major invasion along the eastern section of the border in 1814. Like the
Americans, they suffered the same fate as they had more than 35 years earlier.
In the span of roughly 35 years the relations between the British in Canada and
the United States were marked by two wars, in which both sides invaded the other nation,
and the intervening years were marked by suspicion, fear, and mistrust. Although
relations slowly improved after 1815, the lack of trust, as well as economic competition
in the disputed Oregon territory, prohibited relations from thawing completely.
Continued mistrust combined with growing American expansionist sentiments led
to rising tension between the British and Americans, tension which reached a critical
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level during the 1844 presidential campaign. James K. Polk based his enthusiastic
expansionist candidacy on American braggadocio, political rhetoric, and a Jeffesonesque
desire to create an “Empire of Liberty”. Polk’s campaign platform called for the
“reannexation of Texas and the reoccupation of Oregon.” If Polk, after being elected
president, followed through on another campaign slogan of “54’ 40” or fight,” the United
States would gain most of what is now British Columbia, to the 54’ 40” parallel line,
either through negotiations or the use of military force. As much as the notion of trying
to seize such a large chunk of Canada seems ridiculous now, the British took the hostile
political language quite seriously in 1844, even if they understood Polk had used the
Oregon question for political hay. What he would do as president was unclear.
Therefore, they were warranted in preparing to defend the farthest western region of
Canada from American expansionism.
Despite the heated rhetoric, which served its purpose in helping to get Polk
elected, the president-elect retrenched quickly. 3 Although he spoke boldly about
pursuing all of Oregon in his inaugural address, Polk’s initial offer to the British was
more restrained. 4 Like his predecessors, Polk’s first proposal to settle the nagging
Oregon question was to extend the 49 parallel line all the way to the Pacific Ocean. 5 In
December Polk informed Congress that British officials had refused his offer, which, he
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told them, was the last time he intended to make such a proposal. 6 Polk heightened
tensions further when he asked Congress to terminate the 1827 joint occupation
agreement. As anticipated, the measure passed easily in the House, but was shot down in
the Senate. Despite this defeat, the president’s actions alarmed the British. In response
to the rapidly deteriorating situation, one British official suggested sending naval vessels
to both the Puget Sound region and to the mouth of the Columbia River. In March 1845
it appeared the two nations might actually go to war over the unsettled Oregon question.
Once again, America’s future was intertwined with British Canada, this time far off on
the Pacific coast.
Polk’s boisterous attacks on the British, political posturing, and circumstances
along the Mexican border made it expedient to settle the issue quickly and peacefully.
Furthermore, the Anglo-American trade was too valuable to both countries to risk
conflict in such a far removed region. The British ambassador to the United States
passed along his government’s offer for arbitration of the dispute along with England’s
willingness to agree to the 49th parallel line, excluding Vancouver Island. Political
wrangling in the U. S. Congress delayed action on the proposal until April, when it
agreed to arbitration. The British acceptance of the revised plan reached the capital in
June 1846 where it was approved three days later. 7 Thus, war with England over the
Oregon question was averted, as were tensions along the American-Canadian border.
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As the sectional crisis in America heated up in the late 1850s, relations between
Americans and Canadians in the Pacific Northwest once again degenerated into political
skirmishing. In fact, events in 1859 included the shedding of British blood, which led to
a military standoff between local forces representing both nations. Actions taken on June
15, 1859, resulted in one of the most bizarre episodes in American diplomatic history.
The language that settled the Oregon question had been ambiguous about who owned San
Juan Island in Puget Sound. That ambiguity resulted in both American and British
citizens settling on the island. Given the joint occupancy and lack of either side having a
clear title –or control –a conflict seemed inevitable.
At the heart of the growing difficulties were American rights to be on the island at
all. The British inhabitants, who outnumbered the Americans until May, were employees
of the Hudson Bay Company, and they did not recognize American claims to any part of
San Juan Island. One interloping American named Lyman Cutler sparked the
international conflict when he took matters into his own hands. After building a cabin, he
planted a garden, which he fenced as best he could. Unfortunately for Cutler, freeroaming Hudson Bay livestock easily trampled the garden and uprooted his potato patch.
Following unsuccessful complaints to the local Company official, Cutler shot and killed
an offending hog, for which he attempted to pay the official. The seemingly justifiable
murder of the wandering British pig very nearly ignited a war, or rather the reactions to
that event brought England and the United States closer to armed conflict than at any
time since Andrew Jackson won the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815. 8

8

Information on the origins of the Pig War can be found in Keith A. Murray, The Pig War,
(Tacoma, WA: Washington State Historical Society, 1968), 32-33.

135

The officer who took over command of the American contingent on San Juan
Island, Captain L.C. Hunt, wrote shortly after the incident subsided,
I am confident that this whole imbroglio is a disgraceful plot involving General
Harney, a dull animal, Mr. Commissioner Campbell, a weak, wordy sort of man;
Captain Pickett, to some extent, whose main fault perhaps has been bad judgment
in allowing himself to be used as a tool by the main conspirators. 9
Hunt was not alone in his assessment of the origins and motivations behind the Pig War.
Major Granville Haller contended that Harney and Pickett had conspired to ignite a
conflict with the British as part of a plot to help the South in its growing political
disagreement with the North. Major Haller believed “the hog incident [was] to be seized
as the pretext, and exclusion of British troops from San Juan island to become a casus
belli.” 10 When Haller met with Pickett he advised proposing a joint occupation to the
British authorities, upon which the fire-brand captain informed Haller, “He assured me
that if they attempted to land he would fire on them. He believed they would land, and
considered war inevitable.” 11 Captain Hunt explained immediately after the
confrontation that “Nothing has saved us from a bloody collision but the patient dignity
and forbearance of the old admiral [British Rear Admiral Lambert Baynes], who had an
overwhelming force at hand.” 12 Admiral Baynes’ restraint contrasted markedly with the
aggressive stance taken by American officers General Harney and Captain Pickett and the
British royal governor.
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Although absurd to the point of being ludicrous, the Pig War reflected the level of
mistrust that still existed between local Americans and British officials. The erratic
relationship foreshadowed potential future unrest in the region. Despite the success of
the joint occupancy compromise, due largely to the restraint of the local British
administrators, a number of residents, including officials, still mistrusted each other two
years later when civil war broke out in America. It was in this atmosphere that pro
Confederate elements in what is now British Columbia and Vancouver Island schemed
during the war years. In light of the history of periodic cleavages in the relations between
Americans and Britons in Canada, made worse by the 1859 Pig War conflagration,
Department of the Pacific leaders had to craft policies that addressed all the potential
dangers that might lurk north of the border while treading lightly on issues of
sovereignty. This was made all the more difficult by the presence of southerners in the
two western most Canadian territories.
The reality is that the presence of southerners in the generally favorable
environment of British Columbia and Vancouver Island was initially the lesser concern
facing Department of the Pacific officials and their counterparts in the Pacific Squadron.
At the outset of the war British officials in western Canada alarmed their American
counterparts far more than any Confederate sympathizers in the region. Given the
varying British attitudes, both in Canada and in England, toward the Confederacy and the
withdrawal of United States Army regulars from the Far West (especially along the
Canadian border), combined with the volatile situation over San Juan Island just two
years before, departmental alarm was understandable. Canada presented the Department
of the Pacific (and Pacific Squadron) officials with two significant points for concern:
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first, and certainly potentially the greatest threat, was the danger that if British political
policies changed, their military forces might trickle over the United States’ northwestern
border and, secondly, that Confederate sympathizers would use Canada as a base from
which to launch raids south across the border (or at Union shipping interests in the
Pacific, namely the gold shipments leaving California).
Washington D.C.’s level of concern can be seen by the fact that an American
consulate post was established in Victoria, Vancouver Island, in 1862. There had never
been any such consulate in either of Canada’s two western territories, nor was there any
reason for such a post. Once the war was under way, however, and with British and
American relations deteriorating during the brief, but dangerous firestorm created by the
Trent Affair in late 1861, the administration quickly dispatched Allen Francis to serve as
American consul in the newly-created consulate. He arrived in early April. Francis’
activities far exceeded what was required by his political office. He maintained a
network of spies in Victoria employed to keep him abreast of any pro-Confederate
activity on either Vancouver Island or in British Columbia (with its transitory population
of American miners).13
Despite the fears of what might materialize north of the border, officials in
Washington D. C. faced more imminent challenges in the East. The result of those
dangers was the recalling of most of the regular U.S. Army forces stationed in the
Department of the Pacific at the outset of the war. Concerns over potential Indian unrest
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and uncertainty about the political climate in western Canada, kept the regulars from
leaving to shore up the eastern armies until relieved by volunteer troops. Initially
Californians, but later Oregon troops, were assigned to both the old and some new forts
in the department, along with a handful of Washingtonians.
At no place was the departure of U.S. troops more troubling than on disputed San
Juan Island. In an effort to ensure that the British did not benefit from the departure of
American forces (meaning strengthening their claims to the island), Colonel Silas Casey
suggested that the contingent of Royal Marines stationed on the island be withdrawn
because the American forces were in the process of departing. The theory being that by
doing so neither country would have a stronger claim to the disputed island. The Royal
Navy commander for the region, Rear Admiral Maitland, rather bluntly informed Colonel
Casey, “we were at perfect liberty to withdraw our force or not as HM’s [His Majesty]
Govnt. Might think fit.” 14 The Royal Marines, all 73 of them, remained on the island,
despite the order for the Americans to abandoned Camp Pickett, which would have left
the British in control. 15 Abandoning the American post, however, did not seem prudent
to the district commander, who less than ten months earlier had warned Army
Headquarters:
For the last twelve months the San Juan imbroglio has only served to keep up a
feverish excitement and a hostile feeling between our citizens and those of British
Columbia. This feeling will not subside so long as the question of title to the
island of San Juan shall remain in abeyance. The slightest provocation from
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either side might produce a collision, from which the most deplorable results
would follow. 16
Not surprisingly, Wright, who had stressed that “this state of affairs requires
prudence and firmness in its management,” found a way to countermand the order to
abandon the American post. 17 Using the threat of Native American raids as a pretext
Wright gave new orders, nullifying those issued just ten days earlier, thereby ensuring an
American presence remained on the island throughout the war.

Ultimately, unlike most

of the other posts in the Department of the Pacific, where volunteers replaced the
professional soldiers, Regular Army forces garrisoned Camp Pickett, San Juan Island
throughout the duration of the war.
Two years before the war, during the Pig War imbroglio, three men shared
responsibility for the heightened tensions. The department commander, General Harney,
and the field commander, Captain Pickett, were the primary sparks in the tinder box, but
they had British help. The third person responsible for the brinkmanship diplomacy that
nearly resulted in a war was the royal governor, Sir James Douglass. The governor did
not want war in 1859, but he was unwilling to suffer any political embarrassments at the
Americans’ hands either, and as became clear, he possessed an aggressive streak. This
same characteristic led the governor to make a radical proposal late in 1861 in the wake
of the political turmoil caused by the seizure of Confederate envoys from the British ship
the Trent.
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Fearful that the ongoing troop build-up in the Far West would lead American
expansionists to take some or all of western Canada, Douglass proposed that the English
strike first. To this end he requested two regiments of reinforcements, which authorities
in London refused. 18 Undeterred, in December the pugnacious governor wrote to the
British Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, pointing out that at present he had a
mere 200 troops (along with four naval vessels) with which to protect far western
Canada, should a conflict arise. Despite his numerical weakness, the governor informed
his superiors there “was no reason why we should not push overland from Puget Sound
and establish advanced posts on the Columbia River.” 19 The idea is not as far-fetched it
appears on the surface. Douglas knew that American troop dispositions were in flux and
that some northern posts were likely to be abandoned. Furthermore, there was no doubt
that the British navy could easily take control of Puget Sound and the Columbia River.
The governor assured his superiors, that “with Puget Sound, and the line of the Columbia
River in our hands, we should hold the only navigable outlets of the country –command
its trade, and soon compel it to submit to Her Majesty’s Rule.” 20
In June 1862 newly appointed District of Oregon commander, Brigadier General
Benjamin Alvord, feared just such a move by the British in Canada. After taking some
time to acquaint himself with his new command, Alvord described his district’s
vulnerabilities in a letter to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. The note, which was a

18

Robin W. Wink, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1960), 158.
19

Benjamin F. Gilbert, “Rumors of Confederate Privateers Operating in Victoria, Vancouver
Island,” British Columbia Historical Quarterly, 18 (1954) 3/4, 241. Here Gilbert quotes from Douglas’
December 28, 1861 letter to Newcastle.
20

Ibid.

141

barely veiled request for an increased Union naval presence in the region, read as if
Alvord knew what the Royal Governor was thinking, in regard to both his fears about
foreigners and his strategy in the event of war between the two. Alvord told Welles,
There is no doubt that the day will come when Equimault Harbor [Vancouver
Island] will be the favorite post of the Pacific Squadron of the British Navy.
These considerations cannot be overlooked in all the preparations we may make
for a period of foreign war. This region is the most remote, the most exposed, and
therefore in some respects the most vulnerable of our whole sea-board. . . . These
discoveries [of gold in Washington Territory] will make the country more inviting
to an enemy. 21

Fortunately for the Union, officials in London did not share Douglas’ enthusiasm
for a conflict with the United States, especially given Canada’s military weakness, nor
did they envision the possibilities Alvord saw. Those troops that were eventually
allocated for Canada in the aftermath of the Trent Affair were stationed in the more
populated eastern region. Given the limited manpower available and unwillingness to
strip another part of the empire to shore up Canadian defenses sufficiently, the British in
North America maintained a sometimes shaky neutrality during the war. Consequently,
Douglas’ invasion proposal gained no traction in London. Left with few options but still
not entirely trusting the Americans, even after two years of friendly relations with the
Department of the Pacific leaders and troops, the royal governor authorized the raising of
two volunteer rifle corps to complement the royal marines and engineers stationed in the
region, for defense only. 22
American officials, both in the region and in the capital, never knew of the
governor’s views. It was believed, however, that he, along with other officials in Canada
21
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sympathized with the Confederate cause. This being the case, it was important to remain
abreast of the British military’s activities. This task fell to America consul, Allen
Francis, whose post, as noted above, had been created so the Americans could keep the
pulse of the atmosphere in western Canada. Francis, who worked with both Generals
Wright and later Irvin McDowell at Department of the Pacific headquarters (and
commander of the Pacific Squadron, Admiral Charles Bell), as well as District of Oregon
commander, Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord, went about his task with a dogmatic
diligence that bordered on paranoia. He reported everything, no matter how implausible
or insignificant. 23
Throughout the war Francis reported all the news that came to his consulate post
in Victoria, little of which, as he found out, had to do with odd or threatening British
military activities. Most of his reports focused on insults, schemes, or dangers posed by
Victoria’s openly pro-Confederate population, almost all of whom were American
expatriates. As it turned out, Francis’ vigilance was rewarded, and as actions taken
elsewhere in Canada, as well as activity in California, proved, no matter how far removed
from the conflict’s main scenes the pro Confederate element did pose a threat to the
Union cause.
If the government and military seemed overly concerned about Confederate
sympathizers in Vancouver and British Columbia colonies, it must be remembered that a
number of similarly desperate plots originating elsewhere in Canada came to fruition
during the war. In fact, southern sympathizers and military personnel used Canada as a
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base for both land and naval operations. In October 1864 20 raiders, including a
Confederate lieutenant, crossed from Quebec into Vermont, robbing three banks in the
small town of St. Albans, getting away with $200,000. Although the raiders fled back
into Canada before an effective pursuit could be mounted, Major General John Dix
authorized his subordinates to “pursue them into Canada if necessary and destroy
them.” 24
Secessionists also carried out naval raids that in one case started in Canada and in
another ended there. One month before the St. Albans raid, John Yates Beall and some 20
Confederate agents attempted to capture the U.S.S. Michigan, the sole Union warship
patrolling the Great Lakes. The attempt was foiled when one of the conspirators was
captured and revealed everything, thus giving Union officials time to prepare their own
trap. Beall and his co-conspirators escaped after burning a commandeered ship, which
they hoped to use to get close enough to the Michigan to board it and melted into the
Canadian wilderness. 25 Another attempted seizure of a northern naval vessel occurred
two months after the failed effort to capture the Michigan. Although 14 Confederate
agents were able to seize the Chesapeake, they were unsure of what to do with it, so they
sailed to Nova Scotia and abandoned it to the Canadian authorities –who returned the
ship to its owners. 26 Clearly, desperate Confederates and southern sympathizers
understood the possibilities of staging operations north of the border, and that was no less
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so in western Canada where the atmosphere was at least as sympathetic to the southern
cause as it was in the eastern part of the country.
Confederate sympathizers in the Far West posed two possible dangers from their
perch in western most Canada. The most likely, and also the most potentially rewarding,
scheme they might initiate would be to attack the gold shipments sailing from San
Francisco. The far less likely way to strike a blow for the Confederacy would be to
organize a raiding force with which to attack Union targets in the northern territories
(now Washington and Idaho). Given the South’s desperate need for gold with which it
could purchase supplies in Europe, Confederate sympathizers in Victoria eventually
attempted to acquire and outfit a raider, whereas there was no attempt to launch landbased raids across the border.
Ever since the 1858 Fraser River gold rush, thousands of Americans had been
roaming the rivers and creeks of British Columbia in search of gold. Inevitably, few
found the wealth they sought, and while most drifted back across the border, many
remained in Canada. By the outbreak of the Civil War Victoria, Vancouver Island, was
home to a thriving southern population. The editor of the Victoria Chronicle noted:
“Shortly after the outbreak of the war many sympathizers with the Slave States came to
reside in Victoria. Some leased residences, others took apartments at hotels, still others
went into business while a fourth class proceeded to Cariboo and engaged in gold mining
and trading.” 27
The early Confederate successes emboldened the city’s southern enclave, the
wealthier of which gathered in the rooms of two Alabama brothers, John and Oliver
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Jeffries, at the St. Nicholas Hotel, where they “became noisily jubilant.” 28 Chronicle
editor D.W. Higgins, whom the southerners considered a loyal friend, remembered
celebrating one “great rebel victory, and the company excelled all previous efforts in
singing Confederate airs, while their rebel hearts, bursting with enthusiasm, found
frequent vent in loud cheering.” 29 Not long after assuming his post, Consul Francis
informed his superiors about the overtness of Confederate sympathy displayed in
Victoria.
As the residents prepared to celebrate the Prince of Wales’ birthday with a twoday extravaganza on November 9 and 10, 1862 southern sympathizers seized that very
public opportunity to display their predilections by raising a Confederate flag.

Francis

informed Secretary of State William Seward that a number of northern residents urged
him to protest the affront, which he did, but Governor Douglas chose not to respond to
the American official until two days after the celebration ended. 30 Governor Douglas’
lackadaisical response to Francis’ protest led some to assume such actions would not only
be ignored, but openly tolerated. 31 The flags, which soon flew over a number of homes
throughout Victoria, remained a troubling (and insulting) issue until near the end of the
war. As the governor of Washington Territory informed Secretary of State Seward in
July 1864, “the officers and crew of every American Vessel that enters the Harbor of
Victoria is insulted, & indignant, at the sight of the Rebel Flags flying in Victoria.” Of
28
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course, there was little Seward could do beyond putting political pressure on the British
ambassador in Washington; the Department of the Pacific officials could do even less. 32
The southern presence in Victoria was large and open enough that in 1863 one
J.S. Shapard, who had been at the heart of the flag incident the previous year, opened a
new watering hole named the Confederate Saloon. 33 This establishment soon became the
meeting place of a group of roughly 50 southerners who called themselves the Southern
Association. 34

This bar, and its churlish proprietor, quickly became a thorn in American

Consul Allan Francis’ (the would-be spy master) side.
This was the prevailing climate in Victoria, which worsened when large numbers
of the miners fled the snows that descended upon the gold fields beginning in the fall. As
Consul Francis informed his brother, a major at Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory,
“The miners are now coming down from the upper country, generally in desperate
circumstances, mostly secesh, and ready for anything.” 35 In such an atmosphere, where
the official neutrality stance at times seemed blindly apathetic, Confederate sympathizers
pursued a number of schemes, all with the intent of disrupting trade, particularly the
shipment of gold from San Francisco to the East, via Panama, during the first three years
of the war.
It took time for Victoria’s growing southern community to seize upon an idea of
how best to aid the Confederate cause from so far away. However, during the seemingly
calm time, which lasted until early 1863, there was plenty to celebrate, which, as editor
32
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Higgins noted, they did. As Confederate victories mounted in the East, southern
sympathizers like the Jeffries brothers decided that the best way to assist the southern
cause was to disrupt Union commercial efforts along the Pacific Coast. Of course, the
gold shipments were the ultimate prize, but other Union targets plied the northern Pacific
waters as well.
Before any attempts to attack Union commerce in the north Pacific could take
place, however, local southern sympathizers needed a boat capable of being outfitted as a
raider. This proved to be a serious impediment to the privateers’ visions of glory and
plunder. The ship the conspirators hoped to capture was the U.S.S. Shubrick, which one
old pioneer described as “a handsome sidewheel steamer, far from slow for those days,
perfectly seaworthy and safe for ocean navigation, carried four or five brass cannon, and
had a good supply of small arms, ammunition, etc.” 36 Designs to capture the Shubrick,
however, fell apart, “for the want of a leader in whom the banditti could confide,” as
Francis informed Captain Thomas Selfridge, the commander of the navy yard on Mare
Island, California. 37 This failure forced the conspirators to come up with a new plan.
The next effort played out in the pages of Victoria’s two newspapers, the
Chronicle and the Colonist. That it did is symbolic of the difficulties facing Consul
Francis and his operatives in Victoria. Until the Confederate sympathizers actually
violated England’s official neutrality policy there was nothing he could do. Unless they
crossed into American waters or lands, Francis knew the local officials were not paying
36
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very close attention to the southerners’ machinations. On February 4, 1863, the
Chronicle published an article declaring that a Confederate navy officer had been in
Victoria for a month. His reported purpose was to purchase an English ship, the Thames,
which he was to man with local sympathizers and then set out to capture San Francisco
gold shipments. 38 Ultimately, as the Chronicle reported, the plan failed due to a lack of
funds, which seems odd considering the presence of a number of southerners leading
rather ostentatious lives in Victoria. 39 The failure of this second plot illuminates two
points about Confederate sympathizers in western Canada. First, that no one was jailed,
or even investigated, for very public efforts to violate English neutrality laws make it
clear they had little to fear from the Canadians/British authorities. Secondly, despite their
confidence in themselves, disorganization and bad luck, and Allen Francis and his agents,
plagued the southern expatriates.
Although he had taken no public action, Consul Francis kept Secretary of State
Seward apprised of developments, thanks to his operatives. As Francis told the
Chronicle’s editor once that particular danger passed, “I knew what was going on all the
time. My detectives kept me well informed.” 40 Whether or not there was much truth to
this particular story is difficult to ascertain, but it kept the competing papers busy
postulating on the veracity of the story; the Chronicle believed it and the Colonist did not.
Furthermore, the entire episode served to demonstrate how the Americans navigated the
complex diplomatic seas when trying to prevent Confederate sympathizers (or actual
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Confederates, for that fact) from using far western Canada as a base from which to launch
attacks on the United States or Union interests at sea. Regardless of the truth of this or
any other story, the American consul’s job was to warn the Department of the Pacific and
Pacific Squadron leaders and inform Secretary Seward, and those individuals would then
take the appropriate actions to thwart the enemy’s actions.
Although Francis does not seem to have been particularly alarmed by the Thames
rumors, he dutifully kept all the principle leaders informed. The Thames story gained
increased currency after March 15, 1863, and forced officials in Washington D.C., and its
military leaders (both land and sea) on the Pacific Coast to respond. On that day, civil
and military officials in San Francisco seized the S.S. Chapman, which had been outfitted
as a privateer and was about to leave the harbor when it was captured. 41 Two boats full
of armed seamen from the U.S.S. Cyane, which protected San Francisco harbor at
General Wright’s request, captured the would-be raider and its crew of 21without a fight.
After boarding the vessel, San Francisco police, working with the Customs Collector, Ira
Rankin, discovered “a number of guns, ammunition, and other military stores were found
on board.” 42 The capture of the Chapman conspirators set off an alarm from San
Francisco to Puget Sound, and was felt by Union leaders in Washington D.C. as well.
The capture of a privateer in San Francisco harbor, with well-developed plans for
attacking the gold shipments, led Secretary of State Seward to re-evaluate Consul
Francis’ report about the Thames uproar that had dominated the Victoria newspapers for
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the first two weeks of February. With Francis having done his job by informing Seward
and the military officials on the Pacific Coast, responsibility to act fell to Seward. For
whatever reason, the Secretary of State initially chose to do nothing; that changed,
however, with the capture of an armed and manned privateer in San Francisco, the city
where the federal military authority was headquartered. Given the heightened concerns
about the Confederate threat to Union shipping, Seward sent a letter on March 31 to the
British ambassador to the United States, Lord Lyons, stating:
I regret to inform you that reliable information has reached this department that an
attempt was made in January last, at Victoria, Vancouver’s island, to fit out the
English steamer Thames as a privateer, under the flag of the insurgents, to cruise
against the merchant shipping of the United States in the Pacific. Fortunately,
however, the scheme was temporarily, at least, frustrated by its premature
expose. 43

In addition to drawing Lord Lyons’ attention to the topic, Seward applied his
considerable diplomatic pressure to the British ambassador and asked “the attention of
her Majesty’s colonial authorities to the subject, in order that such violations of the act of
Parliament and of her majesty’s proclamation may not be committed.” 44 In other words,
Seward expected the British government to force its representative in western Canada,
Governor Douglas, to enforce the neutrality policy.
Diplomatic pressure alone was not enough to assuage Francis’ fears or General
Wright’s concerns. 45 In an effort to take more aggressive steps to protect Union
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shipping, The U.S.S. Saginaw was ordered from San Francisco to Puget Sound, “without
any unnecessary delay, to the ports Angeles and Townsend, in Washington Territory, to
Victoria, in the British Possession, on Vancouver Island . . . . for the purpose of obtaining
information from the authorities, and from other sources, in relation to the equipment of
rebel privateers in those waters.” 46 The combination of the presence of a Union military
vessel patrolling Puget Sound and the blow to Victoria’s would-be privateers’ morale
(caused by the news of the capture of the Chapman) quieted pro southern rumblings on
Vancouver Island, but only briefly.
Despite the set-backs, the Southern Association continued to meet, and brew
desperate schemes amid drinks at the Confederate Saloon. As Francis informed the naval
commander at Mare Island, “There is still in this city a rebel organization, which has had
several meetings within the last few weeks. They are awaiting, it seems from rumors, the
receipt of letters of marque from the President of the so-called Confederate States.” 47
Once again, Francis’ agents had done their task well. The association’s president, Jules
David, had indeed submitted a request to the Confederate government in Richmond to
officially recognize the effort to begin operations of a privateer for the South. David, on
behalf of the association, requested the all-important letters of marque in April 1862, but
Richmond did not respond.
Having heard nothing for over a year, David again requested letters of marque in
October 1863. In this second note he attempted to convince Confederate officials
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(Confederate Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin received the letter) of the association’s
earnestness and the possibilities for success by writing:
It is our most anxious wish to do something for our country, and we can not serve
her better than in destroying the commerce and property of our enemies. If you
will for a moment reflect upon the extensive commerce of the Federal States with
South America, California, the islands, China, and Japan, you can well imagine
what a rich field we have before us. 48
David further explained “We have at our disposal a first-class steamer of over 400 tons,
strongly built, and of an average speed of 14 miles. The money required to arm her and
fit her out as a privateer will be raised without difficulty amongst our friends here.”49
The ploy worked, but in the wrong circles. With the war now going against the South,
Confederate officials in Richmond did not consider the desperate scheme, and once again
chose not to reply. However, the ever-vigilant American consul, Allen Francis,
responded in his own way.
In a rather odd twist, Francis, who, through the efforts of his operatives knew that
much of what David told Benjamin was true (although there is no indication that Francis
knew about the letter), chose to inform his brother, Major Simeon Francis, instead of the
proper military authorities. 50 Once again proving just how well informed he was about
the Confederate sympathizers’ activities, Consul Francis described very accurately the
Southern Association’s plans. He informed his brother that ever since a very fast 300ton, all steel, ship had arrived in Victoria the “rumors have been rife that the rebels have
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been trying to buy her for a privateer.” 51 Major Francis understood the significance of
the letter, but since he was not at his post when it arrived, a month passed before he
turned the communiqué over to district commander Alvord–on November 20.
General Alvord responded immediately to Consul Francis. After rebuking the
diplomat for not informing the proper authorities, Alvord reassured Francis that he had
requested naval reinforcements for Puget Sound months earlier. Alvord also informed
the consul that he had passed the contents onto General Wright’s headquarters, with the
assumption the department commander would take action. 52
Alvord was correct, Wright immediately took steps to strengthen the U.S. military
presence in the waters of Puget Sound by requesting that Captain Thomas Selfridge,
naval commander at the Mare Island Navy Yard, send a man-of-war to the region. 53
Unfortunately, the only possible naval vessel suited for the task was the U.S.S.
Narragansett, which needed both repairs and additional men to fill out its crew to a
serviceable contingent. 54 After being assigned men from the U.S.S. Saginaw, the
Narragansett sailed for Puget Sound on December 11. Finding no privateer activity in
the region, the ship returned to San Francisco and underwent more extensive repairs by
March 1864. 55
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The onset of winter seems to have sapped much of the Confederate sympathizers’
eagerness to acquire a privateer and their diminished commitment to begin anew in the
spring. Richmond’s failure to acknowledge the request for letters of marque combined
with the South’s deteriorating fortunes only exacerbated the erosion of the southern
sympathizers’ privateering dreams. In 1864 Governor Douglas was replaced, and the
new governor, Arthur Kennedy, proved more cooperative when enforcing British
neutrality and discouraging Victoria’s southern element’s clandestine schemes. Although
little life remained in the Confederacy by late 1864, a few ardent members of the
Southern Association continued to meet in Shapard’s bar. There they still talked about
attacking U.S. commercial interests on the Pacific. However, the ubiquitous Consul
Francis confidently informed the new Department of the Pacific commander, Irvin
McDowell, in late November, “Governor Kennedy will do all in his power to prevent
them from fitting out any vessel on this island.” 56 In 1865 the Southern Association’s
constant scheming fell silent as even the most ardent southern sympathizers realized their
own obstacles were too steep and the cause which they hoped to aid was crumbling.
By 1865 diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain had
long since improved from the early days of the war. For the Department of the Pacific
and the Pacific Squadron relations with the British in western Canada and on the waters
off the Pacific Northwest coast were relaxed, and in many cases cordial. The new royal
governor on Vancouver proved more amendable in allaying American concerns about
southern sympathizers, and the only problems on San Juan island were caused by the
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confusion over police authority, a point that both American and British military personnel
took great pains to work out together.
Despite Canada’s central place in the history of the spasmodic animosity, and
war, between the United States and England, British forces never crossed the far western
Canadian-American border, nor did Confederate forces or southern sympathizers
successfully use the country as a base of operations for attacks on the United States
during the Civil War. The danger was genuine, and the potential damage to the Union
effort significant (successful attacks on the gold shipments alone might have prolonged
the war). However, through a multilayered effort that started with American Consul Allen
Francis knowing the enemy’s schemes, and ending with the Department of the Pacific,
and, particularly, the Pacific Squadron stopping any land or sea threats, the Union was
spared any threat from southern sympathizers holed up in western Canada. Francis and
Department of the Pacific commanders Wright and McDowell performed equally
successful and important work through their restrained political dealings with Governor
Douglas, thereby ensuring the trigger-happy governor did not cause a political row that
could have grown into a pretext for British military (primarily naval) actions against the
U.S. forces and interests in the region.
In short, the failure of any threats to the Union to originate in western Canada, be
they Confederate sympathizers or British military forces, conveys the false impression
that no danger ever existed, and denies the land and sea personnel, and especially Allen
Francis and his agents, the credit they deserve for preventing another Anglo-American
crisis in the Pacific Northwest. As with the Department of the Pacific’s other
responsibilities, defusing any threats from Canada became more complicated with the
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onset of the Civil War, but its leaders and troops (along with their brethren in the navy
and allies at the consulate) rose to the challenge.
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CHAPTER
–5–
DISSATISFIED SPIRITS, REPUBLICANS, IMPERIALISTS, AND
OTHER DANGERS ALONG THE SOUTHERN BORDER
On January 8, 1865, General of the Union Army U.S. Grant sent a unique
message to Major General Irvin McDowell, who had commanded the Department of the
Pacific since the previous June. The communiqué was not an order but a warning. From
his City Point, Virginia, headquarters Grant advised McDowell to remain watchful of “a
rebel of the most virulent order” then on his way to the Mexican state of Sonora. The
presence of Confederate officials in Mexico was not a new matter. In fact, not long after
the war started the Confederate government sent John T. Pickett across the border in an
effort to gain recognition, if possible, from the neighboring nation, and if that failed, to at
least acquire arms. Fortunately for the Union government, Pickett’s lack of tact and an
alcohol-fueled display of ill temper landed the envoy in a Mexican jail and terminated the
mission. 1
The situation in 1865, as Grant rightly noted, was different. According to rumors,
William Gwinn left an unsuccessful Confederate mission in France, which sought
recognition of the southern states, to assume the governorship of Sonora under Emperor
Maximillian. 2 Gwinn warranted extra attention because of his connections in California,
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which he served as a United States senator until 1861. As he informed McDowell, Grant
worried Gwinn would “entice into Sonora the dissatisfied spirits of California, and if the
opportunity occurs organize them and invade the State [California].” 3 This was indeed
something to be concerned over.
January, however, was not the first time Grant expressed his concerns about how
affairs in Mexico might endanger the Far West. In late July 1864 Secretary of State
William Seward visited the commanding general in the field as Grant’s forces initiated
the long siege of Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia. When Grant turned one of their
conversations onto the subject of Mexico, he, according to his aide, Lieutenant Colonel
Horace Porter, told the Secretary, “while we don’t want another war on our hands before
we finish the present one, yet I feel that the reestablishment of [a] republican government
in Mexico would really be part of our present struggle.” 4 The general was, Porter
believed, “a staunch supporter of the Monroe doctrine generally, and was opposed on
principle to any European monarchy forcing its institutions upon an American republic.” 5
Grant’s concerns extended beyond his “deep sympathy for her [Mexico] people in their
present struggle,” but also included the potential invasion of the United States by
Confederate forces that might gather in Sonora, supported by “officials of the usurpers of
the Government of Mexico.” 6
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Grant was just one of a host of Union military leaders and political officials
concerned about affairs in Mexico. From the war’s outset, Mexico garnered a significant
amount of attention. For the better part of the first two years of the war the Union
government viewed Mexico as a passive player in the ongoing civil war on the American
side of the border. From the war’s outset, Department of the Pacific commanders kept a
watchful eye on the northwestern Mexican states to see if the Confederates might use
them as a highway from which to attack western New Mexico Territory and California.
Shortly thereafter, a number of Union officials pondered the possibilities of employing
the same strategy, but in reverse, and thus using the same region to launch their own
attack, aimed at Texas. The Department of the Pacific’s interest in affairs below its
border changed later as the crisis in Mexico spun out of control and French forces took up
the imperialistic effort that eventually established Austrian Archduke Maximilian as
emperor. That drawn-out struggle incited a good deal of apprehension among Union
officials on both coasts. The nearness of an imperial usurper was just the latest anxiety
emanating from Mexico during the Civil War. In addition to previous concerns, Union
officials in general, and Department of the Pacific personnel in particular, prepared not
merely for a threat coming through Mexico, but one originating from the nation, as well
as a Confederate danger in Mexico. Over the duration of the war, guarding against a
variety of dangers from Mexico proved a complicated and much discussed responsibility
for the farthest western Union troops.

Hearing about a potential Confederate threat from northwestern Mexico, on June
28, 1861, General Sumner warned the Fort Yuma commander, Major Albermarle Cady,
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about a possible movement of Confederate troops south of his position. As he told the
major,
a rumor is prevalent in this community and the State generally that the so-called
government of the Confederate States purpose sending from the State of Texas or
elsewhere, through certain States of the Mexican Republic, to this coast a military
force, considerable in numbers, with the object of seizing upon and holding the
port of Guaymas, in the Republic of Mexico. 7
As Sumner learned after two months as the Department of the Pacific commander, the
only thing more prevalent in the region than gold were rumors. Despite admitting he did
not know “whether this is merely an idle rumor or is really the purpose and intention of
that people,” he felt anything was possible, given “the unparalleled audacity which has
characterized the operations of those now in revolt.” 8
Although it is uncertain whether or not he shared U. S. Grant’s sympathy for the
Republic of Mexico, Sumner’s concern in June 1861 was certainly more pragmatic than
ideological. With the Union navy blockading southern ports, the Confederacy needed
access to international shipping from elsewhere. Clearly, the idea of running a tenuous
supply line across the unforgiving lands between the port of Guaymas, on the
northwestern coast of Mexico, and Texas was hardly ideal, but it could give the
Confederacy something it desperately needed -- ocean access -- as well as a concentration
point for an invasion of California. For these reasons alone, Sumner gave the rumor of
Confederate designs on the port genuine attention.
As events transpiring in New Mexico Territory demonstrated, Sumner’s concerns
were well-founded. Confederate success in the Southwest mirrored the successes
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elsewhere in 1861. Four days after the Confederate victory at Manassas, Virginia,
elements of the Second Texas Mounted Rifles defeated Union Regulars near the town of
Mesilla on the New Mexico Territory –Texas border. The following day those
Confederates, commanded by the gruff former Texas Ranger, Colonel John R. Baylor,
took possession of Fort Fillmore and most of its supplies. On July 27 the Texans
captured the garrison’s Union force, then in the process of a poorly conducted northern
retreat. 9 Fortunately for the Union presence in the Southwest, and maybe the Pacific,
Baylor could not stretch his force, which numbered roughly 250 horsemen, any thinner,
and therefore had to suspend any further offensive actions. 10 Even though Baylor’s
surprising campaign came to a standstill in less than a month, others shared his vision for
Confederate control of the Southwest, and beyond.
The desire to follow up on the early successes in New Mexico Territory
ultimately led to the organization of an expeditionary force headed by Brigadier General
Henry H. Sibley. Sibley, who served in the Far West and Southwest in the years prior to
the Civil War, met with Confederate President Jefferson Davis during the summer of
1861. 11 In those meetings, he advocated conquering New Mexico Territory, where he
expected to find the small Caucasian population supportive of the Confederate cause (the
Hispanic population, most of whom had only been Americans since the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was apathetic at best, and the Native Americans were generally
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openly hostile). On July 8, the Confederate Adjutant General, Samuel Cooper, informed
Sibley,
In view of your recent service in New Mexico and knowledge of that country and
the people, the President has intrusted you with the important duty of driving the
Federal troops from the department, at the same time securing all the arms,
supplies, and materials of war. . . . If successful in accomplishing the objective
herein indicated, the President directs that you will, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, proceed to organize a military government within the Territory, the
detail of which you will submit to him at the earliest possible moment. 12
Although an analysis of Sibley’s New Mexico campaign is beyond the scope of this
study, it is important to understand the general goals of the Confederate advance into the
Southwest and examine those actions that bore directly on the Department of the Pacific.
In August, upon his return from meeting with President Davis, Sibley began
recruiting his expeditionary force in Texas, where he established his headquarters in San
Antonio. By late October, the first elements of what Sibley soon designated the Army
of New Mexico left San Antonio for the Texas –New Mexico Territory border. 13 Just
what Sibley planned or hoped to achieve after conquering New Mexico Territory (now
the current states of New Mexico and Arizona) is unclear, but according to his ranking
artillery officer, Trevanion T. Teel, “The objective aim and design of the campaign was
the conquest of California, and as soon as the Confederate army should occupy the
Territory of New Mexico, an army of advance would be organized, and ‘On to San
Francisco’ would be the watchword.” 14
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California for supplies, etc.” 15 Colonel Baylor, who remained the Confederate point
man, and governor of the recently-created Arizona Territory, felt augmenting the small
Confederate force would be easy: “I am convinced that a strong force stationed in
Western Arizona would enable us to get hundreds of good Southern men, well armed and
mounted, who are anxious to join our cause.” 16 Whether or not Richmond shared these
grand designs, the Confederate leaders in the region had designs on the territory abutting
the Department of the Pacific, and dreams of reaching California, for as Teel noted,
“California had to be conquered, so that there would be an outlet for slavery.” 17
Department of the Pacific officials did not have the luxury of knowing whether
Sibley’s plans ended with New Mexico or included California as well, so they responded
appropriately. The first step was to reinforce the department’s most exposed post, Fort
Yuma, California. The fort, which overlooked the Colorado River, sat in the
southeastern-most section of the state astride the California – New Mexico Territory
(soon to be Arizona Territory) border. In late September, when rumors of Sibley’s efforts
to raise an invasion force reached the coast, General Sumner ordered two additional
companies from Los Angeles to reinforce the fort. At the same time, he made it very
clear what he expected of Lieutenant Colonel George Andrews, who assumed command
at Fort Yuma from Colonel Cady, writing him that “under no circumstances whatever
will any regular force in this military department surrender to the rebels.” 18
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While the Department of the Pacific shored up its most exposed command, Army
headquarters in Washington D.C. began marshalling scattered forces to put a stop to
anything the Confederates might send into the Southwest. Part of this plan included
sending a large force of California volunteers, commanded by veteran Colonel James H.
Carleton, to attack from the west while other elements, namely those under the overall
command of Colonel E.R.S. Canby, which included regulars as well as New Mexico and
Colorado volunteers, confronted the Confederates in eastern New Mexico Territory.
Well before Carleton’s command, termed the “California Column,” reached Sibley and
the main Confederates, Canby’s troops fought the invaders at the battles of Valverde and
Glorietta Pass in February and March 1862. After losing his supply wagons during the
latter battle, Sibley began a desperate retreat back to Texas.
Despite the Union victory over the main Confederate force in eastern New
Mexico Territory, a contingent of southerners probed as far west as Tucson, which they
captured. Chasing off this band of southerners fell to the Californians, which included
the 1st California Infantry and the 1st California Cavalry Regiments. On April 15,
Confederate pickets defeated Union advance riders sent out from Fort Yuma at Picacho
Pass, just 80 miles from the California border. After winning the war’s western most
confrontation between organized Confederates and Union troops, the southerners
retreated before the main elements of the California Column reached Tucson, which they
recaptured on May 20. 19 The Californians pressed ever eastward throughout the summer
and, with Canby’s forces, eventually retook all of New Mexico Territory and took up
posts in western Texas. Any future Confederate schemes to capture New Mexico or
19

Richard Orton, Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1867,
(Sacramento, CA: State of California, 1890), 47.

165

press into California required either confronting the enlarged Union military presence in
the region or using Mexico as a means to circumvent those troops, by falling in behind
them. The troops from the Department of the Pacific played only a minor role in turning
back the Confederate invasion, but their presence hastened the Confederate retreat and
served as a strong deterrent for the remainder of the war.
Although the eventual route of the southerners under Sibley significantly reduced
the immediacy of the danger of a Confederate force entering northwestern Mexico, the
threat did not subside until Union troops established permanent posts in New Mexico and
Arizona Territories. The frequently shifting authority in western Arizona, between the
Departments of the Pacific and New Mexico, further complicated protecting the area.
Despite the ousting of all major Confederate forces from the region by fall 1862,
Confederate dreams of a far western empire persisted. As Union Brigadier General J. R.
West wrote from Arizona Territory in December 1862, “the rebels continue to plot and
practice against us in El Paso and throughout certain portions of Chihuahua.” 20 West
summed up the frustration facing all the commanders in the Southwest and Far West,
noting, “that although the enemy may not advance as lately threatened, we are liable to be
diverted from really serviceable duties by constant alarm of his intention to invade the
Territory.” 21 West’s statement was an uncharacteristically honest admission about the
realities of guarding the Departments of the Pacific and New Mexico. That a handful of
bedraggled Confederates managed to get within eighty miles of the California border cast
tall shadows for a long time to come. The spectre of Confederates marching westward
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across the New Mexico desert or up from the Mexican state of Sonora continued to haunt
regional Union officials, who remained vigilant against such a move.
Despite concerns about the potential violation of Mexican sovereignty, Union
officials –in Washington D.C. and elsewhere– did not hesitate to propose a reverse
version of the Confederate plan as a quick means to invade Texas. In early August 1861
suggestions that the military resources in the Department of the Pacific, including the
recently requested volunteer regiments, be put into action came from two unusual
sources. Writing from his Western Department headquarters at St. Louis, the Pathfinder,
Major General John C. Fremont suggested to Secretary of War Simon Cameron that a
force “should be drawn from the Pacific States, and should be composed largely of
artillery and cavalry, and should be moved by steamer to Guaymas, and thence by land to
its destination [El Paso]”. 22 Such a move, if successful, would draw Confederate forces
away from Fremont, whose command suffered a stinging defeat four days after he
composed this message. 23
Early in the war, interest in Mexico expanded beyond the initial concern that
Confederate forces would acquire a seaport on Mexico’s far western coast. In the late
summer, Union officials pondered the different possibilities suggested by officers such as
Fremont and Major General George McClellan. Those who knew the land, primarily
from the Mexican-American War, understood that the western coast of Mexico offered
more than one port from which to launch an invasion of Texas. Of course, getting the
troops ashore in Mexico was the easy part, trekking across the inhospitable Mexican
22
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desert was another matter. However, excitement over any offensive plan in those dark
days for the Union led promoters to downplay that formidable obstacle, and as a result
the idea grew into a plan in August.
As the summer heat reached its apex, the Union high command formulated a
radical course of action for the Department of the Pacific. With nothing more than
rumors of Confederate troops anywhere near northwest Mexico, the time was right for a
Union offensive in the region. Despite identifying the rumored Confederate designs on a
western Mexican port as desperate, Union officials failed to recognize the irony of
proposing essentially the same plan, but in reverse. In fact, the idea of using Mexican
territory as a throughway for their own invasion, not only failed to cause pause for
reflection, but it garnered support at Army headquarters. 24 Rather than waiting for the
Confederates to execute their own designs, the War Department ordered Sumner to
initiate the Union version of the same plan.
While still reeling from the devastating defeat of Union forces along Bull Run,
Virginia, the commanding general, Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, sent a brief note to
his most distant commander. In that August 16 message, Scott informed Sumner that he
was “to command an expedition into Texas, via Mazatlan, to be composed of two
batteries and ten foot companies of regulars, one regiment of volunteer cavalry, and four
regiments of volunteer infantry.” 25 Clearly, the War Department meant this to be a major
endeavor. More detailed instruction came from the Adjutant General’s office, which
informed Sumner he was “to fit out an expedition in San Francisco, preparing for
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embarkation thence the necessary supplies and land transportation, to land at Mazatlan
and march thence to Western Texas to regain the public property in that state and to draw
off insurgent troops from Arkansas, Missouri, &c.” 26 Whether by design or not, this plan
mirrored Fremont’s earlier proposal.
Union forces could not simply march through a sovereign nation, however, even
if they intended to leave those lands as quickly as possible. Secretary of State William
Seward contacted the Mexican representative in Washington D.C., Matias Romero, who
passed the bold request onto his superiors. On August 26 Romero informed Seward that
the Republic of Mexico granted the United States military the right of passage through
northern Mexico. Aware of its mounting international problems, Romero hoped the
Mexican government’s willingness to let American troops on its soil would strengthen
ties between the two nations. In his note to Seward, Romero hoped “the United States
will see in the grant of this permission a fresh proof of the sincere desire which animates
that of Mexico to draw closer the relations of friendship which happily exists between the
two countries.” 27 The way to a major Union campaign, originating in the Far West, was
now open.
For Sumner, this should have been an opportunity to fulfill his desire to serve in a
more active theatre of operations. Almost from the day he arrived, he lobbied for the
War Department “to authorize me to place Colonel Wright here in command of the
department . . . if my services should be wanted elsewhere, I could be withdrawn from
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this department without detriment to the public service.” 28 Thus, Scott’s orders should
have been the answer to a prayer; however, he did not relish these orders any more than
he did remaining in the Union’s western most headquarters. Much of the problem lay in
the fact that Sumner was far more pragmatic than either the starry-eyed McClelland or
Fremont, and more realistic than the overly optimistic War Department and commanding
general. Although he proclaimed his full support for an endeavor that would bring him
into combat with organized Confederates, deep in their own territory, the plan, he
informed the high command, was fraught with flaws.
The orders reeked of desperation, and Sumner knew it. He must have been
stunned when he received Scott’s message. If anyone at Army Headquarters should
understand the difficulties inherent in moving a large force across inhospitable northern
Mexico, it was General Scott. The Mexican-American War, after all, made Winfield
Scott into a national hero, yet he gave his approval to a plan so audacious as to be
foolhardy.
In his August 30 reply Sumner cautioned, “I shall get the force authorized to be
raised here into my hands as soon as possible; but it will take some time to do this.”
Furthermore, he suggested, “Guaymas will be a much better point of departure than [the
proposed] Mazatlan. 29 Sumner followed up on his suggestion for a new landing site by
expressing his belief that “a more feasible plan [would be] to take my command by sea to
some point in Texas.” 30 Such a tactic would alleviate the almost prohibitive burden of
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trying to carry sufficient supplies over thousands of miles of harsh deserts. In a final
effort to discourage Army Headquarters from pursuing this rather rash campaign, Sumner
concluded his response to the Adjutant General’s office by flatly stating, “a march at the
usual rate across those deserts would unevitably unfit volunteers for some time for
efficient service in the field.” 31
Apparently, as time passed, others began to share Sumner’s concerns. Whether it
was Sumner’s dire assessment of the campaign’s obstacles or perhaps just that far off
politicians and desperate generals finally admitted the impracticality of the scheme, the
plan was stopped before a single soldier boarded a ship for Mexico. Orders issued in
Washington by Army Headquarters on September 9 canceling the plan finally reached
Sumner nearly a month later. 32 Although in April 1862, Sumner’s replacement,
Brigadier General George Wright, issued orders to a subordinate that “should the forces
of [Confederate Brigadier General H.H.] Sibley invade Sonora, you will pursue them
without regard to boundary lines,” no Union officials ever gave serious consideration to
entering western Mexico again. 33
The planning and preparations, however futile they appeared at a quick glance,
aided the Union cause, although not in the manner envisioned by the proponents. The
concentration of regular forces stepped up to fulfill the Mexico plan quickened Sumner’s
ability to carry out his new orders. The War Department’s new plan called for Sumner
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and the bulk of the regulars to embark for New York, and the eastern theatre of the war,
as soon as possible. 34 Even though Sumner used the early preparations for the trek
through Mexico to expedite the transfer of the regulars eastward, progress remained slow
while volunteer regiments filled up.
In a rather odd twist, the failure to keep the original plan secret actually benefited
the Unionists. Pro Confederates who eventually heard rumors about a planned Union
landing at Guaymas passed that information onto Confederate leaders. The informants
ascertained, correctly, the probable debarkation location as well as the intended
destination –Texas. However, accurate intelligence is not generally useful if it is not also
timely, and despite knowing the general plan, Confederate information lagged behind
terribly. Even though the Union government suspended the operation in September, the
plan’s spectre succeeded in distracting a plethora of western Confederate commanders for
months thereafter. Their concerns never rose to frantic consternation, but in the confused
atmosphere that riddled the Confederate leadership in the far Southwest, the thought of a
Union landing at Guaymas, aimed at Texas, remained the bogeyman in their darkest
nights. 35
Union interest was not limited to what the Confederates did, or might do, below
the border, nor did it end once they scrapped their own plans to use Mexico as a backdoor
through which to attack Texas. Department of Pacific leaders, as well as those in
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Washington, grew increasingly concerned over international affairs in Mexico when, in
late 1861, European powers seeking repayment of loans became involved in internal
Mexican affairs. The external pressure applied on the Mexican government further
destabilized President Benito Juarez’s precarious hold on his country. Finally, the French
conquest of most of the country in 1862 and 1863 shattered the fragile stability in
Mexico, greatly alarming American officials in the process.
Department of the Pacific commanders faced a complex problem when
formulating a policy to deal with potential dangers posed by the warring in Mexico.
Since it was national policy to remain neutral, troops on the Pacific Coast enforced
neutrality on a population that openly despised the French presence, in part for its
subjugation of a neighboring republic, but mostly because of the nearness of imperialistic
armies to American borders. The presence of a significant number of Mexican nationals
made this all the more difficult, and the intrigues of both French and Mexican agents
posed an additional impediment to maintaining neutrality and stability.
The deteriorating situation in Mexico created concerns far beyond the Department
of the Pacific and the recently created Department of New Mexico. Instability had long
been a problem in Mexico, and it strangled the country in the years prior to the American
Civil War. In 1857 Mexican officials crafted a constitution, which alienated the
conservative elements, especially the elite clergy. In September of that year, Ignacio
Comonfort, acting president since 1855, was duly elected to the executive post under the
new constitution, with Benito Juarez accepting the second highest position. 36 Almost
immediately the new president became embroiled in a plot to suppress the constitution
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and replace it with a dictatorship. The conspirators soon found President Comonfort too
indecisive to lead such a usurpation, so they forced him to step down in January 1858.
Comonfort’s resignation elevated Juarez to the presidency, but it was too dangerous for
him to remain anywhere near Mexico City, by then under conservative control. For the
next three years civil war raged in Mexico. 37
The fighting in Mexico not only devastated many parts of the country and left
thousands dead, it kept the legal government from addressing its international
responsibilities. By the time Juarez’s liberals retook Mexico City in the fall of 1860, the
nation’s economy was in free fall. In a desperate effort to stave off a complete collapse,
in July 1861 the Mexican Congress, by a vote of 112 to 4, put a moratorium on the
repayment of its debts, a move Juarez hoped would give the nation a chance to rebound. 38
Sensing that the moratorium might become permanent, England, France, and
Spain determined to take matters into their own hands. On October 31, 1861
representatives from the three countries signed an agreement in London that committed
each to the drastic step of occupying part of Mexico in order to guarantee repayment of
debts owed them. 39 All three nations acted quickly to carry out this international
collection work. Starting on December 8, Spanish ships began arriving at the Mexican
port city of Vera Cruz; a month later the English and French contingents arrived. 40 The
combined operation included 700 Royal Marines, 6,000 Spanish troops, and 2,500
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Frenchmen. Union defeats in the early months of the war prohibited the northern
government from responding forcefully to this violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
In the absence of any support from the Americans, there was little the still
fractionalized Mexicans could do to oust the European forces. Although it did not help
Juarez, the Spanish and English envoys soon recognized that the French had no intention
of adhering to the Tripartite Treaty of London. Therefore, the European powers, which
met at Orizaba, concluded they could not reconcile their differing views and dissolved the
tripartite arrangement on April 9, 1862. 41 With the departure of the English and Spanish
forces, the French initiated a war of conquest, which forced the duly elected government,
the only one the United States recognized during the crisis, to move from one place to the
next in order to stay ahead of the French troops.
The dramatic increase in the number of French soldiers in Mexico, and their
eventual seizure of Mexico City on June 12, 1863, alarmed many Americans. 42
Americans, including civilians and military and political officials, sympathized openly
with the Juarez government, which was a government more in name than in actuality.
American opinion solidified against the French even further when Napoleon III had
officials in Mexico lay the groundwork for the appointment of a European royal as
emperor of Mexico. In the end, Austrian Prince Maximillian assumed the Mexican
throne, which he held not by the grace of God, but through Napoleon III’s military
support.
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The presence of some 40,000 French and French-allied troops roaming about
Mexico, meddling in that nation’s internal affairs while trying to capture its lawful
president, caused a great deal of concern for the American president, Congress, and the
Union commanders in the Southwest and Far West. Essentially, as the Army and Navy
Journal told its military audience, “Next to the Southern Rebellion, no question is of
greater interest to the Army and the entire country than this of Mexico. One main object
of the intervention, as publicly avowed by its imperial author [Napoleon III], was to
arrest the growth of the power of this Republic [the United States].” 43 Echoing that view,
U.S. Senator James McDougall warned that “It will not be long before the front of an
undisguised enemy will be exhibited to the Republic; and simultaneous with that will be
the attempt to seize upon all there is of our Republic on the shores of the Pacific.” 44
Senator McDougall also reprimanded the government for its decision to ignore the wellestablished Monroe Doctrine: “the duty is now devolved upon this Government to
protest against, and if necessary, resist by force of arms the extension of the power and
policies of France, with the monarchical institutions of Europe, over the neighboring
republic of Mexico.” 45
Despite the anger voiced by many, with the Civil War in progress, it behooved the
Union government to avoid becoming entangled in another war. American response,
therefore, came in two forms: individuals, both average citizens and leaders like Senator
McDougall, publicly denounced both the violation of the Monroe Doctrine and its
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resulting usurpation of the elected Mexican government as well as the perceived threat to
American territories and states. Administration officials faced an infuriating situation
where any personal desire to threaten France with the use of force had to be muted for the
good of the nation. In short, the official course of action was inaction. As Secretary of
State Seward put it, “in the present circumstances the United States would sacrifice
Mexico if she thought it would save her from French intervention in the U.S. Civil War
which hangs over her.” 46 Thus, despite some impotent remonstrations and toothless
Congressional proclamations, the American government committed itself to a neutrality
stance regarding the French presence in Mexico.
Seward understood that many Americans, including military personnel, in the
affected regions might oppose this policy. In an effort to make the Federal government’s
position as clear as possible he gave those commanders whose responsibilities reached
the Mexican borders detailed instructions. Seward informed the officers that, “You
should be specially charged to do whatever is practicable, consistent with the national
safety and dignity, to avoid any collision between the forces under your command and
either of the belligerents in Mexico, and even guard so far as may be possible against
suffering any occasion to arise for disputes or controversy.” 47
With a large segment of the population opposed to the government’s neutrality
position, enforcing such a national policy proved cumbersome in the Far West. Despite
the need to focus on the ongoing Civil War, the blatant nature of the French imperial
conquest of Mexico angered many in the Far West and Southwest, many of whom feared
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the French more than the Confederates. The proximity of a European-supported (some
said puppet) imperial regime exacerbated that anger. Ensuring that the official neutrality
position remained intact fell to the senior officer in the region, the Department of the
Pacific commanders –first Sumner, then Wright, and eventually McDowell.
All three generals were career soldiers, and as such they carried out their orders
regardless of popular opinion. However, none of the department commanders were
dispassionate about the monarchical assault on a republican government in the Americas,
and the resulting dangers it posed. During their tenures as commander, both Sumner and
Wright, although under somewhat different circumstances, contemplated sending
American troops into Mexico. 48 McDowell, who assumed command in June 1864, was
no less contemptuous of the French actions. However, by the time he arrived, the French
already controlled much of Mexico; therefore, any move he contemplated making below
the border would almost certainly ignite a war between France and the United States.
Therefore, maintaining neutrality, not surprisingly, proved difficult in this highly charged
atmosphere, where a significant portion of the civilian population openly sympathized
with the Mexican cause. Making matters more precarious, the military commanders,
whose job it was to uphold federal policy, likewise either sympathized with the Mexican
plight or worried about French designs (which some feared included a Confederate
component) on America’s most distant lands.
General George Wright assumed command of the Department of the Pacific
months before England and Spain pulled out of the tripartite agreement, leaving France a
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freer hand in its dealings in Mexico. Thus, for most of the war, protecting America’s
western borders and doing everything possible to prevent Mexicans, Frenchmen, or
Americans from compromising the nation’s neutrality fell to Wright. Once thousands of
invading soldiers landed in Mexico, it became impossible for the French to maintain the
veneer that they were there to recoup the rather questionable debts owed its citizens.
Like many others, Wright bristled with indictments of French actions. He went so far as
to describe the French regime as “a rapacious and unscrupulous power” which he felt
“covets California and will fraternize with rebels to accomplish its end.” 49 Unlike others,
however, his job necessitated that he harness his personal views in order to carry out
national policy.
Wright’s indictment of the French might have been off somewhat regarding the
relationship between Confederates and the Maximillian regime, but at the time plenty of
evidence, both from abroad and in the Americas, gave weight to his views. As a result of
the general anxiety caused by the near proximity of French forces and the presence of
Mexican agents in California, Union forces in southern California, most notably at the
inhospitable Fort Yuma, kept a watchful eye southward. In essence, even after the
Confederate threat along the southeastern most section of the state receded, the
possibility of a French incursion necessitated vigilance.
Despite the anger toward, and resulting attention given to, the French military, the
more immediate threat to American neutrality in the Far West came from the Mexican
and French agents, whose intriguing in California and Nevada could at any time incite
Americans to join in the fighting. In California, especially from San Francisco
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southward, something akin to an espionage war took place between operatives from both
factions.
San Francisco served as the epicenter of this cold war, where both France and
republican Mexico maintained consulates. The Mexicans struggled on three fronts,
hoping to induce American citizens to put pressure on the federal government to
terminate the detrimental neutrality policy, while simultaneously, and covertly, buying
much-needed arms and munitions and trying to raise mercenary forces to come to their
aid. At the same time the French officials focused their efforts on ensuring that American
officials, meaning the military and local magistrates, enforced the unpopular neutrality
policy. Department of the Pacific commanders found that maintaining equilibrium
between national interests and sympathy for the neighboring republic was increasingly
difficult in such an atmosphere.
No single individual made maintaining American neutrality in the Far West more
difficult than Placido Vega, former governor of the state of Sinaloa and a Juarist general
after 1860. 50 As the situation grew bleaker for the Juarez government in 1863, the
president and his advisors decided to take a drastic step. In desperate need of arms,
munitions, and men, President Juarez sent Vega on a not so secret mission to San
Francisco, to purchase war materials, and, if possible, raise forces for the Mexican cause.
Although Vega himself did not arrive in San Francisco until 1864, his aides reached the
city in October 1863. Over the next three years the general and his aides spent over half
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a million dollars buying weapons, munitions, raising troops, and greasing both the press
and the political machine in California and, to a far lesser degree, in Nevada. 51
Despite the Department of the Pacific’s efforts to enforce neutrality by stopping
shipments of military goods believed destined for Mexico and hindering the travel of
persons suspected of trying to join the Mexican cause, westerners openly supported
Vega’s efforts. Acquiring arms proved easy in such an atmosphere. The first shipment
of any size reached Mazatlan in December 1863. 52 Two months later, over a thousand
rifles and ammunition reached Juarist troops; and the trade continued until December
1866. 53 The gamble, at least in regard to acquiring arms, appeared to pay off.
Finding someone willing to sell arms proved easy; however, getting those arms to
Mexican forces proved more difficult. Although more shipments arrived in Mexico than
were stopped by American officials, both civilian and military, the process was fraught
with uncertainty and inconsistency. The difficulties Vega and his subordinates faced
were not accidental, but rather part of the concerted effort by French agents to thwart
every step the Mexican officials made. Just as Vega and others acted with the
knowledge and approval of the Mexican consulate in San Francisco, French officials in
their consulate worked to counteract the Mexican moves. The most effective French
official in the hunt to expose any activity violating the American neutrality policy was the
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consul himself, Charles Ferdinand Cazotte, who replaced the outgoing consul in January
1864. 54
The French held an important advantage over the Juarists in this peculiar struggle.
The United States’ official neutrality stance enabled the French to cajole unsympathetic
civilian agents and Department of the Pacific officials into thwarting Mexican efforts to
acquire goods and men. McDowell illustrated the awkwardness of this situation when he
wrote Vega in late 1864 that despite “the interest & sympathy which in common with the
majority of my countrymen I feel for your country,” national policy superseded both
popular and personal sentiments. 55 Since the Mexican agents’ continued efforts to raise
arms and material placed Department of the Pacific officials in the undesirable position
of enforcing those policies, McDowell rather curtly pointed out to Vega, “I am in no way
empowered by the Government to regulate its foreign policy, and am in no position to
discuss it with you. That if you find any cause of complaint in the conduct pursued by
any one in this matter, your proper course is to lay it before your minister in
Washington.” 56 The message was clear, American officials would confiscate any
weapons and materials destined for military use by the Juarists and they would impound
any vessels carrying those items.
French consul Cazotte, who understood that Americans in the region, and
elsewhere, loathed both the French incursion in Mexico and the near proximity of
thousands of imperial troops, relied heavily on the officials’ reluctance to abrogate
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standing orders. Of course, Cazotte and the others understood enforcing the law and
seeking out violators and their cargo were not the same. Since neither was carried out
with any élan, both required incentives. After sizing up the situation, Cazotte informed
the French Foreign Office in Paris that
In this country everything has its price, and if the armaments continue, as a result
of the present situation in Mexico, I will be able to stop them only by means of
‘gratifications’ at the right moment to certain officials, and especially the chief of
police, who seems devoted to us. I dare, then, to propose to Your Excellence, that
if Chief Burke should continue to make important seizures of arms and of
contraband of war, to be so good as to put at my disposition funds for unforeseen
events. 57
Furthermore, Cazotte bluntly informed his superiors that “I do not believe those whom I
employ in these affairs will be very happy with pretty words.” 58 Officials in Paris heeded
their consul’s deft characterization of the situation in San Francisco and established a line
of credit for Cazotte’s use in bribing willing American officials.
Wise distribution of these funds enabled agents to obtain information about
Mexican efforts to purchase arms and supplies. Cazotte, in turn, passed this information
on to the local magistrate and customs officials, whose job it was to assist in enforcing
the neutrality law by preventing either belligerent from acquiring military supplies. 59
The chief of San Francisco’s police force, M.L. Burke, who supplemented his income
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with French bribes, readily acted upon the information supplied him. Chief Burke was
not the only important San Francisco official wallowing in the French trough. Many
believed the city’s chief collector of customs, Charles James, was also on the French
payroll. State surveyor general, Edward Beale, denounced James in a letter stating, “You
are known to have had frequent and cordial interviews with the consul of France, and you
will be seen by the thoughtless multitude through a flood of French gold, which will be
believed to have overwhelmed your integrity.” 60 Whether or not James accepted French
bribes is not entirely clear, but there is no denying he zealously worked to prevent any
military material from reaching Mexico. His effort was so strident that Beale promised
“your name will become the synonym of everything that is humanly base wherever the
Democracy rears the flag of a free people.” 61
The combination of Burke and James proved valuable to the French, and
troubling for Vega. In April 1864 officials seized 3,000 rifles aboard the American ship
John L. Stephens. Later that summer, a revenue ship seized an American merchant
vessel, the Haze, while agents in San Francisco took possession of rifles, ammunition,
and cannons waiting to be shipped. The haul amounted to approximately 9,000 rifles and
more than a dozen cannons. 62 Despite these successes and the continued assistance of
the chief of police and the zealous head customs officer, Cazotte only succeeded in
disrupting, but not stopping, the flow of arms from California to the Juarists in Mexico.
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Far more important to maintaining neutrality, and thereby keeping the United
States out of the fighting in Mexico, was preventing Americans from joining the fray
below the border. Where civilian officials held the primary responsibility for intercepting
any shipment of arms and supplies destined for the Juarists, prohibiting the raising,
organizing, and eventual movement of an American expeditionary force to Mexico fell
predominantly to the United States military. Failure to prevent Americans from assisting
President Juarez in his struggle might induce French forces to take military action –
possibly on the American side of the border. The Lincoln administration fully
understood that any confrontation between American citizens or, worse, military
personnel, would ignite a war, and as Grant said in 1864, “we want Napoleon out of
Mexico, but we don’t want any war over it; we have certainly had enough war.” 63
As General Vega discovered, many people shared half of Grant’s opinion. From
the outset of his mission, Vega had been candid about his desire to acquire arms and
munitions in California. He went so far as to point out to Department of the Pacific
commander McDowell that in an April 1864 meeting he gave California Governor F.F.
Low and Edward F. Beale, then with the Army Corps of Engineers, “full details [of] the
object of my mission, which amounted substantially to procuring the means necessary for
repelling the usurpation of Maximilian in Mexico.” 64 However, he understood that
attempting to acquire arms and supplies, which in itself violated America’s neutrality,
was one thing and openly raising troops in defiance of that neutrality was another.
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Therefore, in order to raise troops to help expel Maximilian and his French masters from
Mexico, Vega acted more covertly.
President Juarez needed Vega to recruit the largest force possible in California.
However, concentrating and transporting any sizeable body of men almost guaranteed
detection. An additional problem stemmed from the need to advertise. Vega needed to
get the word out, but doing so had to be done without raising suspicions; otherwise,
military and civilian officials might imprison anyone caught recruiting by invoking
Department of the Pacific, General Order Number 5. The order prohibited citizens from
sailing to Mexico without convincing officials they had no intention of aiding either side
in any manner. 65 The Mexican agents needed to use ingenuity to evade these dual
problems. Vega proved more than capable of using deception to maintain as much
secrecy as possible.
Shortly after the French initiated large scale operations in 1862, angry native
Californians organized “Mexican Clubs,” where increasing numbers of citizens vented
their rage while discussing what they might do to aid their brethren in Mexico. 66 Juarez’s
agents took full advantage of the presence of those organizations by seeking aid from its
members, and in fact, the Juarist operatives contributed funds to encourage their
continued existence. Vega used the clubs, as well as the Spanish language newspapers,
to get the word out regarding an effort to create a new “colony” in northwest Mexico. He
named the first effort to raise men the Arizona Exploring Expedition. Any such
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colonizing endeavor required dealing with the frequently hostile Apache Indians, which
rather conveniently enabled the body to circumvent American laws prohibiting the
emigration of well armed groups.
With Mexican agents able to both advertise for troops and explain the
transportation of heavily armed bodies, it only remained to be seen if Americans would
respond. If there had been any doubt about the likelihood of raising troops in the Far
West, the continuous flow of letters of inquiry made it clear that Americans were willing
to take up arms for Mexico. Edward Lever spoke for many prospective volunteers when
in November 1864, he wrote Vega, “Being in heart and soul a believer in republicanism, I
have long sympathized with Mexico and her patriots, therefore I offer myself for any
position whereby I might be of service.” 67 One of the volunteers, A. A. C. Williams,
forwarded testimonials about his martial service from a number of Union generals to
Vega, who after meeting him appointed Williams a colonel in the Mexican national
guard. 68 As expected, the native Californians also readily volunteered to help liberate
their former country from the imperial yoke. In fact, Vega found generating interest easy
among the Hispanic population, republicans, mercenaries, and disappointed miners
throughout California and Nevada, where he focused his efforts.
Generating interest and organizing bodies of men proved easier than getting them
past Union officials in the Far West, who suspected the Arizona Exploring Expedition’s
objective. However, so long as the group’s existence was not overt and it did not attempt
to leave for Mexico, officials let the charade continue. The fact was that until they set out
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for Mexico they maintained the façade of not violating the neutrality law. However,
Department of the Pacific officials fully understood that Vega’s effort to raise men went
against their primary objective of maintaining stability in the Far West. Despite their
personal sympathies for the Mexicans and hatred of the French, the department
commanders’ responsibility was to ensure the stability of the Far West. In this case, that
meant prohibiting the raising of men to aid Juarez.
General Wright, demoted to District of California commander in late summer
1864, stated the position unequivocally, “our neutrality must and shall be preserved in
good faith. No recruiting rendezvous for enlisting men for foreign service will be
allowed at any place in the State. No bodies of armed men will be permitted to sail from
San Francisco or any other point on the coast. Any violation of this regulation after due
warning will be met by the prompt arrest of the offenders.” 69 Previous experience in
smuggling arms and supplies out of California, even if the success rate teetered around
fifty percent, gave Vega reason to hope for success in raising and sending men to Juarez.
In any case, given the desperate situation in Mexico, Vega and the other agents had no
choice but to test the officials’ commitment.
In May 1865, with the Civil War virtually over, Vega finally arranged to transport
a body of 400 men to join the Juarist forces in Mexico. 70 Despite the fact that American
policy regarding the shipment of arms (and men) to Mexico was in flux, and murky, at
the time, officials in San Francisco prevented the Arizona Expedition from sailing and, as
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Wright warned, jailed some of those involved. 71 Although American policy soon became
more helpful for republican Mexico, the setback proved significant. Through the joint
work carried out mostly by civilian and treasury officials (some of whom were aided by
French spies), with the support of the military, no organized bodies of volunteers left for
Mexico until 1866, by which time the United States government relaxed laws prohibiting
aid to the Juarez government.
Department of the Pacific commanders and men, with the significant assistance of
government officials, prevented any dangers emanating out of Mexico from drawing
Americans, and eventually the nation, into the morass below the border. During the
course of the Civil War, Department of the Pacific leaders maintained the sanctity of their
department and the safety of the people from being imperiled by dangers bubbling in
Mexico. American neutrality had been preserved, and Mexico, as Secretary of State
Seward predicted, nearly sacrificed to the Europeans in the process.
During the Civil War, Union troops patrolling the southern part of the state, along
with fellow California volunteers serving in the Department of New Mexico, protected
the Far West and Southwest from a myriad of dangers along the regions’ southern
borders. By distributing troops to confront potential threats, including sending a large
contingent from the Department of the Pacific into New Mexico Territory, department
commanders upheld their primary objective of maintaining the integrity of the region for
the federal government.
By marshalling their troops effectively, Department of the Pacific officials
deterred both the French and the Mexicans from either advancing, as in the former case,
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or retreating in the latter, into America. The work to protect the Far West, and thereby
the nation, from being sucked into the Mexican vortex was complicated and required
vigilance by the officers and men stationed in the southern part of the department, deft
political maneuvering by its commanders, and stealth by civilian and department
personnel thwarting violations of neutrality. By maintaining the integrity of the borders
and the nation’s neutrality in the face of public support for the Mexican cause, and
despite their own sympathies, Department of the Pacific officers and men achieved an
important and complicated success for the Union.
Keeping the Confederates from establishing a southwestern/far western empire,
proved no less important for the Department of the Pacific than making certain the
imperial war stayed in Mexico and that Americans did not join either side. Although
Union forces under the overall command of Colonel E. R. S. Canby delivered the fatal
blow to the Confederate Army of New Mexico in March 1862, Department of the Pacific
forces played a key role in arresting Confederate designs on New Mexico Territory and
beyond. Advance elements of District of Southern California commander James
Carleton’s command turned back a Confederate probe less than 100 miles from
California. Just as department commander Wright sent Carleton and his California
Column eastward to block any Confederate advance, he also shifted troops to southern
California and strengthened their most exposed post, Fort Yuma, all in an effort to thwart
any Confederate designs on California. The successful combination of Wright’s
marshalling of troops, Carleton’s vigorous recapture and occupation of New Mexico
Territory, along with Confederate defeats in the eastern part of the territory nearly
eliminated any further serious southern threat to the region.
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Even the aborted Union march across Mexico benefited the nation. Although
General Sumner did not lead a large contingent of troops across northern Mexico, the
plan expedited the concentration and departure of the Regular Army forces for the eastern
theatre. Similarly, the rumors about the Union advance kept wary western Confederate
leaders on edge well after the Federal War Department scrapped the plan. In effect, the
aborted mission served the Union cause by expediting the transfer of the U.S. Regulars
eastward and by forcing western Confederates to expend energy and time preparing to
counter an invasion that never came.
Whether it was the almost accidental benefits gained by the rumored Union march
across Mexico, the role in repelling Confederate attempts to establish a southwestern
empire, or the deft handling of the dangers posed by the imperial war in Mexico, the
Department of the Pacific successfully confronted these threats to the stability of the Far
West. By effectively dealing with these dangers, the officers and men in the department
achieved all that the Union government asked of them. In a unique, although undeniable,
way the Department of the Pacific’s ability to neutralize all external dangers along both
sides of the Mexican border, and thereby prevent the loss of the Southwest and
California, or requiring the transfer of large numbers of Union troops to the region,
contributed to the successful war effort.
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CHAPTER
-6-

An Old Problem in a New War:
The Department of the Pacific and White-Native American
Relations During the Civil War

In November 1863 a rather exasperated General George Wright dictated a note from his
San Francisco headquarters. In it he curtly reminded one of the seemingly endless
streams of local officials besieging him with frantic pleas for assistance and protection
that each of their local concerns was part of a larger myriad of responsibilities he faced.
Wright informed the frightened officials that department responsibilities superseded
individual regional problems, stating: “You must bear in mind gentlemen, that I have a
great many urgent calls for troops to protect our hardy pioneers against Indians, and a
very small number of soldiers to meet all these pressing calls . . . I have still more
important business on hand to look after traitors within our borders, and to be prepared to
meet foes from without.” 1
The terse tone of Wright’s reply easily misled some civilians about his level of
both understanding and concern over the precarious and often volatile relations between
whites and Native Americans. Wright, who spent the last 13 years of his 43-year military
career on the Pacific Coast, understood the difficulties of trying to maintain peace better
than anyone. Unfortunately for worried westerners and their harried civilian leaders, the
Civil War and its myriad of new problems and responsibilities prohibited western
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military officials from focusing their attention solely on relations with the tribesmen. For
the Department of the Pacific, the war dramatically complicated an old problem, which
grew worse with each new wagon train rumbling across the prairies and every ship load
of passengers arriving in San Francisco. Balancing the demands of whites with the desire
to avoid open conflict with the too frequently abused Native Americans required delicate
handling of the complicated situation, and the failure to do so resulted in a number of
conflicts. Although citizens in every part of the department believed they were in grave
danger, the most volatile, and complicated to administer, regions were in coastal northern
California and along the immigrant trails. In these places, and throughout the
department’s jurisdiction, Wright and the other commanders struggled to find solutions,
employing political maneuvering, intimidation, and the use of force to protect whites. In
this increasingly difficult environment, the Department of the Pacific leaders faced a
continuation of the bloody 1850s.
The problems that complicated, and frequently foiled, efforts at maintaining some
sort of peaceful existence between the various far western tribes and the Department of
the Pacific was merely a stage in the decades-long struggle between white Americans and
indigenous peoples in the region. From the start, finding an effective means to ensure
calm between whites and Native Americans in the Far West required both luck and
understanding, on both sides. One or both elements seemed lacking throughout the
1850s, as war raged between Native Americans and whites for most of the decade. The
1850s, in fact, served as a bloody foreshadowing of what the western plains witnessed in
the 1870s and 1880s, ultimately culminating in the massacre along Wounded Knee creek
in South Dakota in 1890. Although a brief calm reigned in the Far West in 1861, it did
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not last, and department commanders, especially George Wright, found themselves
desperately trying to cope with an old problem.
The problem was not that the government initiated new policies or followed new
strategies when dealing with the tribes during the war. What gave rise to a new wave of
violence was the increasing numbers of whites migrating to the Far West during the war,
and the subsequent increase in the abuse of the Indian population, combined with the
effect of the multifarious responsibilities facing the military. In fact, the policies
followed during the 1860s were a continuation of the same policies carried out by men
like George Wright during the previous decade. 2
Of course, the most dramatic increase in population in the Far West exploded in
California beginning in 1849, after the news of the discovery of gold reached the
populated regions of the country in the East. The resulting human flood devoured
California’s Native American population over the next ten years. The influx of miners
brought death in several ways: diseases, which by the time of the American acquisition
had already dramatically reduced the indigenous population, whittled away at the
remaining 100,000 Native Americans; violence toward the tribes by gold seekers spilling
onto their lands and further reduced their numbers; and, finally, miners swarming over
Indian lands made it difficult for the Native Americans to obtain sustenance. The
massive crush of whites in such a short span of time only expedited the inevitable.
Unlike the larger, well organized and loosely connected tribes associated with the Great
Plains, Southwest, and to a lesser degree, Pacific Northwest, tribes in California were
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smaller, family-based, less organized, and were unlikely to create alliances with
neighboring tribes. These tendencies made it easier to subdue and dispossess the rapidly
declining population of Native Americans throughout the 1850s.
Given the rapidly changing population dynamics in California, there were very
few confrontations between the indigenous peoples and Americans (among others) that
could be classified as wars. This, however, does not mean American military officials
did not face a complicated task when dealing with the two groups. Department of the
Pacific personnel inherited a well-established pattern of white abuses of the tribes, which
sometimes precipitated a violent response, which then gave credence to efforts to
exterminate the Indians. The effect of this pattern, which was no accident, plagued
military officials during the 1850s and created a mindset among civilians that haunted
department officials during the Civil War.
As Wright well knew, relations between many tribes in the Far West and the
Americans had been poor (at best) since the United States first organized its western
lands into territories in the wake of the Mexican-American War. In fact, the first of the
loosely-termed Indian wars to involve Americans ignited before Oregon’s organization as
a territory or California’s official acquired from Mexico. In 1847, in what became an alltoo-common scenario, a group of Cayuse Indians retaliated against American incursions
into their lands by attacking the nearest settlement, with the local American population
responding in kind. 3 Unfortunately, the Americans in question were a small group of
missionaries who were more interested in the Cayuses’ souls than lands.
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Marcus Whitman and his wife, Narcissa, saw their relations with the Cayuse
deteriorate over the eleven years that they ran their mission (near the present city of
Walla Walla, Washington). During those years the Whitmans failed miserably as
missionaries, and faired only slightly better in their efforts to persuade Americans to
migrate to the region. Many immigrants who headed for the Willamette Valley, however,
were thankful to regroup for days or more at the mission before pushing further into the
Oregon country. Thus, the Whitman mission served as something of an immigrant
gauge, enabling anyone paying attention to grasp a rough estimate of the increasing
numbers of Americans trickling (at this point) into this still disputed territory. The
Cayuses took notice of the influx in immigrants passing through their lands and the
resulting increase in confrontations with those groups that resulted. Frustrated by the
steady, if light, stream of Americans into their country and increasingly unhappy with the
presence of the Whitman mission, which was blamed for the diseases that swept the
tribes, a group of Cayuses attacked the small enclave on November 29, 1847. They
tomahawked Marcus Whitman to death and murdered 13 other whites before the killings
came to a halt. 4
In an effort to seek justice, revenge, or some combination of the two, local
Americans initiated what became known as the Cayuse Indian War in early 1848.
Although the resulting actions never rose to the level associated with other Indian wars,
what transpired foreshadowed the conflicts that plagued the region for the ensuing ten
years. Since the United States government was not yet in position to assist those far off
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Americans in their effort to seek justice, the local citizens took matters into their own
hands. Ultimately the pursuit of the murderers proved more frustrating than fruitful;
however, it did demonstrate certain tendencies that were common to all the conflicts that
followed up through 1858.
Sending a mixed message, Oregon settlers organized roughly 500 armed men to
pursue the Cayuses and bring those responsible to justice, while at the same time, the
provisional governor, Abernethy, sent three commissioners to meet with the tribe to
establish a peaceful resolution. Initially, Cornelius Gilliam’s determination to exact
revenge on the Cayuses foiled the peace commissioners. As too often occurred, Gilliam
and the volunteer military force he led were unable to capture those they believed
responsible for the murders. Unable to sate their need for revenge, the volunteers
skirmished with both guilty and innocent Indians indiscriminately during their fruitless
pursuit, and even stole large herds of livestock from the tribal bands they encountered.
Those encounters, which continued for months, resulted in a number of Indian deaths and
increased enmity between Americans and the regional tribes. 5 Finally, with the
encouragement of some Nez Perce chiefs, Cayuse leaders turned over five men believed
responsible for the murders. 6 Following a trial in Oregon City, Oregon Territory, all five
were hung on June 3, 1850. 7 The end of the Cayuse War, however, did not end the
sporadic violence between Americans and the tribe. Occasional raids and minor
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skirmishes sputtered on until the few remaining tribal members were forced onto a
reservation in 1855.
The larger scale violence between Americans and the various tribes in the Pacific
Northwest initiated by the Whitman Massacre, continued until 1858. During that time,
wars erupted between Americans and tribes throughout Oregon, and later, Washington
territories. The tribes that found themselves involved in those wars included Cayuse,
Coeur d’Alene, Palouse, Spokan, Umatilla, Walla Walla, Wenatchee, and Yakima in
north central and northeastern Oregon and south central and southeastern Washington
territories. From west-central Oregon to the border with California, wars were fought
against the Rogue River and Shasta tribes. Although lesser in scale, violence also broke
in the Puget Sound region during this same ten year stretch.
Ultimately the military, often joined by volunteers whose wanton violence toward
all Indians exacerbated growing distrust of Americans, defeated the tribes. In the wake of
those defeats, the Native Americans ceded tens of thousands of acres of lands to the
United States and many were forced on to reservations. Victory had not come easy,
however, and the military suffered a number of defeats along the way. The most famous
of those was the routing of two companies of over 100 men from the Fourth Infantry
commanded by Brevet Major Granville Haller in early October 1855, at the outset of the
Yakima War. A similar defeat befell Brevet Major Edward Steptoe’s command in
southeast Washington Territory in late May 1858, which initiated the Plateau Indian War
of that year. 8

8

For Haller’s defeat, see Clifford E. Trafzer and Robert Scheuerman, Renegade Tribe: The
Palouse Indians and the Invasion of the Inland Pacific Northwest, (Pullman, WA: Washington State
University Press, 1986), 63-64, and Robert Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the
Indian, 1848-1865, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1967), 188. For the Steptoe defeat,

198

These wars significantly influenced the nature of relations between Pacific
Northwest tribes and the Department of the Pacific personnel during the Civil War.
Many officers who played prominent roles in the main theatres of the war honed their
skills during the Northwest Indian wars, and two of the most important leaders who
served in the Far West during the war participated in the decade-long wars. Among those
who fought in the Pacific Northwest were a number of future Confederate generals,
including Hylan Lyon, William Loring, George Pickett, Gabriel Rains, Richard Garnett,
William Pender, and Charles Winder. 9 The list of those that served the Union as generals
is far longer, and includes future major generals Phil Kearney, Erasmus Keyes, John
Reynolds, Phil Sheridan, and A.J. Smith, as well as a number of future brigadier
generals. 10 Although all these men played prominent roles in the main arenas of
operation during the Civil War, two others remained on the West Coast and thereby
became key leaders in the Department of the Pacific. The two officers who missed their
chance for greater fame were Benjamin Alvord, who commanded the District of Oregon
during most of the war, and George Wright, the man who spent more time as department
commander than all others combined. 11
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While staying in the Far West during the war significantly diminished
opportunities for dramatic advancement for professional soldiers, the region was
fortunate that a few, such as Alvord and Wright, remained in the area. The calm that
prevailed in the region in 1860, combined with the secession of South Carolina and the
Deep South, led eastern officials to forget about, or ignore, the potential problems
simmering in the region. Although the first department commander, Albert S. Johnston,
was an experienced Indian fighter and military man, his awareness of the situation in the
Far West had limits. During his brief tenure he too endured a barrage of requests for
military assistance from frightened, and opportunistic, civilians from throughout the
department.
From the very beginning, after assuming command of the department on January
15, 1861, the new head of the reconfigured Department of the Pacific, found himself
besieged by civilians pleading for relief from the Native Americans. For Johnston, those
calls for help usually took one of two forms. Most often civilian leaders emphasized the
dangers they faced if certain forts were closed as part of the reshuffling of the
department’s forces, or the local politicians bemoaned depredations already being carried
out by local tribes. Although Johnston did not remain at his post long enough to
acculturate himself to the nuances associated with dealing with the Pacific Coast tribes,
he was an experienced Indian fighter who had dealt with frightened civilians before. In
an effort to mollify one such a group living in the northern part of Puget Sound, Johnston
assured the petitioners, “an outbreak of the Indians in those districts is not apprehended,
but as the inhabitants, and the assembly thinks, feel insecure, and the presence of a
military force will no doubt reassure, I will, as soon as practicable, send a small force to
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that place.” 12 This was a potentially hazardous precedent. Puget Sound politicians were
hardly the only civilians trying to cajole the military to take action, both defensive and
offensive as the situation dictated, to prevent the various tribes from endangering the
white population. Despite the fact that such fears were often more imagined than real,
civilians demanded action form the already harried military.
During the approximately four months Albert Sidney Johnston commanded the
Department of the Pacific he accumulated a substantial array of calls for help from
civilians from as far afield as Puget Sound, along both sides of the Columbia River, the
Humboldt region of northern California, and on down to southern California, near Fort
Tejon. In the process, civilian leaders of varying importance from throughout the
department badgered or begged for aid. All the while, Johnston faced the reality that he
did not have a large enough force to appease every nervous citizen. California Governor
Downey went so far as to upbraid Johnston by reminding him, “I have heretofore had
occasion to make representations to the late General Clarke of depredations committed
upon the property of citizens of California by hostile Indians, and it affords me pleasure
to state that prompt measures were taken.” 13 In a justifiably irritated response to such an
overt challenge to his leadership, Johnston honestly and curtly reminded the governor
that he had dispatched several additional companies to the region to join those already
stationed in the area. Furthermore, “at this time there is no other force available, without
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withdrawing it from positions whose security at present would seem to demand its
presence.” 14
Despite his brusque explanation to the governor, and the views of his own
officers, Johnston found it more expedient to spread his forces even thinner. In the view
of one subordinate stationed in the Humboldt district of northern California, “I would
hesitate to commence hostilities.” His caution derived from the fact that “the white
inhabitants of this section are more than anxious to be at war with these Indians. For this
reason the Indians are afraid to go into the valleys for roots and berries, so that I cannot
imagine how they live, and must think they merit some consideration for not stealing.” 15
The situation was the same in Washington Territory, where the commander of Fort Walla
Walla, informed his superiors that “a large number of California miners are expected this
spring. Trouble will be the result unless something is done to purchase the mineral land
immediately from the Indians. They are very much dissatisfied, and their only
confidence now is in the troops.” 16
The ironic twist was that the military was, in many cases, the best hope the tribes
had for protection. Through manipulation and less than truthful characterizations of who
was responsible for the violence, civilians got military leaders to combat the Indians, and
in a number of cases significant numbers joined the soldiers in their efforts. In no place
was this more evident than in the northwestern counties of California. When Johnston
acquiesced in the Humboldt district he agreed to allow the raising of volunteers from the
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local population, the people most likely to benefit from the death or removal of all the
local tribes. Worn down by the continual harping of civilians to form such units, and
with his own manpower stretched to the limit, Johnston explained that “for the purpose of
giving the most effect to their operations I have thought it expedient and proper to ask
Governor Downey to authorize the enrollment of thirty volunteers . . . acquainted with
that mountainous country, and who I think can be attached to the different detachments as
guides.” 17 Eventually, the employment of those guides demonstrated that the locals were
more adapt not only at finding, but also at combating the raiding tribesmen.
Almost from the outset, the Department of the Pacific leaders demonstrated a lack
of preparedness for dealing with the increasing problems in the Humboldt region. As the
random violence escalated into warfare, it became evident that there were not enough
troops in the region, and those that were sent to quell the unrest possessed insufficient
knowledge of the terrain and the tribes to be effective in their efforts to “chastise” the
Native Americas, as Edwin Sumner put it. Furthermore, trying to marshal the troops
needed for such a task from department headquarters in San Francisco had long proven
ineffective. Therefore, the first significant step in addressing the problems which plagued
the region for three years occurred on December 12, 1861. On that date, General George
Wright, the department’s latest commander, issued Special Order 233, which created the
Humboldt District. Colonel Francis J. Lippitt, commander of the Second California
Infantry Regiment, assumed command of the new district, which included Del Norte,
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Humboldt, Klamath, Mendocino, Napa, Sonoma, and Trinity counties, on January 12,
1862. 18
Shortly after arriving and conferring with officers already in the region, Lippitt
provided Wright with an interesting assessment of the situation. He made it clear that the
local whites were as much to blame for the bitterness that had led to warfare, noting
“there are many whites that are constantly killing Indians, often making up parties for
that purpose.” Those groups, he told Wright, “Kill as many of the women and children,
perhaps, as bucks [men]. Individuals and parties are, moreover, constantly engaged in
kidnapping Indian children . . . . This is said to be very lucrative business.” 19 While all
that was true, Lippitt’s tone of equal blame did not go over well with the locals, nor did
his defeatist attitude:
These Indians are not divided into any considerable tribes with responsible chiefs,
but are made up of numberless rancherias or villages, in many cases speaking
totally different languages. There are so many of them, they are so scattered
about, and so hard to find, that to bring them all in by sending from time to time
small parties or independent detachments after them, it would take about as long
as it would to bring in all the coyotes or squirrels. 20

Continuing in his honest, and accurate, assessment, the colonel told Wright that it was
“plain they [whites and Native Americans] could never live together in peace. The
Indians must all be removed for their own sakes and for the sake of the whites, and the
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be moved far from their home region, otherwise they would leave the reservation as soon
as an opportunity arose. 21 All of Lippitt’s observations were more or less true, and his
assessment of the impossibility of dealing with the tribes according to strategies then in
place proved prophetic over the next three years. 22
Given Lippitt’s initial assessment, Wright wanted him to conduct a
reconnaissance of his new command as soon as was practical, and to determine the
manpower needed to achieve and maintain peace in the region. What the colonel found
when the weather finally permitted him to conduct his reconnaissance was a region
“more alpine than Switzerland itself, and in its physical conformation perhaps the most
extraordinary on the face of the globe . . . . For hundreds of miles around you will
scarcely find a level spot twenty yards square.” 23 The only way the colonel could see to
prevent the marauding was to establish small posts throughout the region. He informed
Wright, “In view of the limited number of troops that can be spared for service in this
district, making any combined and extensive movement impossible, the policy I have
thought it best to adopt is the establishment of posts, consisting of a single company
each.” 24 This was not a new strategy at all, but the hope was the establishment of new
posts would make it more efficient to pursue and capture marauding tribesmen. 25
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Trying to find the responsible tribesmen long after an attack on an isolated ranch
was virtually impossible, and scattering a handful of troops to the most exposed ranches
was illogical, yet that is what Lippitt ordered. 26 Despite the arduous nature of the
pursuits and the difficulty in finding those responsible for the endless attacks, the
California troops did manage to capture some 800 Native Americans, mostly innocent,
non combatants. 27
Dealing with the captured tribesmen and women created a different set of
problems for the troops stationed in the Humboldt District. Housing and feeding,
ostensibly the responsibility of the Indian agent, George Hanson, fell to the military until
the captured persons were placed on one of the region’s reservations. That, however, did
not end the military’s responsibilities toward the Native Americans. Troops had to be
stationed near reservations in an effort to protect the Indians from local whites and to try
to prevent many Native Americans from escaping, which they did in large numbers. 28
All in all, service in the Humboldt District was difficult and ceaselessly frustrating in an
area with rugged terrain that made operations arduous and which favored the tribesmen.
Just how difficult it was to battle the Native Americans in the region is clear from
the allocation of troops to the district during the war. The first return after Lippitt
assumed command in January 1862 shows that he had at his disposal 438 officers and
men, which was roughly eight percent of the department’s available manpower. 29 To
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fully comprehend the disproportionate number of troops stationed in the Humboldt
District it is important to note that the other three districts that then made up the
Department of the Pacific encompassed one or, in the majority of cases, two modern
states. Furthermore, the number of troops allocated to the Humboldt District over the
course of the war demonstrates the ebbing and flowing of violence between the regional
tribes and the white populace. After some initial success in the early part of 1863, the
situation again deteriorated to where there were almost 800 troops in the district on
December 31, 1863. That number represented almost twenty percent of the Department
of the Pacific’s manpower at the time. 30 Continued success eventually resulted in the
defeat of the various tribes, followed by their removal to reservations, thus by the end of
the war just 190 officers and men were stationed in the Humboldt District. 31
Unfortunately for George Wright, and his successor, Major General Irvin
McDowell, the Humboldt scenario was not unique in the vast department, in that dealing
with militant, or out and out warring tribes, proved difficult, costly, and with success
often coming slowly. A situation all too similar to that in the Humboldt District drew
other department forces to the opposite part of California in early 1862. The Owens
River Indians, like the various tribes in the Humboldt region suffered increasingly at the
hands of encroaching whites. Despite the increasing number of whites in the Owens
River valley, the tribe still outnumbered them at the outset of the Civil War. This meant
that sustained uprisings threatened the vary existence of all the white farmers and
ranchers in the region. The only solution, or at least the only one considered by the
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farmer and department officials, was to use troops to suppress the uprisings and force the
tribe into a peace treaty.
Desperate times during the winter of 1860-61, due to food shortages, precipitated
the cycle of violence that plagued the valley well into 1863. The call for troops finally
resulted in the dispatch of a 40 man reconnaissance force being sent to investigate in
March 1862. 32 It was the opinion of Colonel James Carleton, who commanded the
District of Southern California, that

Since the Washoe and Coso mines have been discovered, people have gone into
this valley with stock, to be convenient to the mines for the sale of beef and [et]c.,
and the poor Indians are doubtless at a loss to know how to live, having their
fields turned into pastures whether they are willing or not. It is very possible,
therefore, that the whites are to blame. 33
White depredations against the tribesmen and women exacerbated the
deteriorating relationship. General Wright agreed with Carleton’s assessment, explaining
to the United States Adjutant General in Washington D.C. “Reports from that country
represent that the whites were in the wrong [having murdered four Indians], but I cannot
let the innocent suffer for the guilty. I am compelled to send troops to preserve the
peace.” 34 Regardless of who was at fault, it was his job to maintain the peace; therefore,
he ordered additional troops to descend into the valley from Fort Churchill, Nevada
Territory.
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Although most of the department’s high command believed whites were largely to
blame for the unrest, they had little choice but to use force to compel the Native
Americans to submit to governmental authority and to desist from further attacks. As
was the case in the Humboldt District, there were no quick solutions. The initial effort to
confront and defeat the marauding Indians began in March, when Lieutenant Colonel
George Evans left Los Angeles with three companies of the Second California Cavalry
and headed toward the Owen’s River valley. Once in the valley, Evans found “that the
settlers had for some considerable time been threatened by the Indians, and been hemmed
in at The Fort [a semi fortified complex, at the heart of which was a general store],”
where they were threatened by several hundred tribesmen. 35 The Native Americans, who
battered a home guard just before Evans arrived, fled into the steep hills rimming the
valley upon the military’s arrival. Disinclined to make easy targets of themselves, the
Indians remained among the rocky slopes, eventually forcing Evans, now joined by the
civilians and a contingent of California troops sent down from Fort Churchill, to attempt
to dislodge them by force. The effort proved futile, and costly, leading the colonel to
admit, “I saw that it would be madness and no less than murder to attempt to go any
farther: that I could do nothing but get half of my men killed without as much as getting
a fair shot at an Indian.” 36 Two days after the failed attempt to dislodge the tribesmen
from their natural bastions, Evans and his command began a slow withdrawal, leaving the
Owen’s River Indians in control of the valley. The 41-day campaign failed entirely,
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which meant more men and more material would have to be put into the field to bring the
depredations to a close as soon as possible. 37
Eager to see the natural resources in the region developed, Wright sent orders for
a second expedition to start as soon as practical. Since the responsibility for defeating
and forcing a peace settlement on the tribesmen again fell to Lieutenant Colonel Evans
and his contingent of cavalrymen, the need for recuperation prohibited any alacrity in
preparation.
Once Evans’ command was finally ready in June, it again worked in conjunction
with a smaller contingent of troopers moving southwestward from Fort Churchill. Just as
in the previous case, there were difficulties in executing the pincer-like strategy. Wright,
himself, caused a good deal of confusion by issuing dissimilar orders to the separate
wings of the movement. As Evans noted in his report, he learned that the other force,
under Captain Edwin Rowe, “was acting under orders from headquarters Department of
the Pacific and endeavoring to make peace with the Indians, while I was under
instructions to chastise them severely.” 38 There was method in Wright’s madness,
however, as Evans’ forces “commenced killing and destroying whenever I could find an
Indian to kill or his food to destroy,” it “changed their [recalcitrant Indians] tune and
were anxious for peace.” 39 With Evans destroying homes and crops, and occasionally
exchanging shots with the Native Americans, while Rowe wrangled peace agreements,
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the second effort proved more successful than the first, and a degree of peace returned –
albeit momentarily – to the valley by mid July 1862. 40
Part of the cost guaranteeing peace included assurances that provisions would be
provided for the reconciled tribesmen. The food was the key issue since white
destruction of Native American food supplies precipitated the retaliatory violence, theft
of livestock, and raiding. As was all too commonly the case when the U.S. government
and its agents dealt with the Native Americans throughout the 1800s, those promises
proved hollow, or at best insufficient. The lack of the promised food rations reignited the
conflict between whites living in the Owen’s River valley region and local Indians in mid
1863. In response to a new round of calls for assistance, General Wright ordered another
expedition to chastise the Indians once and for all.
Fortunately for George Wright, the latest effort fell upon the shoulders of
someone other than Colonel Evans, who seemed confounded by the challenges of trying
to defeat an elusive enemy over rugged terrain. This time around the Indians faced a far
more aggressive and hardened officer in Captain Moses McLaughlin. Pragmatic, brutally
efficient, and utterly honest, the captain understood the situation entirely. In his view,
“Mr. [John P.H.] Wentworth, Indian agent for this district, has been most undoubtedly the
cause of the present difficulties and . . . has been shamefully negligent of his duties.”
Captain McLaughlin bluntly informed department headquarters that “Mr. Wentworth
promised everything, gave nothing, and the results have been the destruction of life and
property.” 41 Despite understanding that undelivered promises were the cause of the
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troubles, McLaughlin believed that peace meant the permanent subjugation of the
warring Indians, and he went about that work in a manner reminiscent of how George
Wright conducted his 1858 campaign in Washington Territory.
In a demonstration of cold, calculating efficiency, at dawn on April 19,
McLaughlin and roughly 20 of his 50 troopers surrounded a Native American
encampment along the Kern River, which is adjacent to the Owen’s River valley. After
gathering all the males together, he asked some local citizens who accompanied his force,
as well as an Owen’s River chief named Jose Chico, who acted as guide, to point out all
the tribesmen for whom they could personally vouch for as being “good.” After the
process was finished, “the others, to the number of thirty-five, for whom no one could
vouch, were either shot or sabered. Their only chance for life being their fleetness, but
none escaped.” 42 The captain explained his savage actions to department headquarters as
being necessary, adding that “I feel certain that a few such examples will soon crush the
Indians and finish the war in this and adjacent valleys.” Furthermore, he prophesied,
“They will soon learn that . . . with the forces here they will soon either be killed off, or
pushed so far in the surrounding deserts that they will perish by famine.” 43
General Wright, desperate for good news regarding relations with the Native
Americans within his department, welcomed McLaughlin’s report. After reading the
captain’s account, Wright expressed “his admiration of the energy, perseverance, and
good conduct displayed by yourself and your command throughout the whole
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campaign.” 44 That Wright had no qualms about McLaughlin murdering 35 Indians is
understandable for three reasons: first, as McLaughlin predicted, the word of his
willingness to act in such a manner spread throughout the remaining bands, leading most
of them to agree to end the fighting; second, as the commander of a vast department with
a multitude of responsibilities, anything that quelled any unrest, no matter what the
nature, was good news to Wright; finally, since Wright had, himself, summarily executed
warring tribesmen and slaughtered their entire herd of ponies to bring about a quick end
to the 1858 war in the Pacific Northwest, he was not as squeamish as some of his
subordinates. 45
As a final compliment to the captain, department headquarters also informed him
that the Indian agent had been ordered to provide food supplies for the Native Americans
who turned themselves over to the cavalry and, if possible, to establish an encampment
for them far from the Owen’s River valley. This latter point, which did not happen for
some time, was based on the premise that if the Owen’s River and allied tribes were
removed from far enough from their homelands they would be less likely to try to escape
and return to the region. In a final move to help protect the whites from marauding
tribesmen and the Indians from unruly whites, a cavalry company remained in the valley
at Camp Independence.
The calm that settled into the Owen’s River valley by late summer 1863 more or
less prevailed to the point where Wright, forced to move his forces around like chess
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pieces, removed the troops from Camp Independence in September. Denuded of their
security blanket, local citizens petitioned Wright’s successor, Irvin McDowell, for the
reoccupation of the camp a year later. Fortunately for the civilians, a greater degree of
calm reigned throughout the department as the end of the war neared. Thus, McDowell
was able to assuage their fears by having Wright, now the District of California
commander, order the reoccupation of the post in December. 46
Although the violence in the Owen’s River valley, both in duration and cost,
paled in comparison to what transpired in the Humboldt region in the far north of the
state, both typified one type of the difficulty faced by the officers and men of the
Department of the Pacific during the war. Increasing numbers of whites competing with
Native Americans for finite lands all too frequently led to violence, and that in turn
almost always led to pleas for assistance once the civilians stirred up the Indians beyond
what they could handle. Although regular Army officers like Wright and Carleton
understood that the whites were generally to blame for the violence between the two
groups, their job was to ensure the tribesmen were pacified to the point that they could
not impede the development of the lands by white settlers and miners. In both the
Humboldt District and in the case of the Owen’s River valley campaigns, the military
faced an enemy accustomed to the terrain, who was highly mobile, but within a fairly
well defined area (albeit the Humboldt region was massive), which required a significant
outlay of men and equipment.
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If fighting a guerilla war against an enemy accustomed to the terrain proved
difficult at best and maddening at the worst times, at least officers like Lippitt, Evans, and
McLaughlin could be thankful they knew generally where to find their enemy. Knowing
essentially where the raiding tribesmen were was not a luxury enjoyed by the officers and
men trying to protect the steady flow of immigrants into the Far West. With literally
hundreds of thousands of square miles to guard, the Humboldt and Owen’s River
operations appear almost sedentary in comparison to the responsibilities faced by officers
patrolling the open spaces of Oregon, and Idaho and Utah Territories. 47
The difficulties in dealing with the semi nomadic tribes along the immigrant trails
were not new, but each year since the discovery of gold in California in 1848 the
situation deteriorated. As the initial gold rush subsided and gave way to widely separated
gold and silver rushes throughout the Far West more and more people trekked across the
often inhospitable lands between Missouri and the Pacific slope, in search of better lives.
The mounting pressure that arose as competition for lands traditionally held by Native
Americans increased grew even worse after the Civil War began. With more people
heading west to escape the war, looking to establish homesteads, seek their fortunes
through mining, or by mining miners, the frequency of confrontations between whites
and Native Americans accelerated. Given the increasing numbers of immigrants
combined with the reduction in the number of troops serving in the Far West and along
the immigrant trails, the escalating violence was inevitable.
The experiences of the Van Orman party in September 1860 illustrate the
growing danger along the immigrant trails on the eve of Civil War. Near the end of the
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travel season, not far from Salmon Falls, Washington Territory (now the state of Idaho) a
large group of Shoshonis attacked the Van Orman’s 44 person wagon train. 48 After 34
hours of fighting, the survivors abandoned their wagons and fled. The Shoshonis took up
the trail after plundering the wagons. The outcome was predictable; the Native
Americans easily overtook the jangled men, women, and children, most of whom
eventually perished. News of the attack spread quickly after one, and then two
additional, survivors reached safety by October 2. Two days later the future Department
of the Pacific commander (then) Colonel Wright ordered a 100 man rescue party in
search of possible survivors. Ultimately the soldiers found 12 more survivors, who
sustained themselves by eating the corpses of four children. 49 Being so late in the season,
no punitive expedition could be launched before snow made it impossible; therefore,
Wright devised a plan for the coming spring.
Of course by spring 1861 the nation was in a state of civil war and any such
retribution was entirely secondary to the need to strengthen the Union military. Even
though no military operations were launched, the Van Orman party’s fate cast a long
shadow, especially given the fluctuating strength of the military in the region and its
expanded responsibilities. Given the prevailing state of confusion and the brief tenures of
the Department of Pacific’s first two commanders any aggressive steps to protect the
immigrant trails would have to wait. It was not until George Wright assumed command
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of the department that steps were taken to address the dangers along the immigrant road
(and the mail and telegraph route).50
The desperate concentration of as many of the Regular Army troops as possible in
the east meant that a number of posts in the Far West were closed or at best left with a
skeleton contingent until the first volunteers could replace them. Since Albert Sidney
Johnston oversaw a department focused on concentrating its forces, and Edmund
Sumner’s chief objective was dispersing those troops, it fell to Wright to replace the
departing Regulars with a virtually all-volunteer command. That process also meant
deciding which posts remained open, and eventually where to place new facilities.
Although the Department of the Pacific had more men at its disposal than the same
region prior to the war, the enhanced responsibilities actually left department officials
trying to achieve more with a vastly inferior force.
On December 30, 1860, the Departments of Oregon and California, which were
soon combined into the Department of the Pacific, were manned by 2,245 troops, present
for duty. Those troops were stationed at 26 installations throughout the vast territory. As
of June 30, 1861, with the first major battle of the war just a month away at far off
Manassas, Virginia, Edmund Sumner commanded 2,064 men in the field. 51 Both Sumner
and his predecessor, Johnston, spent the months between January and June strengthening
the coastal defenses. As a result, they also closed two posts and left skeleton contingents
at most of the Pacific Northwest garrisons. Thus, although the department had sent only
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a small number of its strength to the active theatre of the war by June 30, there had
already been a major reduction in the number of troops along the immigrant routes and
lightly inhabited areas.
The most dramatic changes to effect the department took place during the last six
months of the year, when virtually all the Regular Army troops left for the eastern
battlefields and were replaced by volunteers. When Edmund Sumner left the department
in October, Wright was elevated to department command, and thus became the recipient
of requests, and sometimes frantic pleas, for redeployment of troops to protect regions
ranging from southern California to Gray’s Harbor, Washington Territory. Between
June and the end of December 1861 civilians and/or politicians sent eight requests for
military protection. In one case, the petitioners pointed out that certain Native Americans
attacked settlers and those passing along the various trails “with impunity from their
knowledge of the smallness of the force at this place.” 52
Although replacing veteran units with raw volunteers hardly seemed like a
positive move for citizens living in the Far West, there was an upside to the transition.
By the end of 1861 Wright’s commanded twice as many troops as had been in the
department just six months earlier. Of course, a disproportionate number of those troops
were stationed along the coast and furthermore, the increased numbers had to be spread
among five more posts than had been the case in June. With Indian wars heating up in
both the far northern part of California as well in the east-central part of the state, and
requiring a greater outlay of troops in those regions, Wright found himself unable to
allocate troops commensurate with the needs along the immigrant trails, mail and
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telegraph routes, and near the booming mining districts. The effort to placate nervous
civilians, as well as regional and national political leaders regularly led to the
establishment of additional posts, manned by smaller and smaller contingents.
Despite the dangers of spreading an insufficient command dangerously thin,
Wright found himself doing just that to ease the politicians’ raw nerves. Each year, the
troops were spread to more and more posts, which did place troops in a greater number of
areas, but in smaller numbers at those places. This strategy reached its pinnacle in June
1864, the height of the war, both in the Far West and in the main theatre, when Wright’s
command consisted of just 3,933 troops dispersed over 46 posts throughout the
department. To give some perspective to just how comparatively thin the troops were
spread, one need only consider that there were roughly 1,700 more troops in the
department than three and a half years earlier, but those troops manned 20 additional
posts, almost a one hundred percent increase in the number of facilities operated by the
military. 53
The greatest challenge facing Department of the Pacific officials trying to protect
immigrants, miners, and the communication routes in the wide open regions was the need
to overawe any marauding tribes or any that felt pushed to such actions. Even with the
establishment of 20 additional posts (that number shrank from a high of 46 to 42 by the
end of 1864, but bounced back up to 44 the following June) department leaders found it
difficult to defeat the roving bands of tribesmen who attacked immigrants on the trails
and the miners that poured into the District of Oregon. The solution appeared simple in
53
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theory, but difficult in practice; the best way to thwart attacks was to establish
temporary posts or permanent forts along the most dangerous regions and to send patrols
to protect civilians and frighten the Indians. When attacks occurred, expeditions
specifically designed to seek out and punish the perpetrators took to the plains.
The attacks occurred most often in what are now southeastern Idaho, northern
Utah, and eastern Oregon, regions inundated with immigrants and miners. This was not a
new phenomenon, and in fact, during the 20 years prior to the Civil War, the vast
majority of murders along the immigrant trails took place in this loosely defined area. 54
Somewhat oddly, or at least rather coldly, the War Department’s initial concern was not
for the lives of the immigrants or even the miners who helped strengthen the nation’s
economy, but for keeping the mail and telegraph lines between the coasts open.
Despite numerous offers from the various state militia commanders, the War
Department steadfastly refused to accept any of California’s militia units directly into the
Union army. However, with the removal of the Regulars and fears about the safety of the
thin ribbon that connected the East with the gold rich Far West, the Secretary of War,
Simon Cameron, finally sought aid from the politicians. Accordingly, on July 24, 1861,
Cameron notified the governor of California that Department of the Pacific officials
would shortly call for infantry and cavalry volunteers to serve not in the East as most
hoped, but in the inhospitable regions of the Far West. The sole purpose of those
volunteers was to protect the Overland Mail Route in Utah Territory, which could hardly
be considered a quick path to glory and prestige. 55
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This initial step eventually led to the raising of some 17,000 Californians in eight
infantry and two cavalry regiments before the war ended. More importantly for the mail
service and, almost as an afterthought, the immigrants traveling through northern Utah
and southeastern Washington Territory, this first call resulted in a war-long military
presence in Utah Territory. The California soldiers and troopers that marched into Utah
in August 1862 found themselves chasing recalcitrant Shoshoni and Bannock Indians
across the northern part of the territory and into what became Idaho Territory in 1863.
Colonel Patrick Connor, a gruff Irish native and veteran of the Seminole and
Mexican wars, who disliked Utah’s Mormons, led the 700 or so Californians in the
District of Utah, the command of which he assumed in August 1862. 56 During the
course of the war, his principle responsibility was keeping the mail and telegraph routes
open and protecting immigrants heading west. The far-flung nature of this task led
Connor to spread his forces to widely separated points throughout his district. From
these posts, which included Forts Churchill and Ruby, Nevada Territory and Fort Bridger
and Camps Douglas and Connor, Utah Territory, Connor’s California troops initiated
patrols, escorted both immigrants and mail coaches, and carried out offensive campaigns
to capture or kill those Native Americans that haunted the trails and way stations. Most
troubling for Connor were the Shoshoni and Bannock tribesmen, who regularly attacked
and often killed postal carriers, miners, and immigrants along the Idaho – Utah border. 57

56

Warner, 87-88. The District of Utah included much of the state of Nevada, which entered the
Union during the war.
57

Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 222-223.

221

Asserting military control over marauding Indians in such a vast region proved
virtually impossible, and led Connor and his subordinates to use the murder of captured
Native Americans as a tactic to break the spirit of the roving tribesmen. In an effort to
exert early control over his district, Connor ordered a company of California cavalry to
traverse a lengthy section of the Overland Mail Route searching for hostile Indians
beginning on September 30, 1862. The leader of the patrol, Major Edward McGarry,
employed extreme measures to instill fear in all regional tribes, hostile and otherwise.
Connor told McGarry, that if he captured any Indians he believed guilty of killing
immigrants to “immediately hang them, and leave their bodies thus exposed as an
example of what evil-doers may expect while I command in this district.” 58 Following
Connor’s orders rather closely, the major’s command killed a large number of captured,
unarmed Native American braves who, according to McGarry, attempted to flee.
Furthermore, he recounted for Connor that
I put to death four of those [Indians being held by his force] remaining, and
released the squaws and child, telling them that we were sent there to punish
Indians who were engaged in the massacre of emigrants, and instructed them to
tell all the Indians that if they did not desist from killing emigrants I would return
there next summer and destroy them. 59

These tactics, as brutally effective as they might appear, did not end the raids and
killing. In fact, the largest pitched battle between Native Americans and Union military
forces to take place during the Civil War occurred in late January 1863, just over the
Idaho side of the border with Utah. Indicative of just how important he believed it was to
crush the powerful band of Shoshonis led by chief Bear Hunter, Connor took the unusual
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step of initiating a winter campaign in the rugged country along the Utah – Idaho border.
Marching out from Camp Douglas, near Salt Lake City, on January 24, Connor led
roughly 300 California infantry and cavalrymen northward toward the Bear River, and
the climactic confrontation he sought.
The Union force arrived opposite the Indian encampment shortly before dawn,
January 29. Connor ordered all available forces to ford the river and take positions so as
to cut off any retreating tribesmen. With about two thirds of his force in position shortly
after dawn, the Californians attacked. The Shoshonis, well-established behind the
undulating landscape and brush, put up stout resistance at first, but the soldiers were able
to turn both of their flanks, forcing some of them to give up their protective cover. Once
flushed from their position among the rocks and brush, they became easy targets. As
Connor reported, “those who did escape from the ravine were afterward shot in
attempting to swim the river.” With 224 Native Americans killed and the survivors
captured and 20 soldiers killed or mortally wounded with an additional 48 others less
severely wounded, Bear River ranks as a battle when skirmishes were the norm. 60
Despite getting a congratulatory note from the, commanding general of all Union
forces, Major General Henry Halleck, the raiding continued, but on a more sporadic
basis, and travel on the immigrant trails and Overland Mail Route was safer, if not
exactly safe. 61 Even if Connor did not gain as decisive a victory as he hoped, the victory
in a pitched battle dramatically weakened the regional tribes’ will to fight. Unfortunately
for Connor’s neighboring District of Oregon, the military never forced the raiding Indians
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into a pitched battle. This, in turn, meant Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord, who
commanded the district for the majority of the war, never weakened the power of the
tribes in his district in one blow. For Alvord and the troops assigned to the District of
Oregon, which included Washington Territory, out of which grew Idaho Territory, the
war became a chess game between Indian raiders and the military.
Although Alvord eventually had the First Oregon Infantry Regiment, a few
California Infantrymen, and the First Washington Territorial Infantry Regiment under his
command, the task of addressing any troubles with the Native Americans along the
immigrant trails and in the mining districts fell primarily to the First Oregon Cavalry
Regiment. For four years the First Oregon Cavalry troopers fanned out from posts
scattered across the eastern portion of the district in its efforts to perform the tasks
assigned it. 62 During that time its troopers rode tens of thousands of miles in pursuit of
its primary objective: “To prevent the outbreak of hostilities, protect settlers, and secure
justice on either side, for the preservation of amicable relations it is expected that the
force under your command is mainly to be employed.” 63
The first opportunity to actively carry out these responsibilities did not occur until
August 1862, when the first of many similar expeditions over the course of the next three
years left Fort Walla Walla. The first expedition exemplified one of the common actions
carried out by the Oregon troopers during the war. On August 9, Captain George Currey
62
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received orders to lead an expedition consisting of his own Company E from Fort Walla
Walla to apprehend the leaders of a small group of Indians threatening local whites in the
Grande Ronde Valley, Oregon. Early on August 12 Currey’s troopers surprised the
Indian leader, called Dreamer, in his tipi, where they planned to hold him until dawn.
Eventually a melee ensued and Dreamer and three other Indians were killed by Currey’s
soldiers. 64 Despite the unfortunate outcome (the objective was to arrest the leaders, not
kill them), Colonel Justus Steinberger, the leader of the First Washington Infantry,
informed the District of Oregon commander, “the immediate punishment served, has, I
think, produced a salutary effect for their future good conduct. It convinces them of the
determination and ability of the Government to protect its citizens.” 65 The colonel’s
wishful thinking aside, depredations against whites not only continued, but worsened as
the war dragged on.
On the morning of May 4, 1863, the largest expedition organized in the District of
Oregon during the war left Fort Walla Wall, beginning a long, arduous, and, in many
ways, largely fruitless push into Idaho Territory. The force, led by Colonel Reuben
Maury, consisted of Companies A, D, and E, First Oregon Cavalry, and numbered over
200 troopers. Before the campaign ended months later, elements of the First Washington
Infantry joined the command in the field. The troopers’ primary goal was to prevent the
Shoshoni Indians from attacking the immigrants traveling the trails that led to Oregon
and Washington Territory, with a secondary goal of providing muscle for a treaty
commission then negotiating a new treaty with the powerful Nez Perce bands. The sheer
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size of the force attests to district commander General Alvord’s determination to ensure
the safety of the immigrants and his desire to easily crush any Native American
combatants it should encounter. 66
The campaign got off to a positive start when the Indian agents and governmental
negotiators attempting to open Nez Perce lands to miners successfully used elements of
the force to overawe some of the Nez Perce leaders. By using a show of force, at the
appropriate time, the government negotiators intimidated some of the Nez Perce leaders,
thereby reducing the lands held by the Nez Perces to a fraction of the size as determined
by the 1855 treaty. 67 This success, though important due to the presence of white miners
scouring the Nez Perce lands looking for gold, was not the primary objective, and thus,
on June 15 the combined force pressed further south. 68
In some important ways, the command’s role in the Nez Perce negotiations
proved to be a harbinger of things to come over the next several months. In fact, the
troopers encountered more tribesmen during their stay around the treaty party than they
did during the rest of the expedition combined. Just as they fortunately did not need to
resort to a use of arms against the Nez Perce, Colonel Maury’s troopers never fired a shot
at a “hostile” Indian until nearly the end of the campaign. Given that Maury instructed
his subordinates to arrest and hold tribal headmen, impress upon all the Native Americans
encountered of the importance of maintaining peace (conveyed in a lightly veiled threat
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of retribution), and “to attack in case of finding any considerable force of them
[Indians],” the general absence of contact with the Shoshonis is telling. The plain fact is
that after three months traversing the open prairies of Idaho Territory none of the
expedition could say they had encountered a hostile tribesman, or any Native Americans
for that fact. 69 This prevailing calm, although good for the immigrants traveling the
trails, did not sit well with some of the Oregonians.
In one dispatch to district headquarters, Colonel Maury’s assessment of the
continued inability to find any Native Americans interested in testing the mettle of his
force is laced with the tincture of regret. By late September, after months in the field, the
colonel predicted that he would not “succeed in finding any body of Indians of sufficient
force to warrant me in attacking them; and in the case of the small parties that I may be
able to capture, or that may come to my camp, I cannot possibly obtain such evidence as
would warrant me in hanging them.” 70 One of Maury’s most active subordinates, the
aforementioned Captain Currey, echoed his commander’s strange regret, when he
reported finally coming upon a Native American encampment. Currey’s force
surrounded the camp, preventing any escape, and prepared to attack. However, before
the soldiers initiated an attack, the band’s chief “caused all his men to stand in a
conspicuous place and show us that they were unarmed and did desire peace, by holding
up their hands. Although we had then trailed the party for four days, one day without
rations, I could not consent to fire upon an unarmed and supplicating foe.” His display of
humanity notwithstanding, the captain forced the band to provide his men with salmon,
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and took their chief captive upon his departure the following morning. 71 When the
expedition finally came to an end on October 26, only Lieutenant James Waymire could
report his troopers had actually fired upon (there seems to be significant doubt as to
whether the Indians fired back) any tribesmen –killing four before the rest fled. 72
The lack of confrontations could have been considered an example of a successful
campaign, whether or not the Oregonians were disappointed by the lack of military action
or not. However, as historian G. Tom Edwards pointed out, the reality was that the
Shoshonis who attacked immigrants and miners understood the soldiers’ tactics all too
well. As he noted, Department of the Pacific officials followed the prevailing logic when
conducting field operations, meaning that all field activity took place between late spring
and mid fall. The various tribes understood this, and those attacking immigrants and
miners melted into the wilderness, as far from the regions patrolled as possible, during
the hot months. Thus, Maury’s inability to find any of those perpetrating the attacks
throughout the region is understandable –at least in hindsight. 73
Despite what the men thought, the major 1863 expedition had been a qualified
success, aided and abetted by the Native American’s decision to avoid the military, if
possible, during the warm months. Knowing that the calm was temporary, General
Alvord, like his field officers, was not satisfied by the largely bloodless achievements of
the 1863 campaign. He spent the winter season planning for a decisive campaign for the
next spring. Unlike Colonel Maury’s disproportionately large, single campaign in 1863,
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Alvord planned to send two separate, yet sizeable, forces into the field in 1864. This time
the objective was not the immigrant trails running through Idaho Territory, but the
sparsely populated eastern portions of Oregon, from which rumors of gold strikes echoed,
promising a rush of whites into an area already noted for predatory tribesmen.
According to Alvord’s strategy, one contingent would leave Fort Dalles in northcentral Oregon (along the Columbia River) and press southward, while simultaneously
another force of cavalrymen would leave Fort Walla Walla in the southeastern corner of
what is now Washington state, moving southwestward. 74 There was something of a
pincer tactic to these joint operations, however, events prior to the traditional
campaigning season complicated things in February.
Even though campaigning in the cold, wet months of winter and early spring was
rare, regardless if one served in the Department of the Pacific or the Army of the
Potomac, circumstances sometimes dictated active operations during the most
inhospitable times. This was the case in February 1864, when civilians along the south
fork of the John Day River pleaded with Alvord for protection. In response, a small
contingent of cavalrymen, commanded by Lieutenant Waymire, left Fort Dalles to
establish a camp near Canyon City, Oregon. Just three weeks after arriving in the area
local citizens asked Waymire to help them recapture some 40 mules and horses stolen by
an Indian raiding party, and to punish the tribesmen. Waymire and 18 troopers joined
about 50 civilians in pursuit of the marauding Indians and stolen mules and horses.
Finally making contact with a Native American encampment on April 6, the combined
force was ambushed by a surprisingly large number of Indians, leading to the deaths of
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three soldiers, including a lieutenant. The number of tribesmen and their success in this
initial fire fight disheartened the civilians who fell back, which in turn forced the
remaining cavalrymen to retire as well. Given their enemy’s large force and the
unexpected casualties, the pursuit ended and the rattled group withdrew, eventually
returning to Canyon City. 75
This was not the auspicious beginning to the 1864 campaign that General Alvord
envisioned. Although Waymire’s small command was not intended to act as part of the
larger coordinated expeditions that served as the backbone of the 1864 strategy, Alvord
somewhat begrudgingly admitted, “He has converted his humble task into a regular
campaign into the Indian country, thus anticipating the operations which are confided to
Captains Drake and Currey.” 76 As Alvord explained in his report, Drake and Currey
represented the heart of the effort to defeat any predatory Native Americans, thereby
encouraging development of eastern Oregon, which included a number of mining
districts. Each officer was to lead two sixty-day circuits into eastern and south-eastern
Oregon. Alvord reminded Currey that “The mining camps already established on the
Owyhee should be protected, and it is desirable to assist the whites in traveling over that
whole region west and southwest of old Fort Boise.” 77 The Drake and Currey forays
represented both the modified approach to addressing the problems created by roving
bands of Indian raiders and also the antiquated view of how to deal with such dangers at
the same time.
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On April 28, 1864, just ten days after Lieutenant Waymire concluded his
unsuccessful pursuit of the Indian raiders, Captain Currey set off from Fort Walla Walla
to assume his part in the campaign to rid eastern Oregon of hostile Native Americans.
The captain’s initial force consisted of 91 Oregon troopers, accompanied by pack masters
and 104 pack mules and eight wagons full of supplies; before the campaign concluded
Captain Edward Barry and a contingent of 31 infantrymen from the First Washington
Infantry joined Currey’s force. 78

Rounding out Currey’s force were 10 members of the

Cayuse tribe, who were recruited by their war chief, Umahontilly, after “a war dance was
set on foot, and for hours the hideous yell and horrid pantomimoes [sic] peculiar to the
war dance of that race rendered my camp both a lively and appropriate scene.” 79 The
campaign, which lasted six months and resulted in Currey’s command crossing well over
a thousand miles of mountain ranges, high plains prairies, and alkali flats, covered the
full length of eastern Oregon and even extended into Nevada. 80
Currey’s objective was plain: to clear out all hostile Indians from eastern Oregon,
thereby making it more likely that if the rumors of gold discoveries proved true, they
would be exploited, and to keep records of the largely unknown lands he marched over.
Captain Currey went about his task with a ruthless determination that bordered on a
fanatical desire to rid the region of virtually all Indians, regardless of their culpability in
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attacks on whites. 81 Finally, after a slow start, on May 16 local citizens informed Currey
that about 150 Shoshoni Indians were fishing on the Owyhee River. The captain
cheerfully informed district headquarters of his plans: “I will move forward with the
cavalry in the morning, clear the river of any Indians who may be found on it . . . . I hope
to be able to bring my men under fire within five days of this.” 82 Unfortunately for
Currey, he missed the opportunity to disperse or kill the reported Indians. The command
finally came into contact with a small group of Indians, also engaged in fishing, on June
3, which upon “seeing us they attempted to escape –killed them and moved up the creek
in search for more, but only found one –killed him and returned to Camp Henderson.” 83
One of the truly humorous incidents that took place during Currey’s determined
expedition occurred on June 8. On that day a settler frantically informed the captain of
the close proximity of a band of mounted, armed Indians. This information led Currey to
order some of his weary men back into their saddles at sundown. “On arriving” where
the settler indicated, Currey “satisfied myself that it was my own Indian scouts who had
accompanied me,” and, the captain had to rather comically admit, “in fact, my night ride
was a forced march in pursuit of myself!”84
Up to this point Currey’s expedition proceeded independently of all other
commands besides the infantry which he amalgamated into his force. However, the
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spectre of Waymire’s earlier foray combined with frantic appeals for protection from
massed hostile Indians led Alvord to issue orders for the merger of Currey’s and Drake’s
commands near Harney Lake. Owing to the difficulty in trying to coordinate two forces
in the lightly inhabited expanse of eastern Oregon, Alvord’s orders, though issued in
early May, proved difficult to fulfill. When Currey’s command reached Harney Lake on
June 28 and did not find Drake’s troopers, the captain felt “somewhat disconcerted in not
finding Capt. Drake.” 85 The junction of the two forces occurred three days later.
Like Currey, Captain John Drake had orders to clear a different section of eastern
Oregon of marauding Indians, protect the miners and immigrants, and to take note of the
territory through which his command traveled. On April 20 Drake led Companies D and
G, First Oregon Cavalry south from Fort Dalles, taking up a more or less southerly line of
march. His command numbered 119 troopers along with roughly 40 civilian pack
masters. Like Currey, he, too, induced Indians, from the Warm Springs Reservation, to
join his force and act as scouts. 86 Drake’s first opportunity to clear out hostile Indians
occurred on May 17 when some of his scouts reported the nearness of an encampment of
nine lodges and approximately 30 Native Americans. Determined to strike, Drake
ordered 39 troopers, led by Lieutenant John McCall “to make a night march, surprise
their camp at daylight the following morning and attack at once without preliminaries.” 87
Lieutenant McCall divided his force, including some 20 Indian scouts, to attack
from three sides, but the coordination failed and the results paralleled those experienced
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by Lieutenant Waymire six weeks earlier. One element of the cavalry force struck the
camp before the other two were in place, thus enabling the warriors to fall back to a
strong position; “a complete fortification, strongly barricaded with large boulders, and
with the appearance of having been prepared for the purpose, probably at some time
past.” 88 The lack of coordination proved costly as the tribesmen unleashed a
concentrated volley into the one attacking force, killing Lieutenant Stephen Watson and
two troopers, while wounding five other troopers and the leader of the Indian scouts,
Stock Whitley. 89 McCall initiated a rapid retreat and sent out riders in search of Drake
and reinforcements, which arrived at 9:00 am, or roughly five hours after the attack.
Drake’s arrival ended any interest the Shoshonis had in continuing the fight.
Although the band fled upon Drake’s arrival and evaded all efforts to track them
down over the next two days, he could take some comfort in having captured their camp,
which was full of plundered goods and provisions. Before falling back to a hastily
created supply base along his line of march, Drake had all the captured goods of use
distributed among his men and Indian scouts and ordered the rest burned. 90 The loss of
three of his men and serious wounding of six others, including Stock Whitley, far
outweighed the meager rewards gleaned from the destruction of the camp and supplies.
Failing to catch the band of Shoshonis that inflicted such a sting on his command,
and with orders to press on to Harney Lake and meet Currey, Drake led his men
southward for two more weeks. Arriving at Harney Lake before Currey, Drake explored
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the region, both to chart the land and hopefully to flush hostile Shoshonis from their
hiding places, while he waited. In late June he sent riders out to find Currey, and as
noted the two commands finally merged on July 1.
Merging the two commands was, by no means, the best strategy to follow when
trying to chase off or exterminate the highly mobile Shoshonis, who broke into small
bands during the summer months. 91 In Captain Drake’s opinion, merging the two
commands was “the very worst thing that could have been done, binding the command
down in orders to a course of action that will prove futile to accomplish anything
whatever.” The initial orders, granting each command the autonomy to move
independently and range broadly appeared the far more logical, but, Drake lamented, “at
the eleventh hour an order is received that will destroy the effective strength of both. . . .
What a blunder!” 92
Time demonstrated the good captain’s wisdom when, while the commands were
united, little was accomplished, despite the strength and relative mobility of the force.
Given the size of the command, finding sufficient water and feed often proved difficult,
thus hindering their activities. In fact, it was two weeks before the joint force came into
contact with any predatory Shoshonis, and nothing came of that fire-fight because, as
Captain William Rinehart recalled, “It soon became apparent that whilst they were firing
over us we were under firing them, as our bullets could be seen striking the cliff twenty
feet below the hostiles.” 93 In the wake of several weeks of inconclusive scouting, Currey
ordered the commands split up, both operating from their supply bases, which were only
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a few miles apart at this point. The commands never reunited, and Currey left for his
supply base on August 2, while Drake remained in the Harney Lake area, sending out
patrols and short reconnaissance parties. Both commands marched for their respective
bases, either Fort Dalles or Walla Walla, in mid September and prepared to set up winter
quarters by October. Essentially, nothing had been accomplished by the combining of
the two forces, which led a bitter Captain Drake to comment: “Taking all things into
consideration Genl. Alvord could not have botched matters worse if he had aimed at it
direct.” 94
The 1864 campaign season was not exactly a failure, but it was not exactly a
success either. By ordering his main field commands to merge into a single large body,
Alvord caused them to be plagued with all the complications large numbers faced in that
inhospitable land, ultimately hamstringing the effort to find and destroy hostile Indians.
The fear that a massed uprising by several bands of Native Americans ignored their
tradition of breaking into small bands during the summer months, when sustaining a large
community would be difficult in the arid lands. Therefore, Alvord altered the initial
strategy based on a false understanding of the situation, forcing the two commands to
adjust their movements so they would meet, and then merge, eventually acting as one –
although only for a month –but by that time the damage had been done.
The reality was that the district commander fell victim to the tendency to apply
outdated strategies to changing circumstances. However, the initial activity, even the set
backs, and the continued presence of mounted troops in the field did limit, but not halt,
Indian depredations in eastern Oregon in 1864. Captain Currey demonstrated a better
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understanding of the situation than the new department commander when he requested
authority to keep his command in the field during the winter at Camp Alvord, situated in
the Shoshonis’ wintering grounds. 95 Department commander, Major General Irvin
McDowell, denied the request, missing an opportunity to defeat the much feared and
despised Shoshonis. What might have been accomplished is unknown as the 1865
strategy focused on defensive presence, in which the newly formed First Oregon Infantry
was parceled out to posts throughout the region, providing safe havens for travelers, but
conducting few sweeping expeditions.
In many ways the campaigns in the District of Oregon can be seen as a metaphor
for how officials dealt with the Native Americans throughout the expanse of the
Department of the Pacific during the Civil War. Confronted with a multiplicity of
responsibilities, enhanced by the growing number of immigrants traversing the district,
just as they were throughout the entire department, officials at both levels struggled to
come up with strategies to deal with the Indian threat while confronting other dangers.
Even more so than the years before the war, department commanders faced the dilemma
of how to marshal their troops for maximum effect. Of course, the policy followed
included distributing troops to posts throughout the department’s various districts, and
sending patrols from those posts on what essentially amounted to search and destroy
missions. Doing so proved far more difficult, administratively, because of the need to
protect the Far West from external threats as well as quell any internal unrest initiated by
pro Confederates.
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Despite these dangers, department officials allocated the bulk of their troops to
confront the dangers posed by warring Native Americans. The first departmental returns
after the creation of the District of Humbodlt show that 1,100 of the department’s 4,800
troops served in the Humboldt and Oregon districts, where the primary concern was
defeating the Native Americans. 96 That distribution is somewhat deceiving because it
includes the large contingent of California troops designated for service in the
Department of Arizona. More telling are the returns for 1863. At the end of June, 1,900
troops served in the same two districts, with more than 850 in the District of Utah as well.
Most of the troops in that district were assigned the task of protecting the immigrant trails
and the Overland Mail Route from raiding bands of Native Americans. Thus, the first
departmental returns for 1863 show over 2,700 troops stationed in regions almost
exclusively concerned with defeating the various Indian tribes, and that number is
derived from a total departmental strength of 3,637. By the end of the year there were
fewer troops stationed in those districts, but the roughly 1,800 men still represented a
significant percentage of the departmental strength of just over 4,000. Furthermore, these
numbers do not include those troops in the District of Southern California trying to put an
end to the fighting in the Owen’s River valley, which would add between 100 and 200
more troops to those whose primary task was confronting Native Americans. 97
The reality was that despite the increased need to jockey around a larger number
of troops over a more expansive territory, the Civil War did not drastically alter how the
United States military dealt with the indigenous population in the Far West. In many
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ways, the task of dealing with the Native Americans in the Department of the Pacific
during the Civil War, which was just one facet of the department’s complicated
responsibilities, can be seen as a transitional phase. Prior to the war, before additional
gold and land rushes swept the Pacific slope, there simply were too few whites competing
for Native American lands to warrant the allocation of troops at the Civil War and post
war levels. With the additional rush of people not only seeking better lives but also
trying to escape the fighting in embattled states, Department of the Pacific leaders and
men found themselves embroiled in more clashes than ever before, many taking place
simultaneously throughout the massive department.
Given the increased violence along the immigrant and mining frontiers,
Department of the Pacific leaders demonstrated a tenacious, often brutal, ability to quell
in some cases, and limit in others, the Indian attacks. When considering the confusion
that came with the recall of nearly all the Regulars to the eastern battlefields, and the
resulting chaos of replacing the professional soldiers with volunteers, men like Wright,
Alvord, McClaughlin, Carelton, and others performed the job of protecting the
immigrants sufficiently well so as not to let it retard the migration to the region. By
taking aggressive steps to avoid clashes and then crushing them as soon as possible if
they could not be averted, the Department of the Pacific provided material assistance to
the Union war effort by encouraging people to develop the Far West and all its natural
resources during the war –and for the future as well. This feat is especially impressive
considering the multiplicity of dangers beyond the often volatile relationships between
whites and Native Americans. Even if success in this part of the overall war effort did
not gain laurels for the officers and men of the Department of the Pacific, they could be
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justly proud of the contribution to the very complex responsibilities faced by the left arm
of the Union.
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CHAPTER
-7EORUM BELLUM SERVITIUM

At noon on July 28, 1865, the overburdened steam ship, Brother Jonathan,
prepared to make its usual voyage from San Francisco harbor to Puget Sound. The ship,
however, was so laden with goods and passengers that it could not pull itself out of the
mud into which the weight had pressed it. Finally, with the rising tide and the help of a
tug, the ship left the harbor at 4:00 pm. This was an inauspicious, even foreboding,
beginning to an ultimately tragic voyage. George Wright, his wife, and staff, were
among those aboard the ill-fated ship. After two days making very slow progress against
a storm generated strong head wind, the Brother Jonathan struck a reef off the California
coastal town of Crescent City. The ship slid beneath the sea in less than 45 minutes,
before most of the groggy and seasick passengers and crew could make it on deck, almost
all of whom were asleep when the ship struck the reef. Only one lifeboat, with 19 cold,
nearly naked souls aboard, made it through the churning sea in the pre-dawn darkness
and eventually reached shore. Six weeks after the tragedy George Wright’s badly
decomposed body washed ashore 150 miles from the site of the disaster. General Wright,
his wife, and his staff, were among the more than 200 passengers who perished in
California’s worst maritime disaster. 1
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Even though he had not commanded the Department of the Pacific for a year, in
many ways George Wright’s death signified the end of the department’s Civil War
service. After all, he led the department longer than the other three commanders
combined and therefore faced the majority of the department’s myriad of wartime
responsibilities – and deserved the greatest share of the credit for most of its successes.
Therefore, in a post war era in which so many books and articles were written (and
speeches given) about the war, his death greatly reduced the likelihood that the volunteers
who protected the Pacific Slope would ever receive fair recognition for their long,
complicated, and arduous service to the nation. As time passed, only a small handful of
volunteers stepped forward to inform the nation about the role they had played in winning
the war by protecting the Far West from a plethora of threats. Despite the general lack of
awareness about their service, the veterans, as one of them said years later, could take
comfort in “the proud consolation of saving this Western Empire of broad and prolific
acres and its mighty mountains, the source of the mineral wealth of our great American
republic.” 2 The old soldier was correct, when considering what was asked of the
Department of the Pacific in light of what they achieved during the war, there is no doubt
that with fewer than 20,000 troops the department had successfully protected the left arm
of the Republic.
From the outset of the war, the Department of the Pacific’s most important
responsibility was maintaining Union control over the Far West. Doing so meant more
than preventing the region from falling into Confederate hands. This multilayered task
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also meant preventing local secessionists from disrupting the region’s economic and
political routine, or letting the vast wealth be exploited to aid the Confederacy. The key
to thwarting any such designs was juggling the department’s strained resources to meet
one threat while not weakening another part of the command. This placing of troops in
the right place at the proper time to address its many simultaneous needs was the
fundamental challenge the Department of the Pacific faced throughout the war.
At its peak, the department’s present for duty strength never exceeded 5,500, and
that total was for June 30, 1865, two months after the bulk of the Confederate forces
surrendered. 3 The Department of the Pacific’s highest strength level occurred on
December 31, 1864, when the tallied fell just short of 4,300 troops.4 Although both totals
are larger than the pre war allotment, these were paltry numbers of troops, given the
increased responsibilities during the Civil War. 5 Never-the-less, deft handling of the
department’s manpower resources enabled the succession of commanders to meet the
government’s primary goal of maintaining control of the region without outside
assistance.
In late 1861, while the Union government reeled from serious defeats in Virginia
and Missouri, the Department of the Pacific’s preparedness was put to the test. As
Confederate troops took control of New Mexico Territory, gobbling up Union-held forts,
the department scrambled to meet the oncoming storm. Although a combination of
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Regulars and Colorado and New Mexico volunteers halted the Confederate advance in
early 1862, Department of Pacific forces chased off the remaining bands of Confederates
and pressed on so aggressively that they eventually advanced into western Texas. In the
process they fought (and lost) the western most “battle” of the war, roughly 70 miles
from the California border. The presence of California troops in New Mexico Territory
(encompassing the present states of New Mexico and Arizona), and Texas, and stationed
on the New Mexico Territory – California border ensured that there would not be any
serious Confederate threat coming from the east during the rest of the war. Thus, even
though department troops did not halt the main body of Confederates, during the ill-fated
drive toward California, their presence in the scorching southwestern deserts ended
Confederate hopes attempting a later of invasion of California.
The permanent Confederate retreat made another of the department’s
responsibilities easier. Not only had the Department of the Pacific thwarted all efforts
and plans to either take the Pacific slope out of the Union or to exploit its wealth for the
Confederate cause, it was also charged with defusing potentially dangerous schemes by
secessionist, and impeding the flight of those Confederate sympathizers trying to reach
the main theatre of war. By keeping Confederate forces at bay far to the east in Texas,
the western volunteers made it more difficult for far western secessionists to join the
southern armies. Of course their patrolling in some of the most inhospitable places in the
country, combined with well-manned Fort Yuma, left most regional secessionists unable
to leave the department boundaries. Certainly, some determined southern sympathizers
did get through, but overall the effective distribution of troops resulted in few
secessionists leaving the Far West, as well as netting a number of notable captives.
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Perhaps the most notorious of those captured was former state assemblyman
Daniel Showalter and his party of 18 would-be Confederates, which one Union officer
described as “a desperate set of men.” 6 The Showalter party planned to edge past Fort
Yuma on the Gila/Colorado rivers and then set out across the Arizona desert on its way to
Texas. Instead of joining the Confederate forces in 1861, the various members of the
party spent less than six months incarcerated at Fort Yuma before being released in early
1862. 7 Quite a few secessionists found themselves prisoners at the fort, where escape
was all but impossible and where it was unlikely there would be any meddling from
civilian authorities concerned about rights violations. After the first few, chaotic, months
of the war, escaping the Department of the Pacific’s grasp proved too challenging for
most southern sympathizers and the frequency of such desperate endeavors dropped off.
Just how much assistance a stream of western secessionists might have provided
the perpetually under-manned Confederate armies is unclear. However, a number of
southern schemers believed there was a large source of potential Confederates in
California alone. 8 Ultimately, the Department of the Pacific’s ability to first thwart and
then discourage western secessionists from trying to flee to the South meant whatever
manpower pool might exist in that part of the Far West would not join the Confederate
armies.
Just as important as keeping Confederate forces from invading the department or
large numbers of secessionists from fleeing was protecting the region from internal
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unrest. Success in this regard seemed somewhat in doubt at the outset of the war,
however, by war’s end the department could boast that not one plot to wrestle the Far
West from Union control had succeeded. This, in turn, meant that the incredibly
important gold shipments and regional harbors remained safe throughout the war.
By concentrating forces at danger spots, such as Los Angeles, San Bernardino,
and Visalia in southern California, and southwest Oregon, department commanders
demonstrated the importance of a strong working relationships between the military,
naval commanders, and civilians. The best example of this successful cooperation
occurred during the 1863 capture of the Chapman in San Francisco harbor. It was a joint
effort between the civilian, naval, and military authorities that foiled the attempt to
capture the Chapman (for the purpose of raiding the gold shipments). Such incidents as
the attempt to seize the Chapman, as well as the stagecoach robbery near Placerville,
California in June 1864 were, however, were the exception and not the rule when it came
to how the department dealt with the secessionists.
Throughout the war, the timely arrival of Union forces at the troubled spots kept
the Confederate sympathizing element in check. For making that possible, the
department deserves a great deal of credit for employing a network of spies that put the
generally inept Pinkerton agents used in the East to shame. Remaining well informed
about the attitudes of the local populace throughout the department led officials to
remove warehouses of arms and munitions from endangered places, as they did in Carson
City, Nevada, thereby further discouraging any secessionist plots. The general lack of
anything more than occasional displays of either the Confederate battle flag or the Bear
flag, attest to the department’s success in protecting the Far West from internal threats.
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Had the Department of the Pacific failed in this endeavor, it is still unlikely the
secessionist element could have seized control of the entire region. However, had any
such effort succeeded, particularly in the war’s early days, a situation akin to that which
existed in Kansas might have erupted in the Far West, requiring Union troops be sent to
the region to reestablish federal control.
Protecting the northern and southern borders, at a time when uneasy relations
existed between the United States and both Mexico and Great Britain, also required
cooperation between civilian and military leaders. Had it not been for that cooperation
there was a distinct danger north of the border and a threat from Mexican republicans and
French imperialists both below and within the department’s borders. In its effort to
protect the Far West from any dangers emanating from the British Columbia or
Vancouver Island colonies, whether that danger originated from British military forces or
secessionists then in either colony, the department received invaluable aid from the
American consul in Victoria, British Columbia, Allan Francis. Through Francis’ use of
informers and spies, he enabled the department commanders to remain abreast of all pro
Confederacy plots developed on Vancouver Island during the war and discourage those
efforts through diplomatic means as well as the timely (if brief) display of the American
naval presence.
Although the British officials in western Canada could not act without permission
from London, it is important to remember that relations between the United States and
Great Britain were strained, particularly in the wake of the seizure of Confederate agents
from the British ship Trent in November 1861. Furthermore, the royal governor in
Victoria went so far as to suggest to his superiors that the best defense against anticipated
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American aggression in the region was to invade first. 9 In this atmosphere, it was the
good communication between the American consul and the British officials as well as the
calm and restraint shown by Department of the Pacific commanders, who knew there was
a vocal secessionist segment within the Canadian population, that prevented an eruption
along the northern border.
By working together, department commanders sifted the information passed onto
them by consul Francis, then put their troops on the alert, and, when necessary, called up
on the Pacific Squadron for naval assistance. The hard-pressed navy did the best it could
with even more limited resources than its land-locked counterpart. When department
leaders sought to enhance American visibility in Puget Sound, the navy could only send
an additional ship –and only for a limited time. Those actions, however, combined with
the presence of a number of military forts and camps along Puget Sound or along the
interior border sufficed to protect the northern border.
The Department of the Pacific faced an entirely different situation along the
Mexican border, where the chaos that reigned within that nation’s borders was the greater
danger than any designs the Mexican government might have on trying to recapture its
lost lands. The absence of any such idea did not eliminate the threat to regional stability.
The problem confronting the department, regarding relations along its southern border,
was far more dangerous and challenging than it was along the northern border.
Again, department leaders showed tremendous restraint, both personal and
professional, in their handling of the volatile situation that churned out of Mexico almost
from the outset of the Civil War. By 1863, with the duly elected Mexican government on
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the run, and officially deposed by the French imperial puppet regime of Maximilian, the
state of California became the scene of a cold war. San Francisco, in fact, was the
epicenter of an espionage war carried out between agents of the Juarez regime and French
operatives. With troops in place along the department’s southern border, sent there
initially to protect against a Confederate invasion as well as to capture secessionists
trying to escape to the South, department officials had to navigate the difficult path
between their own personal support for the Mexican republicans, which mirrored the
general populace’s support for the Juarez government, and national policy. Had any of
the department commanders, or their subordinates, failed to maintain that very precarious
position, it is likely that the United States would have been pulled into the destructive
vortex in Mexico.
Despite their own feelings, which the Union commander, U.S. Grant, shared, and
the general public’s support for the Mexican republicans, national policy required strict
neutrality. This position favored the French puppet regime, whose agents used the
American policy to force department officials into blocking both the removal of weapons
to Mexico and the departure of American Juarez supporters. Although strict neutrality
meant having no choice but to confiscate weapons caches and turning back Juarez
reinforcements none of the department leaders carried out those orders with any alacrity.
Wright and McDowell, especially, did little to disrupt Mexican efforts to acquire arms
and men, unless cornered into action by the French consul, who used agents and bribed
American officials to unearth shipments and recruitment efforts.
The French succeeded in manipulating department officials into acting on
Maximilian’s behalf, which meant they followed the neutrality as required. However, so
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many officers turned a blind eye or moved so ponderously when ordered to confiscate
arms shipments or apprehend Americans heading to Mexico (ostensibly part of a
fictitious prospecting endeavor named the Arizona Exploring Expedition), that
enforcement was often ineffective. In essence, Department of the Pacific officials found
a way to keep the Far West from being drawn into the civil/imperial war going on south
of the border, while at the same time not completely abandoning their personal
sympathies for their sister republic.
While many officers and troops sympathized with the elected Mexican
government, and thereby courted danger by letting their personal sympathies seep into
their (in)actions, they showed virtually no sympathy when dealing with the region’s
Native American tribes. Erratic relations between the growing, and spreading, white
population and the regional tribes plagued western military leaders long before the
Americans arrived, and it continued well after the Civil War. Dealing with the Indian
“question” for some or “problem” to others proved more challenging during the war
years. Fortunately for emigrants traversing the various trails leading to the Far West, and
miners, and farmers already there, the department’s first leaders were experienced,
sometimes ruthless, when dealing with the far western tribes. Given this level of
command experience, it was not surprising that the Department of Pacific compiled a
string of victories over the tribesmen, some by military force and some through
negotiation.
With the exception of putting far more troops in the field to confront the warring
tribes, little changed about the nature of the military relations between the department and
the various tribes. In a sense, this was beneficial because long-serving commander,
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George Wright, successfully, and brutally, dealt with various Pacific Northwest tribes
during the 1850s. Prior to Wright’s assumption of command, Albert Sidney Johnston and
then Edwin Sumner endured months of trying to calm politicians and citizens throughout
the region. Each local official demanded something be done to prevent Indian
depredations, acting as if theirs was the only part of the department in jeopardy, and of
course, never admitting the role played by white antagonism in the increasingly violent
atmosphere.
Although Johnston was an experienced Indian fighter, and solid soldier, and
Sumner a hard fighter in his own right, nervous far westerners benefited greatly when
Wright assumed command of the department in September 1861. Under Wright a new
military district was created along California’s north-west border specifically to deal with
the increasing problems between Native Americans and the expanding numbers of white
farmers. The influx of farmers into the Humboldt district, as it was termed, began before
the start of the Civil War, but during the war years the friction caused by the competition
for land led to increasing violence. Therefore, in an effort to make the region safe for
development by whites, General Wright not only created the new military district, he also
committed a large number of troops to the task.
This scenario repeated itself in California’s southeastern corner, in the Owen’s
River valley. There, too, reinforced forts and numerous mounted expeditions helped to
quell the uprisings. After two concerted campaigns in 1862 and 1863, violence in the
valley came to an end once the surviving tribesmen were removed from their homelands.
The military performed the task of subjugating the local Native Americans with a bloody
precision that, on a small scale, at least matched the work other soldiers did in the
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Humboldt district. 10 After years of fighting and many deaths, department troops had
forced the tribes to give up their lands, thus enabling white farmers to exploit the rich
lands, just as Wright intended and the citizens wanted.
The Department of the Pacific faced a different challenge when trying to protect
the emigrants streaming into its expansive borders. With more troops available than
before the war, one would think protecting the emigrant trains would have been easier –
although not easy. However, the influx of people increased well beyond the proportional
expansion of the department’s manpower levels. The key was to prevent another Van
Orman catastrophe, where all but 15 members of a wagon train were killed by roving
Mountain Bannocks near Salmon Falls (present-day Idaho) in September 1860. 11
Department officials did their best not only by strengthening those posts along the
trails, but by creating new forts and camps. The establishment of such forts as Boise and
to a lesser degree Lapwai, put troops nearer the endangered network of trails, and thus
provided emigrants with additional protection. Doing so, combined with aggressive
patrolling, particularly in Oregon and Idaho Territory, paid off. Although small bands of
Bannock Indians did attack small trains or other isolated groups during the war, the
likelihood of an attack diminished from pre-war levels. That success encouraged more
emigrants to head westward, looking for opportunities, and in the process they developed
the region, just as politicians, and many military men, wanted. Those patrols across the
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dusty high plains deserts and over mountain ranges might have been forgotten, but they
played an integral part in the development of the West during the Civil War years.
The department’s efforts battling tribes, whether the various Bannock Indians
along the northern emigrant trails, or the tribes in the Owen’s River Valley and those in
the Humboldt district, did help open the Far West to white development. However,
Indian wars were costly, both in lives lost and in time consumed before it was safe
enough that emigranting farmers were willing to risk their lives establishing farmsteads.
Fortunately, George Wright was well acquainted with the most powerful tribe within the
department’s borders, the Nez Perce, who controlled vast lands in what is now Oregon
and Idaho. The Nez Perce’s legendary tolerance was put to the test when gold was
discovered on those lands. That the various bands did not wipe out the miners is a
testament both to their incredible patience and the effective negotiating skills of
department officers like Brigadier General Benjamin Alvord, who commanded the
District of Oregon. Even Alvord, who spent many years in the Pacific Northwest, could
not believe the reserve shown by the Nez Perce. He told Oregon senator, James Nesmith
“It is a miracle considering the mass of people upon their reservation that last year or
two, that last month the first alleged murders by Indians occurred.” 12 In early 1863, with
more and more whites scrambling over lands guaranteed the Nez Perce by an 1855 treaty,
Wright and Alvord knew something must be done to avoid a confrontation –one that
might last a long time. 13 Fortunately for the miners, and the increasing number of

12

Alvord to Nesmith, November 25, 1862, cited in Alvin M. Josephy, The Nez Perce Indians and
the Opening of the Northwest, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 413.
13

It is important to note that the situation in 1863 favored the Nez Perce more so than it did in
1877 when war with the tribe finally did break out. By then the white population was larger, the military
had fewer responsibilities, and the government was able to put more energy into the development of the

253

farmers that were also heading into the Nez Perces’ fertile Wallowa Valley, negotiations
proved successful, although not conclusive, and a war with the most powerful tribe on the
West Coast was avoided – or at least postponed for 14 years. 14
The Department of the Pacific, with more men than the military had at its disposal
prior to the war, opened vast lands for white exploitation, both for farmers and miners,
and it protected the immigrants traveling to those lands, as best as possible. Just as was
the case with all of its other responsibilities, the department’s success in opening far
western lands materially aided the development not only of the West, but the economic
growth of the nation. The process of opening Native American lands, however, had not
been easy and the eruption of conflicts meant the overall objective of maintaining peace
in the region periodically failed. However, quelling the unrest never required the
assistance of outside forces, soldiers desperately needed for carrying out the war in the
East. Compared to departmental efforts to protect the region from external Confederate
forces and internal secessionists, while guarding the borders, dealings with the various
tribes throughout the vast Department of the Pacific was far more problematic, yet the
outcome was just as successful.
Throughout the war, the Department of the Pacific successfully met a myriad of
challenges, and in the process protected the Far West from both internal and external
threats, organized by foreign and domestic forces. While the war created many new
responsibilities for the most remote military department, it also simultaneously made the

West (instead of fighting the Civil War). Had department officials been unsuccessful, the results would
have been much bloodier than they were 14 years later, went the deck was stacked against the Nez Perce.
14

Ibid, 415-429 the 1863 treaty, with all of its intrigue, political gamesmanship, and weakness, is
treated in depth in this section of Josephy’s excellent study.
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traditional tasks even more complicated than prior years. By preventing the region from
falling under Confederate, or regional secessionist control, protecting both the northern
and southern borders from foreign intrusion, while using force to control the Native
American population –without drawing troops from the main theatres of war – the
Department of the Pacific played an important, and generally overlooked, role in the
Union victory. Its success meant raw material (primarily ore) continued to flow from the
Far West, boosting the Union economy, while wagons streamed into the department’s
vast lands.
Ultimately, the war was about establishing a new version of the Union, which not
only meant a South without slavery, but also an increasingly important West. Through
their sacrifices, deaths, and arduous service, Department of the Pacific veterans could
rightly claim to have done their share by protecting the left arm of the republic. Major
DeWitt Thompson, who led one of the two groups of Californians that fought in the East,
extolled the virtue of those volunteers who remained on the Pacific Slope when he said,
“They guarded the country from British Columbia to Mexico, from the shores of the
Pacific to the Rocky Mountains –an empire in extent. They fought the stalwart
aborigines in the north and the treacherous Apaches of the south.” 15 Although they knew
their service was in the shadow of the great and bloody struggle in the East, they spoke
about their achievements with a certain laconic pride, believing what few others cared to
acknowledge. As one veteran wrote on the last page of his diary, “By losing their lives
[they] gave freedom to thousands of travelers who seek new homes amid the western

15
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wilderness.” 16 Without any fanfare, and since largely forgotten, the Department of the
Pacific guarded the Far West for the Union, secured its borders, and defeated the various
tribes who chose to defend their lands, and in so doing they contributed to the Union
cause and laid the groundwork for the rapid development of the Far West.

16
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Original Map in Lloyd Wayne Herbener, “The Military Establishment in Southern
California During the Civil War,” (Mater’s thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1952),
Table 1, plate 1.
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Original map in Aurora Hunt, Army of the Pacific (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, Co. ,
1950), front inset. The departmental boundaries, as determined by Lloyd Wayne
Herbener, have been added. Herbener, plate 4.
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Original map in Aurora Hunt, Army of the Pacific (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark, Co. ,
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Original map in Lloyd Wayne Herbener, “The Military Establishment in Southern
California,” (Master’s thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1952), plate 7.
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